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Abstract 
With wireless vehicular communications, Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) 
enable numerous applications to enhance traffic safety, traffic efficiency, and driving 
experience. However, VANETs also impose severe security and privacy challenges 
which need to be thoroughly investigated. In this dissertation, we enhance the security, 
privacy, and applications of VANETs, by 1) designing application-driven security and 
privacy solutions for VANETs, and 2) designing appealing VANET applications with 
proper security and privacy assurance.  
First, the security and privacy challenges of VANETs with most application 
significance are identified and thoroughly investigated. With both theoretical novelty and 
realistic considerations, these security and privacy schemes are especially appealing to 
VANETs. Specifically, multi-hop communications in VANETs suffer from packet 
dropping, packet tampering, and communication failures which have not been 
satisfyingly tackled in literature. Thus, a lightweight reliable and faithful data packet 
relaying framework (LEAPER) is proposed to ensure reliable and trustworthy multi-hop 
communications by enhancing the cooperation of neighboring nodes. Message 
verification, including both content and signature verification, generally is computation-
extensive and incurs severe scalability issues to each node. The resource-aware message 
verification (RAMV) scheme is proposed to ensure resource-aware, secure, and 
application-friendly message verification in VANETs.  
On the other hand, to make VANETs acceptable to the privacy-sensitive users, the 
identity and location privacy of each node should be properly protected. To this end, a 
joint privacy and reputation assurance (JPRA) scheme is proposed to synergistically 
support privacy protection and reputation management by reconciling their inherent 
conflicting requirements. Besides, the privacy implications of short-time certificates are 
thoroughly investigated in a short-time certificates-based privacy protection (STCP2) 
scheme, to make privacy protection in VANETs feasible with short-time certificates.  
Secondly, three novel solutions, namely VANET-based ambient ad dissemination 
(VAAD), general-purpose automatic survey (GPAS), and VehicleView, are proposed to 
support the appealing value-added applications based on VANETs. These solutions all 
16 
 
follow practical application models, and an incentive-centered architecture is proposed 
for each solution to balance the conflicting requirements of the involved entities. Besides, 
the critical security and privacy challenges of these applications are investigated and 
addressed with novel solutions. Thus, with proper security and privacy assurance, these 
solutions show great application significance and economic potentials to VANETs.  
Thus, by enhancing the security, privacy, and applications of VANETs, this 
dissertation fills the gap between the existing theoretic research and the realistic 
implementation of VANETs, facilitating the realistic deployment of VANETs.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the background and the state-of-the-art of VANET-related 
research, based on which the research motivations and major contributions of this 
dissertation are presented.  
1.1 VANETs 
Transportation has huge impacts on the economic and human assets in modern 
societies. For instance, in the USA, in 2009 alone traffic accidents resulted in totally 
30,797 deaths [1], and traffic congestion caused an economic cost of about $115 billion 
[2]. Thus, it is meaningful to enhance transportation safety and efficiency. One especially 
promising approach to this end is to integrate transportation systems with information 
technology in intelligent transportation systems (ITS) [3], where vehicular ad hoc 
networks (VANETs) have been envisioned as an indispensible component.  
VANETs are special mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) formed by smart vehicles. It 
is envisioned that in the future vehicles will become smart, in the sense that each vehicle 
will be equipped with information processing devices (on-board CPU), information 
collection devices (on-board sensors), on-board display devices as well as wireless 
communication devices [4]. Based on the nature of involved communications, VANETs 
generally consist of two domains [5]-[7] as shown in Figure 1.1: an ad hoc domain and 
an infrastructure domain. 
The ad hoc domain is formed by smart vehicles which wirelessly communicate with 
one another (V2V) via dedicated short range communication (DSRC) [8] and wireless 
access in vehicular environments (WAVE) [9] technologies. Each vehicle (also called 
vehicular node, or simply node) will periodically (with a period between 100ms and 
500ms) broadcast beacons containing its driving state, such as its current location, speed, 
and heading direction, to support road safety applications [10]. To provide security, each 
node will carry one or more certificates issued by a certificate authority (CA) in VANETs. 
A Tamper-proof device (TPD) [11] exists in each node to keep its cryptographic elements, 
for example private keys, secure and confidential.  
18 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Exemplary VANET architecture 
The infrastructure domain contains the managerial entities in charge of certification, 
registration, ID management, registration, and so on. Here, for brevity, all these entities 
are abstracted as the VANET Authority. The infrastructure domain also includes service 
providers for various applications, such as traffic management, traffic analysis, and 
location-based services (LBS) which are not shown in Figure 1.1 for brevity. Roadside 
units (RSUs) are deployed along road sides as vehicular nodes’ access points to the 
infrastructure domain. Due to cost considerations, RSUs may be only sparsely deployed 
in VANETs, usually in road intersections or important downtown areas. Vehicle-to-
roadside (V2R) communications are also based on DSRC [8] and WAVE [9]. The 
communications between RSUs and the infrastructure domain and within the 
infrastructure domain may adopt the existing mature communication technologies, such 
as WiMax, 3G, 4G, ATM and so on, which are out of the context of this dissertation.  
With V2V and V2R communications, VANETs can greatly enhance traffic safety with 
applications such as collision avoidance, lane merge assistance, and so on  [10]. Besides, 
VANETs provide an efficient approach to collect real-time traffic data from individual 
nodes [12], based on which traffic analysis and management can be further optimized. 
For instance, autonomous traffic control [13], [14] based on the real-time traffic data can 
be readily supported by V2R communications in VANETs. Eventually, VANETs provide 
a handy platform for information sharing among vehicles, based on which driving 
experience can be enhanced with applications such as ad dissemination [15], Internet on-
the-wheel, on-road video game playing [16], and so on. Thus, VANETs open the door to 
numerous promising applications.  
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Due to VANET’s application potentials, the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) specifically allocated 5,850 MHz to 5,925 MHz radio band to DSRC 
communications [17] in the USA, and in Europe the 5,725 MHz to 5,875 MHz Industrial, 
Scientific and Medical (ISM) band is allocated for DSRC communications [8]. Recently, 
US Department of Transportation (DoT), with various state DoTs, has been researching 
the technical and policy issues of VANETs in Vehicle-Infrastructure Integration (VII) [18] 
and later IntelliDrive [19]. The European Union also funds many research projects for 
VANETs, such as Secure Vehicular Communication (SeVeCom) [20], Cooperative 
Vehicle Infrastructure System (CVIS) [21], Adaptive Integrated Driver-vehicle InterfacE 
(AIDE) [22], E-safety Vehicle Intrusion Protected Applications (EVITA) [23], and Co-
operative systems for intelligent road safety (COOPERs) [24], to name only a few. 
Among them, SeVeCom [20] aims to derive a threat model and a security architecture for 
VANETs; CVIS [21] aims to propose a universal communication module for VANETs 
based on Continuous Air Interface for Long and Medium Interface (CALM) [25], and 
propose realistic traffic safety applications. Japanese research mainly is focused on V2R 
communications [26]. Due to the relatively smaller area of European countries and Japan, 
their projects generally assume that V2R communications are pervasive in VANETs. 
However, in the USA RSUs may only be available in hot spots, such as downtown areas. 
Thus, the research projects in the USA generally are focused on V2V communications 
and only assume sparse V2R communications.  
Recently, there is a trend of integrating various communication technologies in 
VANETs, as envisioned by CALM [25] and heterogeneous vehicular communications 
[27]. However, DSRC [8] and WAVE [9] are still commonly assumed to be the 
dominating technologies for V2V and V2R communications in VANETs. Thus, this 
dissertation only considers DSRC [8] and WAVE [9] in VANET communications.       
1.2 Security and Privacy in VANETs 
As distributed systems, VANETs also impose severe security and privacy challenges. 
Specifically, to fully realize the application potentials of VANETs, especially those of the 
traffic safety applications, security provisioning is necessary to ensure the proper 
functioning of VANETs. Otherwise, VANETs might become a handy tool to harm traffic 
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safety and traffic management [28]. For instance, by broadcasting false warnings about 
its emergent braking, one misbehaving vehicle may cause the vehicles behind itself to 
collide. Besides, the unique characteristics of VANETs, such as infrequent access to 
infrastructure, high node mobility, and precious assets at risk, to name only a few, make 
security provisioning more challenging than that of the general ad hoc networks [5].  
Currently, many security schemes have been proposed for VANETs, among which the 
representative ones have been reviewed in our book chapter [5], as well as several 
existing surveys [4], [6], [7], [29]-[39]. Here, the existing security schemes are 
categorized and summarized according to their design goals. Detailed reviews on each 
individual scheme will be given later in the context of our proposed schemes.   
Identity Management: In VANETs, to ensure message integrity, message authenticity, 
node authentication and node non-repudiation, identity management schemes are 
necessary to securely represent the identities of both vehicular nodes and RSUs. Briefly 
speaking, to prove its identity and its eligibility of participating in VANET 
communications, an entity needs a certificate issued by the VANET Authority. Besides 
the common public key cryptography techniques, several special digital signature 
techniques, such as group signature [40], ring signature [41], and identity-based signature 
[42], [43], can also be adopted in VANETs for identity management. For instance, [44] 
proposes an identity management framework for VANETs based on group signature. Still, 
many existing schemes [45]-[56] adopt a PKI-like approach to manage certificates, with 
various techniques to adapt to the unique characteristics of VANETs. In these schemes, 
certificate revocation list (CRL) distribution is necessary to evict the misbehaving nodes 
due to the relatively long lifetime of each certificate, which may incur heavy 
communication overhead. Thus, free of CRL distribution, short-time certificate schemes 
[57]-[60] are gaining popularity in VANETs. To ensure privacy-preserving node 
authentication, several anonymous authentication protocols [61], [62] have been 
proposed for VANETs. To detect the nodes which assume the identity of other nodes by 
launching the Sybil attack, several existing schemes [63], [64], [65] can be adopted.  
Message Verification: To ensure message integrity and authenticity in VANETs, each 
node needs to verify the content [66]-[69] and digital signature of each received message. 
However, due to the numerous messages each node can receive, message verification 
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must be efficient and scalable. Among existing schemes, several schemes [45], [70], [71] 
attempt to reduce the resource required for verifying each message, while others [72]-[74] 
attempt to reduce the number of messages to be verified by each vehicle. So far, these 
schemes fail to ensure efficiency, security, and application-friendliness at the same time.  
Cooperation Enhancement and Misbehavior Detection: In VANETs, it is necessary 
to detect the misbehaviors of any node to ensure reliable traffic safety applications and 
robust communications. Thus, several existing schemes [66]-[68], [75], [76] verify the 
content, for instance the location information, broadcasted by vehicular nodes; [77]-[81] 
rely on the watchdog mechanism to detect the routing and packet relaying behaviors in ad 
hoc networks, which may be adopted in VANETs. Besides, various incentives are 
adopted to encourage the cooperation of nodes in VANETs or general ad hoc networks, 
such as credit [82]-[84] and reputation [80], [85]-[88]. Several schemes [89]-[91] have 
been proposed to evict the misbehaving nodes from VANETs, usually with the 
cooperation of neighbors. So far, these schemes still fail to ensure reliable and faithful 
multi-hop communication in VANETs: watchdog-based schemes [77]-[81] generally 
perform badly in face of communication issues, while reputation or credit-based schemes 
[80], [85]-[88] cannot react fast enough to prevent the dissemination of invalid messages 
in VAENTs. Thus, a comprehensive solution to ensure reliable and faithful multi-hop 
communications is still needed to support various VANET applications.   
Trust & Reputation: In VANETs and general networks, trust and reputation are a 
powerful tool to encourage node cooperation and punish node misbehaviors [92]. 
Currently, various trust model and metrics based on information theory [93]-[95], 
Bayesian theory [96]-[98], graph theory [99]-[101] and abstract algebra [102] have been 
proposed for general ad hoc networks and VANETs. The representative reputation 
schemes have been reviewed in [103], and in [104] the optimization of parameters in trust 
evaluation is discussed. Several trust schemes [105]-[107] for VANETs evaluate not only 
the cooperation of nodes but also the trustworthiness of the data itself, due to the 
importance of authentic data to VANETs.  
In this direction, one remaining issue is to efficiently and reliably maintain the 
reputation history of vehicular nodes in the face of high node mobility and, potentially, 
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frequent pseudonym changes for privacy protection as discussed next. So far, only [108] 
begins to address this issue, with many issues still open.     
Privacy Protection: The pervasive wireless vehicular communications and periodic 
beacons impose severe privacy issues [109]. By overhearing VANET communications, 
one powerful adversary may figure out the real identities of its interested nodes and 
profile them in terms of application accessing and personal information. Thus, several 
schemes [61], [62], [110] have been proposed to enable privacy-preserving node 
authentication in VANETs. Still, by overhearing the periodic beacons one adversary may 
collect the location history of any node. Thus, to protect the identity privacy of each node, 
each node may use pseudonyms instead of its real identity in VANET communications, 
as in [111]-[115]. Here, a pseudonym of one node is a temporary identifier without any 
obvious connection to its real identity, and a pseudonym usually consists of a certificate, 
a MAC address and an IP address. However, by collecting personal information and 
movement trajectory related to one pseudonym, an adversary may still derive the real 
identity of one node. Thus, frequent pseudonym change has been adopted in many 
schemes [116]-[127] to protect the location privacy of vehicular nodes and reduce the 
personal information revealed by any pseudonym. Briefly speaking, the major differences 
among these schemes [116]-[127] lie in the strategies of pseudonym changing. Especially, 
several schemes [128], [129] adopt the concept of mix [130], [131], so that vehicular 
nodes will change their pseudonyms to form mix zones for VANETs.  
Besides pseudonym change, several special approaches for privacy protection exist in 
VANETs. For instance, [132] proposes that in contention-based forwarding each node 
should contend with a dummy distance to the destination, instead of its true locations, to 
protect location privacy. However, [132] ignores the periodic beacons in VANETs which 
will reveal the true location of each node anyway. [133] proposes that each node only 
sends out a fuzzy location in its beacons to protect its privacy, which may not be practical 
due to the safety risks. [134] proposes a pseudonym-less beaconing scheme for VANETs, 
based on secret keys shared by node groups. However, this scheme ignores the fact that 
the IP and MAC addresses of each node also form the pseudonym for this node.  
Overall, the privacy protection for VANETs has been extensively studied. However, it 
is still necessary to investigate the interactions between privacy protection and other 
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security schemes, for instance reputation management. The conflicting requirements 
imposed by such schemes may make it challenging, if not impossible, for such schemes 
to coexist in VANETs. Besides, the existing privacy protection schemes mostly assume 
that each node has multiple pseudonyms at any time and can change them at will. 
However, privacy protection with other assumptions is still meaningful, since short-time 
certificates may still be implemented in VANETs in the future. Thus, it is meaningful to 
investigate privacy protection with short-time certificates.   
General Security Topics: Besides the topics discussed above, several general security 
topics are still meaningful. For instance, [135] investigates the impact of VANET 
security on traffic safety, and [136] investigates geocast in VANETs and proposes a 
secure geocast protocol. [137] evaluates the performance of a basic VANET model 
implementing representative security schemes to identify new design issues for VANETs.  
In summary, from the above reviews and discussions, several major open research 
issues for VANETs can be identified: reliable and trustworthy multi-hop communication, 
resource-aware and application-friendly message verification, as well as synergistic 
coexistence of multiple security schemes in VANETs. These open issues need to be 
investigated and properly solved to enable the imminent implementation of VAENTs, so 
they are the major concerns of this dissertation. Besides, existing security schemes and 
privacy protection schemes generally lack careful considerations of the realistic 
constraints imposed by VANETs. Thus, in this dissertation, special care will be taken to 
make our proposed schemes readily applicable to the realistic VANETs.    
1.3 Envisioned Applications for VANETs 
To exploit the pervasive vehicular communications, numerous applications have been 
proposed or envisioned for VANETs, including traffic safety applications, traffic 
management applications and value-added (commercial) applications.  
Traffic safety applications are the primary justification for VANETs. Many traffic 
safety applications such as collision avoidance, lane change assistance, traffic light 
violation warning, and so on [10] have been proposed for VANETs. To support such 
applications, each node needs to periodically (with a period from 100ms to 500ms) 
broadcast beacons to indicate its driving states, including location, speed, driving 
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direction and so on, to its neighboring nodes [10]. Besides, warnings about traffic 
incidents should be disseminated to the vehicles which may be influenced by such 
incidents. Traffic safety applications and the incurred communications should be 
assigned the highest priority in VANETs.  
Relying on V2V and V2R communications, real-time traffic statistics may be collected 
from vehicular nodes, based on which traffic monitoring and traffic management could 
be enhanced. For instance, autonomous traffic control [13], [14] can be cost-effectively 
supported with VANETs. The application of float car data collection [12] can also be 
cost-effectively supported with VANETs, where cellular communication from each 
vehicle to a central data center is not necessary. Smart traffic routing is envisioned in 
CVIS [21] based on V2V and V2R communications to improve traffic efficiency in 
downtown areas. Besides traffic statistics, VANETs provide a ready platform to collect 
environmental and weather information about the roads. For instance, Clarus [138] is a 
road weather management system proposed to this end.  
Value-added (commercial) applications are gaining popularity in VANETs due to two 
reasons. First, such applications can attract more users to VANETs. Secondly, VANETs 
with V2V and V2R communications may enable more cost-effective solutions for such 
applications. For instance, in [139] a parking lot management system based on VANETs 
is proposed. On-road entertainment [16], [140], [141] is another promising value-added 
application for VANETs. With numerous nodes in VANETs, ad dissemination in 
VANETs [15] may be especially efficient and cost-effective.  
In summary, VANETs show great application potentials, which will be further realized 
with new value-added applications in this dissertation.  
1.4 Motivations and Contributions 
As previously discussed, the open research issues form a great gap between the 
existing research and the realistic implementation of VANETs. Thus, the major research 
motivation of this dissertation is to fill this gap with 1) application-driven security and 
privacy solutions and 2) applications with security and privacy assurance. Driven by the 
realistic constraints of various VANET applications, we propose theoretically novel 
security and privacy solutions which are readily applicable to VANETs. On the other 
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hand, we propose new value-added applications for VANETs, which feature satisfying 
security provisioning and privacy protection. Thus, this dissertation greatly enhances the 
security, privacy and applications of VANETs.  
Specifically, by identifying the root cause of unreliable multi-hop communications, we 
propose a lightweight reliable and faithful data packet relaying framework (LEAPER) 
[142] for VANETs. With LEAPER, reliable and faithful multi-hop communications, the 
basis of many VANET applications, can be ensured in various network scenarios. 
Additionally, by differentiating various messages, we propose a resource-aware message 
verification scheme (RAMV) [143], [144] to ensure secure and scalable message 
verification in VANETs which underlies the traffic safety applications.  
To make privacy protection practical and compatible to other security schemes, we 
propose a joint privacy reputation assurance scheme (JPRA) [145], [146] to enable the 
efficient and synergistic coexistence of privacy protection and reputation management in 
VANETs. Besides, a short-time certificate-based privacy protection scheme (STCP2) 
[147] is proposed to protect the location privacy of vehicular nodes with short-time 
certificates. With JPRA and STCP2, privacy protection becomes both feasible and cost-
effective in various VANET scenarios. 
Three appealing solutions, namely general purpose automatic survey (GPAS) [148], 
[149], VANET-based ambient ad dissemination (VAAD) [150] and VANET-based 
vehicle performance monitoring and analysis (VehicleView) [151], [152] are proposed to 
support various value-added applications based on VANETs. Besides being efficient and 
cost-effective, these solutions all feature proper security and privacy assurance for the 
involved entities. Thus, being cost-effective, secure and privacy-preserving, these 
solutions can be readily implemented in VANETs.  
Thus, by enhancing the security, privacy and applications of VANETs with both 
theoretic novelty and realistic solutions, this dissertation fills the gap between research 
and implementation, pushing VANETs further to the stage of massive deployment. 
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Chapter 2 Reliable and Trustworthy Multi-hop 
Communications1 
In VANETs, reliable and trustworthy multi-hop communications are critical to many 
important applications. In this chapter, the root causes of unreliable and tampered multi-
hop communications are identified, based on which a novel Adaptive Role Playing (ARP) 
strategy is proposed to tackle these issues with the cooperation of neighboring nodes. A 
Lightweight Reliable Faithful Data Packet Relaying Framework (LEAPER) [142] is 
proposed to implement the ARP strategy in each hop and ensure reliable and faithful 
multi-hop communications. In each hop the required security strength is configurable, 
making LEAPER flexible and adaptive to various application scenarios. Theoretical 
analysis and simulation studies show that LEAPER outperforms existing schemes in 
terms of communication overhead and security strength.  
2.1 Introduction 
Many VANET applications designed to enhance driving safety and convenience [10], 
[153], such as Accident Warning, Event Reporting, Car-to-Home Synchronization, and so 
on, rely on reliable and trustworthy multi-hop communications. However, in VANETs 
multi-hop communications (packet relaying) often suffer from various node misbehaviors 
and malfunctions such as packet tampering and packet dropping. For instance, the loss or 
tampering of a warning message about an accident may render the approaching vehicles 
unprepared for the potential dangers. Besides, tampered packets, once propagated 
throughout VANETs, are also a waste of the network resource.  
Thus, reliable and faithful data packet relaying is vital to VANETs. Here, reliable 
relaying of a data packet means that this packet will be relayed by each intermediate 
relaying node; faithful relaying requires that the data packet will not be tampered. 
However, to our best knowledge, the existing schemes fail to meet both requirements as 
discussed in detail in section 2.2.  
                                                 
1 The material contained in this chapter was previously published in the journal of Ad 
Hoc Networks. © 2011 Elsevier. See Appendix A for documentation of the permission to 
republish this material.  
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In this chapter a novel Adaptive Role Playing (ARP) strategy is proposed to allow the 
nodes in each hop to adaptively play the roles of a relaying node or watchdog monitoring 
the relaying node, based on their capabilities for such roles and their neighbors’ behaviors. 
Thus, if one current role is not played honestly by a misbehaving or malfunctioning node, 
it will be taken over by the other honest nodes, so that the data packet will be faithfully 
relayed in each hop. As such, in principle ARP can prevent the malfunctioning and 
misbehaving nodes from directly affecting packet relaying in each hop, which is its major 
advantage over existing schemes. A Lightweight REliable and FAithful Packet RElaying 
FRamework (LEAPER) is proposed to securely implement the ARP strategy, organizing 
the nodes in each hop into a trust group where each node’s behaviors are monitored by its 
neighbors. Thus, reliable and faithful data packet relaying can be ensured in each trust 
group, based on which end-to-end reliable and faithful packet relaying can be achieved.  
Besides, a configurable security threshold k is adopted in LEAPER to determine the 
number of required watchdogs in each hop, tuning the tradeoff between the security 
strength and performance requirements in various application scenarios. Theoretic 
analysis and simulation studies prove LEAPER’s salient merits compared to the existing 
schemes in face of misbehaving and malfunctioning VANET nodes.  
2.2 Background & Related Work 
2.2.1 Background 
Here the problem of ensuring reliable and faithful packet relaying is considered in 
multi-hop communication scenarios where simplistic flooding [154] is not feasible due to 
the communication overhead involved. If one node needs to determine whether the 
received data packet is authentic or not, it has to depend on the information from its 
previous hop. Such a scenario is common in either urban areas or highways, so in this 
chapter the traffic models are not differentiated. Indeed, as we will show in section 2.5, 
the procedures of LEAPER in each hop will end within 100ms so that the network 
topology can be considered as being fixed during the concerned period. Thus, the merges 
and departures in the urban traffic model have no direct impact on the procedures of 
LEAPER and do not need to be considered. 
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Figure 2.1 Exemplary relayers and watchdogs in VANETs 
For brevity, following the conventions of [77], [155], in each hop the relaying node is 
called a Relayer. Due to the nature of wireless communications, the nodes within the 
communication range of the Relayer can overhear the data packet. Thus, as shown in 
Figure 2.1, the nodes within the communication ranges of both Relayers in hop i and hop 
(i+1) can verify whether the data packet sent by hop (i+1) is the same as that sent by hop 
i, functioning as the watchdogs for hop (i+1). These watchdogs can in turn inform the 
next hop of hop (i+1), namely hop (i+2), of their opinion about the data packet, so that 
hop (i+2) is able to know whether the data packet from hop (i+1) is authentic or not.  
Thus, four basic functions critical to reliable and faithful data packet relaying can be 
abstracted in each hop: data reception, data verification, data transmission and proof 
presenting, as shown in Figure 2.2. In data reception, the nodes in one hop (say hop i) 
receive or overhear the data packet (Di?1) from the previous hop. These nodes need to 
verify the authenticity of Di?1 based on the proof presented by the previous hop with the 
data verification function. Di?1, if regarded as authentic, will be transmitted to hop (i+1) 
in the form of Di by the Relayer in hop i. Similarly, in proof presenting the nodes in hop i 
need to present the proof of the authenticity of Di, usually constructed and vouched for by 
the watchdogs of hop i, to hop (i+1). As such, these four basic functions can establish the 
trust of the data packet’s authenticity between any two consequential hops. Thus, these 
basic functions are all indispensible, and the failure of any one may result in either data 
tampering or packet dropping in VANETs.  
However, multiple node misbehaviors (attacks) may result in the failure of these basic 
functions, as shown in Figure 2.2. These common attacks have been thoroughly 
investigated in [155], with their impacts summarized in Table 2.1. VANET nodes may 
also fail to perform these basic functions due to malfunctions such as collision, 
interference and random errors in packet transmissions, as shown in Figure 2.2.  
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Figure 2.2 Basic functions, failures and attacks in each hop 
Thus, in order to ensure reliable and faithful data packet relaying, the negative impacts 
of the individual node’s misbehaviors and malfunctions on the four basic functions need 
to be prevented. To this end, a novel Adaptive Role Playing (ARP) strategy is proposed 
here. The core idea of ARP is to allow the nodes in each hop to contend to perform the 
four basic functions, adaptively playing the role of either Relayer or watchdog according 
to their capability and their neighbors’ roles. Thus, if the current Relayer or watchdog 
fails to properly function, its role will be taken over by the other honest nodes in the same 
hop and the basic functions associated to this role will be successfully performed. As 
such, all basic functions in this hop will be successfully performed.  
 
ARP will ensure more reliable and faithful data packet relaying than the commonly 
adopted strategy [77], [155]-[157] where the roles of Relayer and watchdog are rigidly 
assigned to specific nodes, as further discussed next. 
2.2.2 Related Work 
The routing protocols initially designed for general ad hoc networks, such as DSR [158] 
and AODV [159], are prone to performance degradation in VANETs due to the high 
node mobility. GPSR [156] selects the node nearest to the destination as the Relayer in 
Table 2.1 
Common attacks to data packet relaying 
Attacks Impacts 
Packet Dropping The Relayer simply refuses to relay the data packet. 
Packet Tampering The Relayer tampers the data packet before relaying it. 
Relaying Invalid Data The Relayer intentionally relays data packets tampered by its previous 
hop. 
Badmouthing Watchdog either gives positive evaluation to tampered data packets or 
negative evaluation to authentic data packets. 
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each hop, so any malfunction or misbehavior of the Relayer will result in packet loss or 
packet tampering. Thus, in GPSR neither reliability nor faithfulness is ensured.  
Several routing schemes specifically proposed for VANETs, including PBF [157], 
CBF [160], [161], OPERA [162], and REAR [163], all ignore node misbehaviors, so 
faithful data packet relaying cannot be ensured in such schemes. Moreover, PBF [157], 
similar to GPSR [156], in each hop selects the node nearest to the destination as the 
specific Relayer, so it cannot ensure reliable data packet relaying either. CBF [160], [161] 
allows each node that overhear the data packet to set up a timer based on its distance to 
the destination, and the node with the shortest timeout period will serve as a Relayer. 
Thus, CBF could handle the packet dropping and nodes’ malfunctions, ensuring reliable 
packet relaying. Similarly, in REAR [163] the nodes also contend to relay the data 
packets according to each node’s reception probability, so reliable data packet relaying 
can also be achieved. OPERA [162] is focused on carrying data packets across network 
segmentations, without considering reliable and faithful data packet relaying in each hop.  
Besides, several security schemes [77]-[80], [155] proposed to handle misbehaviors in 
data packet relaying generally fail to ensure reliable data packet relaying, relying on a 
specific Relayer in each hop. Specifically, the reputation schemes [78]-[80] update the 
reputation of each node based on its data packet relaying and routing behaviors with the 
help of watchdogs. These schemes may not be effective in VANETs, since 1) in 
VANETs nodes’ reputation history is difficult to maintain, and 2) the tampered data 
packets can still get propagated during the reputation update periods. DTT [77] uses the 
previous hop of the Relayer as the watchdog to monitor the Relayer and detect data 
tampering. In each hop only one pre-selected watchdog exists, so DTT is prone to 
badmouthing attack, as discussed in [155]. To enhance DTT [77], AWF-NA [155] 
autonomously organizes several nodes around the Relayer as the watchdogs. It thus is 
resistant to the badmouthing attack. However, in AWF-NA [155] each node has to 
maintain the information of all neighbors within its 2 hops, which incurs heavy control 
overhead. Additionally, AWF-NA relies on the special connectivity model provided by 
RPB-MAC [164], which has not been commonly adopted in VANETs.  
In summary, the existing schemes cannot ensure both reliable and faithful data packet 
relaying in VANETs, and LEAPER will achieve both goals with the ARP strategy. 
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2.3 LEAPER 
2.3.1 Overview of LEAPER 
LEAPER is proposed to enable the nodes in each hop to securely follow the ARP 
strategy to ensure reliable and faithful data packet relaying. To this end, LEAPER 
organizes the nodes in each hop into a trust group (TG), as shown in Figure 2.3. Each 
trust group (say TGi) receives the data packet (Di?1) and the total trust token (Ti?1) from 
its previous trust group (TGi?1). Here Ti?1 is the proof of the authenticity of Di?1 presented 
by TGi?1. Thus, each node in TGi knows both Di?1 and Ti?1, as shown in the bracket above 
TGi in Figure 2.3. All nodes in TGi can thus follow the ARP strategy to relay the data 
packet (denoted as Di) and the associated total trust token (Ti) to the next hop. During this 
process, each node in TGi is able to detect any malfunction or misbehavior of its 
neighbors, so that together the nodes in TGi will ensure that only the authentic Di and Ti 
will be sent out. Eventually, after Di and Ti are received by the nodes in the next hop, 
such nodes can form a new trust group TGi+1 to further relay the data packet.   
In the above process, the nodes in TGi not only know that the Relayer in TGi has 
already faithfully relayed the packet by comparing Di?1 with Di, but also know in the first 
place that Di?1 itself is authentic with the help of Ti?1. Thus, by following the ARP 
strategy, each trust group can reliably and faithfully relay the data packet to the next hop. 
The relations between the four basic functions and the trust groups are self-evident: by 
relaying Di to TGi+1, TGi is performing the data transmission function, and TGi+1 is 
performing the data reception function; while by relaying Ti to TGi+1, TGi is performing 
the proof presenting function, and TGi+1 is performing data verification.  
Before introducing LEAPER in detail, the assumptions of this chapter will be clarified.  
 
Figure 2.3 The relation of trust groups and ARP procedures 
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? The routing information is present in the data packet, as in geographic routing 
protocols and the source routing protocols, such as DSR [158].  
? Each node is able to verify the IDs and the corresponding public keys of its 
neighbors, with the help of IBS [165] or any PKI-based key management schemes.  
? From the source to the destination the node density is sufficient to support 
LEAPER. Network segmentations could be handled by adopting the robust 
message dissemination schemes, for example [162] and [166], into LEAPER. 
2.3.2 Detailed Procedures 
The detailed procedures of LEAPER are designed for the nodes in each trust group to 
collectively follow the ARP strategy. For clarity, the procedures in any trust group i are 
divided into three phases: data packet relaying, single token collecting and total token 
relaying. In these phases, tS and tE are used to indicate the start and end time, respectively. 
Each node will set up three distance-sensitive timers, namely Data Contention Timer 
(T_DCT), Single Token Timer (T_STT) and Total Token Timer (T_TTT), in these three 
phases respectively, to coordinate its interactions with the neighbors. The timing 
algorithms of these timers will be discussed in details in subsection 2.4.1.  
Phase I: Data Packet Relaying.  
In this phase the nodes contend to perform the data transmission function. As shown in 
tS of Figure 2.4, nodes in TGi have all received Di?1 and Ti?1 from TGi?1 at the beginning 
of this phase. Each node in TGi will set up its T_DCT timer with timeout period inversely 
proportional to its distance to the Relayer in TGi?1. The timeout period of each timer is 
figuratively indicated by the length of the shadowed bar beside each node in Figure 2.4, 
Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6. The node (say ni) whose T_DCT expires first will send out the 
data packet (Di) to next hop. Other nodes in TGi can overhear Di, and check Di against 
Di?1, as shown in tE of Figure 2.4. If Di is authentic, the role of Relayer has been 
faithfully played by ni and the other nodes in TGi will move on to contend to play the role 
of watchdogs. Specifically, the other nodes in TGi will cancel their T_DCT timers and set 
up T_STT timers for Phase II. Otherwise, Di will simply be discarded and Phase I will 
continue until one node finally relays an authentic data packet to the next hop.  
33 
 
 
Figure 2.4 The procedures of Phase I (data packet relaying) 
In Phase I, all the different copies of Di from TGi have been overheard by the nodes in 
the potential TGi+1, as shown in tE of Figure 2.4.  
Phase II: Single Token Collecting.  
In this phase, each node in TGi will contend to send out its own proof of the 
authenticity of Di, called single trust token here, based on which a total trust token Ti can 
be constructed by TGi. At the beginning, each node in TGi has already set up its own 
T_STT timer with timeout period proportional to its distance to the Relayer in TGi, as 
shown in tS of Figure 2.5. Whenever the T_STT timer of a node nj expires, it will play the 
role of a watchdog and send its single token packet TSj to the current Relayer, as shown 
in tE. On the other hand, TSj will be overheard and recorded by all the nodes in TGi. After 
k such single token packets are thus generated, the still running T_STT timers will be 
cancelled and Phase II will come to an end.  
Here k is the security threshold used to define the number of required watchdogs in 
each trust group, to handle the badmouthing attacks of individual watchdogs. The 
configuration of k will be discussed in detail in subsection 2.4.3.  
 
Figure 2.5 The procedures of Phase II (single token collection) 
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Figure 2.6 The procedures of Phase III (total token relaying) 
Phase III: Total Token Relaying.  
In this phase TGi as a whole presents its total trust token Ti, as a combination of k 
single trust tokens, to the potential TGi+1. At the beginning, each node in TGi has 
overheard k single trust tokens, and each node will set up its own T_TTT timers with 
timeout periods proportional to its distances to the Relayer in TGi, as shown in Figure 2.6 
(with similar legends as Figure 2.5). Thus, the Relayer itself will set up a T_TTT timer 
with period 0, and it is supposed to send Ti to next hop immediately. If the Relayer fails 
to send out Ti when the T_TTT timer of another node expires, this node will send out Ti. 
Once Ti is sent out, Phase III in TGi comes to an end. Meanwhile, TGi+1 is automatically 
formed by the nodes in the next hop which have overheard both Di and Ti.  
Thus, in Phase I TGi performs the data transmission function and TGi+1 performs the 
data reception function; in Phase II and Phase III TGi completes the proof presenting 
function and TGi+1 completes the data verification function. As such, by the cooperation 
of the neighboring node, reliable and faithful data packet relaying is ensured in each trust 
group. The packet dropping attack is effectively handled, and the tampered data packet 
will be stopped from being further propagated in VANETs.  
2.4 Enabling Techniques 
Several enabling techniques of LEAPER, including the distance-sensitive timers, the 
secure packet format and the security threshold k, will be described in detail here. 
2.4.1 Distance-Sensitive Timers 
As shown in subsection 2.3.2, the distance-sensitive timers T_DCT, T_STT and 
T_TTT serve to control the contention of the nodes in each trust group to relay data 
packet, generate single trust token and total trust token, respectively. Here the timing 
algorithms of these timers will be designed so that in each phase of LEAPER the 
desirable node interaction can be ensured.  
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Let R be the communication range of VANET nodes. For a node (ni) in trust group i 
(TGi), let d1 and d2 be the distances of ni to the Relayers in TGi?1 and TGi, respectively.  
T_DCT Timer: In Phase I it is desirable that the node farthest from the Relayer in 
TGi?1 will relay the data packet, so that the data packet could geographically go as far as 
possible in one hop. With this consideration, the timeout period (TDCT) of the T_DCT 
timer of ni will be:  
 
? ? 0 1
1 0 1
1 0 1
2 (2) / 2
2 / (1) / 2 (3 ) / 4
/ (1) (3 ) / 4
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. (2.1) 
Here uni(x) is a uniform random function over [0, x], and ?0 is the basic timeout period 
which should be set based on application requirements. Nodes with different d1 are 
differentiated by three cases in (2.1), so that their timeout periods will be significantly 
different to avoid collisions in transmission. Thus, with (2.1) the node farthest to the 
Relayer in TGi?1 will be most likely to get the smallest TDCT and relay the data packet first. 
T_STT and T_TTT Timers: As shown in Phase II and Phase III, these timers should 
favor the nodes nearest to the Relayer in TGi, so that in TGi+1 the nodes overhearing Di 
will also overhear Ti and the size of TGi+1 can thus be maximized. Let TTT be the timeout 
period of the T_STT or T_TTT timer of node ni, and it could be determined as follows:  
 ? ?2 0/ (0.5)TTT d r uni ?? ?  (2.2) 
Equation (2.2) indicates that the nearer ni is to the Relayer in TGi, the smaller TTT tends 
to be. uni(0.5) is used to randomize the TTT of the nodes with similar d2. Thus, with (2.2) 
T_STT and T_TTT timers will ensure that the nodes nearer to the Relayer in TGi are 
more likely to win the contentions in Phase II and Phase III of LEAPER.  
VANET nodes may have different communication ranges, but even in such a case a 
Relayer and k watchdogs can still be adaptively selected in any trust group. Two nodes 
might have similar timeout periods for one timer, which may lead to duplicate packets or 
packet collision. However, the probability of this scenario is quite small and LEAPER 
could tolerate duplicate or lost data (token) packets. Besides, such a scenario could be 
ameliorated by the joint-layer design [167] of MAC and network layers. 
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2.4.2 Secure Packet Format 
To prevent packet forging and packet replay in LEAPER, secure packet formats are 
proposed here for the data packet, single trust token and total trust token.  
Data Packet: {Payload = {R_ID, Type, TSP, S_ID, P_ID, M}, {Hash(Payload)}PRR_ID, 
CertR_ID}. 
Here, R_ID is the ID of the Relayer and Type indicates the packet type. S_ID is the ID 
of the source node of this data packet, and P_ID is the packet ID assigned by the source 
node. TSP is the timestamp generated by the Relayer, and M is the application-specific 
message contained in this data packet. {Hash(Payload)}PRR_ID is the digital signature of 
the hash value of Payload generated with the Relayer’s private key PRR_ID. Here, Hash() 
is a standard hash function, such as SHA-2 [168]. CertR_ID is the certificate of the Relayer.  
Single Trust Token: {Payload = {G_ID, Type, TSP, DP_ID}, {Hash(Payload)}PRG_ID,  
CertG_ID)}. 
Here, G_ ID is the ID of the generator of this single trust token. DP_ID={Rel_id, S_id, 
P_id} of the data packet to be vouched for. The other items have similar meanings as 
those in the data packet. Thus, after receiving a single trust token any node can figure out 
its generator and the associated data packet. 
Total Trust Token: {Payload = {T_ID, Type, Tsp, K, ST1, …, STk}, 
{Hash(Payload)}PRT_ID, CertT_ID)}. 
Here, T_ID is the ID of the generator of this total trust token. STi is the ith single trust 
token embedded in this packet. Thus, after receiving this packet, any node can easily 
figure out for which data packet this total trust token is generated and whether it contains 
enough single trust tokens.  
The verification of the certificate and signature in these packets can be performed 
following the standard procedures in any common PKI schemes. Exemplary procedures 
can also be found in [77], [155], so for brevity they will not be discussed in detail here. 
Note here the pseudonyms, instead of real node IDs, of vehicular nodes can be used in 
these packets. Thus, LEAPER is also compatible to the common privacy protection 
schemes where each node usually uses a pseudonym in VANET communications and 
changes its pseudonym from time to time, as introduced in Chapter 1.  
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2.4.3 Security Threshold 
The security threshold k mandates the number of required watchdogs in each trust 
group, so it has significant impact on the security strength and performance of LEAPER. 
Specifically, bigger k will make each trust group more resistant to the misbehaving 
watchdogs and meanwhile incur higher communication overhead with more single trust 
tokens collected. Thus, it is critical to set a proper k in LEAPER to achieve desirable 
tradeoff between the security strength and communication overhead.  
Here we investigate the feasible range of k determined by the application requirements 
and VANET environments. Specifically, per-hop latency (Td) and per-hop successful 
delivery ratio (SDR) PS as application requirements, and the average node density (?) as 
VANET parameter are carefully investigated here. The constraints of these factors on the 
feasible values of k are summarized in Table 2.2.   
First, k must be fewer than the number of nodes in a typical trust group, which is 
determined by node density (?), the length of the trust group (L) and number of lanes (nl). 
For any specific application targeted at one specific area, ?, L and nl all can be estimated 
and the feasible range of k can thus be obtained.  
Secondly, each single packet will incur a certain latency, including average MAC 
access time (?m), signature creation time (?s) and signature verification time (?v). The 
total delay caused by 1 data packet (?m+?v+?s), k single trust tokens (k?m+k?v+?s) and 1 
total trust token (?m+(k+1)?v+?s) must be shorter than Td. Thirdly, more than k+1 
misbehaving nodes in a trust group could collude to relay a tampered data packet to the 
next hop. Thus, k must be big enough to make it practically impossible to have k+1 
misbehaving nodes in a trust group. 
 
Table 2.2 
Constraints on security threshold k 
Factors Constraints 
#. Neighbors k ????L?nl 
Delay per Hop 
(Td) 
(k+2)?m + (2k+2)?v+3?s ? Td 
Per-hop SDR(Ps) Pr{less than k+1 misbehaving nodes in a hop} ??Ps 
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Within the feasible range as determined above, the value of k has significant impacts 
on the tradeoff of the security strength and performance of LEAPER, as will be 
investigated in detail in section 2.5. 
2.5 Performance Analysis and Evaluation 
Here the salient security properties of LEAPER will be identified and justified, and the 
performance of LEAPER will be evaluated both analytically and based on simulation. 
2.5.1 Trust Group Size 
LEAPER requires that at least k+1 nodes (one Relayer and k watchdogs) exist in any 
trust group, so the trust group size has direct impacts on the performance of LEAPER. 
Here the trust group length will be estimated, since the trust group size is proportional to 
the trust group length given a node density. Additionally, the trust group length can also 
show geographically how far a data packet can be relayed in each hop.  
As shown in Figure 2.7, let Li?1 and Li be the lengths of two adjacent trust groups TGi?1 
and TGi, respectively. Then the Relayer (A) and the node (B) relaying the total trust token 
in TGi?1 must lie within aLi?1 from the joint point of TGi?1 and TGi, where a?[0,1]. Thus 
from the procedures of LEAPER we know that Li?1 and Li have the following relation:  
 aLi?1 + Li = R. (2.3) 
The expectations of both Li?1 and Li should be equal, so it follows from (2.3) that 
 E[Li] = R?1/(1+a).                             (2.4) 
Ideally, with the help of the distance-sensitive timers a can be 0, and E[Li] = R from 
(2.4). Even in the worst scenario where R and T are exactly at the opposite sides of TGi?1 
(a=1), E[Li] is still R/2 from (2.4). Thus, E[Li] is between R/2 and R, ensuring at least the 
data packet geographically be relayed over a distance of R/2 in each hop. According to 
WAVE [9], R typically is 300m-1000m, which indicates the lower bound of E[Li] can 
allow each trust group to contain enough nodes given a reasonable node density.  
 
Figure 2.7 Estimation of the expected length of a trust group  
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2.5.2 Security Properties of LEAPER 
With adequate nodes in each trust group, LEAPER shows salient security properties 
against the misbehaving or malfunctioning nodes. With the ARP strategy the nodes in 
each trust group contend to be the Relayer and watchdogs, so that the malfunctioning 
nodes have no direct impact on data packet relaying. Meanwhile, the common node 
misbehaviors in Table 2.1 can also be effectively handled by LEAPER.  
In case of packet dropping by any node in a trust group (TGi), the other honest nodes 
in TGi can still relay the data packet to next hop, as discussed in Phase I of LEAPER. 
Similarly, if any node relays a tampered data packet in TGi, this tampered packet can be 
detected and discarded by the honest nodes in TGi. Thus, both packet tampering and 
intentionally relaying tampered packet can be effectively handled in each trust group.   
In case of the badmouthing attack, the misbehaving watchdogs can generate single 
trust tokens for a tampered data packet. However, to convince the next hop, there must be 
k+1 misbehaving nodes (one Relayer and k watchdogs) in this trust group (TGi), which 
will be quite unlikely with k > 0. Even if k+1 misbehaving nodes do exist in TGi, the 
remaining honest nodes in TGi can still relay the authentic data packet and the associated 
total trust token to the next hop. Besides, by monitoring the network environments, the 
applications could adaptively increase k in case of more misbehaving nodes, to make the 
badmouthing attack practically impossible.  
Additionally, LEAPER is also effective in ensuring data validity in the source node, 
which is in trust group 0 (TG0). In case of personal communications, it is sufficient for 
LEAPER to ensure reliable and faithful packet relaying in the intermediate hops. 
However, in case of data packets with public information, such as warnings about traffic 
jams or accidents, LEAPER can also ensure that TG0 will only generate and send out data 
packets with valid content. Specifically, to send out invalid data packets and convince the 
next hop, the number of misbehaving nodes in TG0 must be bigger than k+1 (one node to 
generate the data packet and k nodes to generate single trust tokens), which will be 
unlikely due to high node mobility in VANETs.  
Even if a set of misbehaving nodes do succeed in sending out false warnings, the 
secure packet formats of LEAPER (as given in subsection 2.4.2) will ensure that the IDs 
40 
 
of the colluders (with their signatures present in the invalid data packets and tokens) can 
be verified with non-repudiation in the court. This court trial is also suitable to the 
badmouthing attacks as the ultimate aftermath countermeasure. 
In summary, reliable and faithful data packet relaying can be ensured in LEAPER, 
with the misbehaving nodes and malfunctioning nodes effectively handled by the ARP 
strategy. Comparatively, the existing schemes, at best, can only ensure either reliability or 
faithfulness in data packet relaying, as discussed in subsection 2.2.2. The advantages of 
LEAPER over the existing schemes also include its flexibility and adaptability: by 
configuring k to different values, LEAPER can actually outperform, or at least perform as 
well as, the existing schemes in different application scenarios. For instance, when only 
malfunctioning nodes are of concern, LEAPER with k=0 can ensure reliable data packet 
relaying similar to CBF [160], [161] and REAR [163]. When misbehaving nodes exist, 
LEAPER with k?1 can ensure faithful packet relaying as DTT [77] and AWF-NA [155], 
additionally ensuring reliable packet relaying. 
2.5.3 Analytical Performance Estimation 
Here, the per-hop performance of LEAPER will be analyzed with comparisons to a 
baseline protocol (BSL), namely GPSR [156]. As discussed before, GPSR [156] selects 
one specific Relayer and has no watchdog in each hop. 
Per-hop SDR: Per-hop SDR (successful delivery ratio) is the probability that a data 
packet can be faithfully relayed in a certain hop, in face of misbehaving nodes and 
malfunctioning nodes. Thus, per-hop SDR actually is a comprehensive metric for both 
reliability and faithfulness in each hop. 
In LEAPER, let Ni be the total number of nodes in trust group i (TGi) and na be the 
number of active nodes. The other (Ni ? na) malfunctioning nodes cannot take any active 
communication action. Let pd and pm be the probability of any node malfunctioning and 
misbehaving, respectively.  
Thus, in hop i the average number of active nodes is na = Ni ? (1? pd). Let P(j) be the 
probability that j (j?0) misbehaving nodes exist in trust group i. Thus,  
 ( ) (1 ) aa n jjm m
n
P j p p
j
?? ?? ?? ?? ?
.                       (2.5) 
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Then the probability that more than k misbehaving nodes exist in TGi is  
 
1
0
Pr{ } 1 ( )k
l
j k P l??? ? ?? .                        (2.6) 
Let SDRLP be the per-hop SDR of LEAPER, and SDRBSL be the per-hop SDR of BSL. 
For LEAPER to ensure that the data packet can be faithfully relayed, there must be less 
than (k+1) misbehaving nodes in this trust group. Thus,  
 SDRLP = 1? Pr{j?k+1}.                          (2.7) 
Comparatively, in BSL the data packet can be faithfully relayed only if the selected 
Relayer is not malfunctioning and there is no misbehaving node in this hop. Thus,  
 SDRBSL = ???pd ? Pr{j?1}.                        (2.8) 
As shown in (2.5)-(2.7), in LEAPER pd has no direct impact on SDRLP. And with k > 0 
the negative impact of misbehaving nodes on SDRLP will be much smaller than that on 
SDRBSL, as shown in (2.5), (2.6) and (2.8). Thus, given the same pd and pm, LEAPER can 
achieve much higher per-hop SDR than BSL. 
Per-hop Latency: As already discussed in section 2.4.3, generally the per-hop latency 
of LEAPER is  
 TD, LP = (k+2)?m + (2k+2)?v+3?s.                   (2.9) 
Let nm be the number of misbehaving nodes in a trust group. In the worst case, these 
misbehaving nodes will all send out tampered data packet or invalid single trust tokens, 
and the per-hop latency of LEAPER becomes 
 TD, LP = (k+2)?m + (2k+2)?v+3?s + (nm?m + nm?v).      (2.10) 
Even in the worst case, TD, LP is acceptable for reasonable values of k. As defined in 
DSRC [8] and WAVE [9], the allowable latency for safety messages is 100ms. In this 
case, plug in the parameters from [155] (?m=5ms, ?s=1.42ms, ?v=0.07ms) and let nm=k, 
we can get that k ? 7 from (2.10). Meanwhile, with efficient message authentication 
schemes such [144], ?v could be further reduced, and LEAPER can achieve smaller TD, LP. 
Tradeoff: To comprehensively compare the per-hop performance of BSL and 
LEAPER, the tradeoff between SDR and latency will be considered here. In BSL, in each 
hop there are only one signature generation, signature verification and MAC access for 
the data packet. Thus the per-hop latency of BSL is  
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Figure 2.8 Difference between overall per-hop SDR of BSL and LEAPER 
 TD, BS = ?m+?v+?s.                               (2.11) 
From (2.9) and (2.11), TD, LP is approximately k+2 times of TD, BS, given that ?m 
generally is much larger than ?v and ?s. Thus, if SDRLP is (k+2) times higher than SDRBSL, 
LEAPER will have a lower per-hop latency for each successful delivery than BSL, as 
shown in Figure 2.8. In Figure 2.8, Diff is defined as Diff = SDRLP/SDRBSL ? (k+2). Thus, 
when Diff is larger than 0, the overall performance of LEAPER is better than that of BSL. 
In this comparison pm=0.1, pd=0.2, and the time parameters for (2.10) are adopted.  
As shown in Figure 2.8, Diff is above 0 when k is between 0 and 4. However, when k 
becomes larger than 2, the increase in k will bring down the overall performance of 
LEAPER. This is because SDRLP is almost 100% when k is 2, and further increase in k 
can only bring additional latency without obvious increase in SDRLP.  
Thus, by tuning k carefully, LEAPER can achieve much better overall per-hop 
performance than BSL, which justifies the high per-hop latency of LEAPER to achieve 
higher per-hop SDR. Since with large k fewer tampered data packet will reach the 
destination, LEAPER will perform much better than BSL when security is taken into 
consideration. Actually, this reasoning is also meaningful for the end-to-end performance 
comparison between LEAPER and other schemes, as shown in our simulation studies. 
2.5.4 Simulation Studies 
To study LEAPER’s performance, extensive NS2 [169] based simulations are 
conducted with vehicle mobility traces generated by MOVE [170]. The common 
simulation parameters are summarized in Table 2.3. The time required for signature 
generation and verification (RSA1024), and Hash function (SHA512) are adopted from 
one cryptographic benchmark [171].  
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In these simulations, the source node and the destination node are placed at either end 
of a 3km road segment. The malfunctioning nodes will participate in neither data packet 
relaying nor token generation. The misbehaving nodes will tamper every data packet as 
Relayers. As watchdogs the misbehaving nodes will either refuse to generate token, or 
choose to collude with the misbehaving Relayer with a probability of 0.1, which is to 
reflect the fact that in VANETs collusions among misbehaving nodes are quite rare. For 
comparison, LEAPER, BSL and DTT [77] are implemented in the simulations. 
Individual Metrics: Here three metrics are evaluated: end-to-end SDR (SDRE), end-to-
end latency (TE) and ratio of tampered packets at the destination (Rb). Six protocols are 
implemented for comparison: BSL, DTT, LEAPER0 (k=0), LEAPER1 (k=1), LEAPER2 
(k=2) and LEAPER3 (k=3). The performance differences among these protocols with 
different ratios of malfunctioning nodes (pd) and misbehaving nodes (pm) will be studied. 
Here, pd is fixed to 0.1, and pm changes from 0.0 to 0.1 with a step size of 0.01. The 
simulation is run 10 times and the metrics are averaged to reduce randomness effects.  
As shown in Figure 2.9, LEAPER1 achieves the highest SDRE with increasing pm, 
which is almost stable as pm increases. LEAPER2 and LEAPER3 also achieve stable 
SDRE with increasing pm, but their SDRE are obviously lower than that of LEAPER1. In 
LEAPER2 and LEAPER3 more watchdogs are required in each trust group, so that they 
will face more network segmentations given the same mobility traces. This can also 
explain the fact that SDRE of LEAPER2 is always higher than that of LEAPER3. The 
SDRE of LEAPER0 is quite high when pm is 0 but it decreases sharply with the increase 
of pm, since LEAPER0 does not configure any watchdog and the packet authenticity 
cannot be ensured in each hop.  
Table 2.3 
Simulation parameters of LEAPER 
Parameters Values Parameters Values 
# of Nodes 142 Beacon Interval 200 ms  
Road Length 3 Km Communication Range 300 m 
MAC Protocol 802.11 Node Velocity 40m/s 
Bit Rate 6 Mbps Simulation Time 900 seconds 
?0 10 ms   
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Figure 2.9 The end-to-end SDR statistics of BSL, DTT and LEAPER 
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Figure 2.10 The ratios of tampered packets of BSL, DTT and LEAPER 
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Figure 2.11 The end-to-end delays of BSL, DTT and LEAPER 
Thus, in LEAPER0, with the increase of pm more tampered data packets will arrive at 
the destination, as shown in Figure 2.10. Due to the impact of malfunctioning nodes, 
DTT and BSL only achieve very low SDRE with any pm values, which is consistent to our 
previous analysis. Meanwhile, BSL allows more tampered data packets at the destination 
than DTT, as shown in Figure 2.10. Comparatively, LEAPER0 allows most tampered 
data packets at the destination, as shown in Figure 2.10, since it ensures reliable packet 
relaying without detecting the tampered data packets. LEAPER1, LEAPER2, and 
LEAPER3 can actually achieves Rb=0 for increasing pm. 
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In summary, LEAPER1 can ensure reliable and faithful packet relaying in face of 
malfunctioning nodes and misbehaving nodes, achieving the highest SDRE and low Rb. 
Thus, LEAPER1 shows the merits and overcomes the disadvantages of both LEAPER0 
(similar to REAR and CBF as discussed in subsection 2.5.2) and DTT. Though 
LEAPER2 and LEAPER3 show lower SDRE than LEAPER1 in this simulation, their 
performance could potentially be enhanced once the network partitions can be handled by 
integrating the existing robust message dissemination schemes into LEAPER.    
Figure 2.11 shows the end-to-end latency (TE) of these various protocols. BSL and 
LEAPER0 have similar TE, since they only transmit data packets in each hop. DTT, 
LEAPER1, LEAPER2, and LEAPER3 require the collection and relaying of trust tokens 
in each hop, so they incur higher latency in each hop. Figure 2.11 shows that bigger 
values of k (more tokens required in each hop) result in larger end-to-end latency, which 
is consistent to our previous analysis. However, the increased latency is still acceptable: 
the average hop number is 11, and TE of LEAPER3 is still less than 400ms. Thus, the 
average per-hop latency of LEAPER3 is still less than 40ms in this simulation setting.  
Thus it is arguable that the overall performance of LEAPER1, despite its higher TE, 
can be better than that of LEAPER0, DTT and BSL due to its much higher SDRE. The 
performance of these protocols will be comprehensively compared next. Note that 
LEAPER2 and LEAPER3 have lower SDRE than LEAPER1 due to network 
segmentations, so they are not considered in the comprehensive comparisons. 
Comprehensive Metrics: Here, a TCP-like end-to-end control protocol is implemented, 
where the source node will wait for an ACK from the destination node before it transmits 
the next data packet. If no ACK comes for 300ms, the source node will retransmit the 
data packet. Two metrics are designed here to indicate the comprehensive performance of 
LEAPER, DTT and BSL: expected overhead (OE) and expected latency (TL). OE is the 
average communication overhead (including data packets, single trust tokens and total 
trust tokens) for each successfully received data packet at the destination; TL is the 
averaged latency for each successfully received data packet. Here, pd is set to 0.1 and pm 
changes from 0.0 to 0.15 with step size 0.01. Again, the simulation is run 10 times and 
the metrics are averaged over all the simulation runs.  
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Figure 2.12 The overhead per successful delivery of DTT, BSL and LEAPER 
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Figure 2.13 The latency per successful delivery of DTT, BSL and LEAPER 
In Figure 2.12 the expected overhead is shown. LEAPER1 will outperform BSL and 
LEAPER0 when pm is bigger than 0.04 and 0.1, respectively. LEAPER0 can always 
outperform BSL and DTT. Here, DTT has the highest OE because it has SDRE similar to 
BSL but has to generate tokens in each hop as LEAPER1 does.  
The TL statistics are shown in Figure 2.13. Due to the high SDRE of LEAPER1, it can 
outperform BSL and DTT for any pm, and can outperform LEAPER0 when pm is larger 
than 0.04. LEAPER0 can always outperform BSL and DTT. This indicates that generally 
in face of misbehaving nodes LEAPER1 enables the destination to wait shorter for each 
authentic data packet. Meanwhile, the comprehensive performance of LEAPER1 is 
almost constant with the increase of pm, as shown in Figure 2.12 and Figure 2.13, which 
shows the robustness of LEAPER in face of misbehaving nodes.  
Moreover, LEAPER allows flexible configuration of k based on the specific 
application scenarios and desired tradeoff between security strength and performance. 
When there is no misbehaving node and only malfunctioning nodes in VANETs, k=0 is 
the best option. However, when misbehaving nodes exist k must at least be 1. When any 
tampered data packets cannot be tolerated by the destination, k can be set to 2 or higher in 
order to preclude any possibility of node collusions, at the cost of lower end-to-end SDR. 
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2.6 Summaries 
In this chapter, insightful investigation into data packet relaying in VANETs identifies 
four basic functions. A novel Adaptive Role Playing (ARP) strategy is then proposed to 
enable the nodes in each hop to contend to perform the basic functions, so that reliable 
and faithful data packet relaying is still achievable in face of malfunctioning and 
misbehaving nodes. LEAPER enables the nodes in each hop to securely and efficiently 
follow the ARP strategy. With each honest node in each hop contending to relay the 
authentic data packet and to vouch for it with tokens, the misbehaving and 
malfunctioning nodes are effectively detected and handled. Thus, LEAPER achieves both 
reliable and faithful data packet relaying in each hop, which is its major advantage over 
existing schemes. Ensuring both reliable and faithful data packet relaying, LEAPER is 
appealing to VANETs, where many applications rely on trustworthy multi-hop 
communications. Especially, the configurable security threshold k makes LEAPER 
flexible and adaptive to various network environments and applications requirements.  
In the future, the dynamic adjustment of k will be studied, so that LEAPER can 
achieve optimal tradeoff between security and performance in varying VANET 
environments. Another future work is to adopt the existing robust message dissemination 
schemes [162], [166] into LEAPER, so that LEAPER can effectively handle the network 
segmentations to achieve better end-to-end successful delivery ratio with k?2.  
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Chapter 3 Resource-Aware Message 
Verification in VANETs2 
Driven by various applications, verification of messages’ content integrity and 
authenticity is indispensable for VANETs. However, due to the numerous message 
exchanges in VANETs, message verification often leads to excessive resource 
consumption and even resource depletion in vehicular nodes. To tackle this scalability 
issue, a novel Resource-Aware Message Verification (RAMV) [143], [144] scheme is 
proposed in this chapter. With application-specific differentiation of messages to better 
support traffic safety applications, RAMV streamlines existing message verification 
schemes to keep their resource consumption within the preset resource budget. Besides, 
the common security requirements for message verification are properly met by RAMV. 
Enabling resource-aware, application-friendly and secure message verification, RAMV is 
especially appealing to VANETs. 
3.1 Introduction 
It is critical to ensure message authenticity and integrity in various VANET 
applications, especially the traffic safety applications. Thus, content verification and 
source verification are critical to VANETs to ensure message authenticity and message 
integrity, respectively. Regardless of the implementation details, message verification, 
especially source verification which relies on digital signature verification, is resource 
demanding.  
Thus, message verification may incur varying and excessive resource consumption in 
face of the massive message exchanges in VANETs. Such massive message exchanges 
result from the periodic messages broadcasted by each node to support traffic safety 
applications (Beacons) and various other applications (neighbor information for proactive 
routing [172], information abstract in epidemic routing [173], or message flooding [174]). 
Each node thus needs to verify numerous messages per second, the exact number of 
                                                 
2  The material contained in this chapter was previously published in the Journal of 
Security and Communication Networks. © 2011 Wiley-Blackwell. See Appendix B for a 
copy of the copyright transfer agreement.   
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which changes linearly with the node density in the neighborhood. The resource 
consumed by message verification, given any algorithm adopted, tends to be huge and 
will make message verification non-scalable. Moreover, the variances in resource 
consumption will also negatively affect the resource available to other applications.   
Thus, it is desirable to make message verification in each node resource-aware, in that 
its resource consumption in any circumstance will be bounded by the actual resource 
available to message verification, in form of a resource budget. For brevity, this chapter 
only explicitly considers the verification of Beacons, which, periodically broadcasted by 
each node to signal the driving status, may be the most prevalent messages in VANETs. 
However, as discussed throughout this chapter, the proposed scheme is also applicable to 
the verification of any kind of messages in VANETs.  
In this chapter, a Resource-Aware Message Verification (RAMV) scheme is proposed 
to streamline the existing message verification algorithms to make them both resource-
aware and application-friendly. Specifically, RAMV differentiates the Beacons based on 
their application relevance and latency requirements. Each node will mainly spend its 
resource budget in verifying the more important Beacons from the near-by neighbors or 
with safety-critical information, which are crucial to the traffic safety applications. This 
way, RAMV is also application-friendly by better supporting traffic safety applications 
given a limited resource budget. The less important Beacons generally will only be 
indirectly verified by the receiver with the help of its neighbors, at essentially no 
computation cost. Thus, even with a limited resource budget, RAMV still keeps the 
critical security strengths of message verification, in that 1) each Beacon will be verified 
by at least one receiver to timely disclose the misbehavior of data forging; and 2) each 
node is able to learn to validity/invalidity of each received Beacon to properly evaluate its 
neighbors, as in the reputation schemes [80], [86].  
In short, by properly differentiating received Beacons, RAMV ensures resource-aware, 
application-friendly and secure message verification, which underlies many important 
applications in VANETs. Thus, RAMV is especially appealing to the approaching 
massive deployment of VANETs.  
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3.2 Background and Related Work 
Here we will show the necessity of considering resource budget in message 
verification, as well as the drawbacks of the existing schemes in this light.  
3.2.1 Resource Budget 
A vehicular node is essentially a real-time system with limited (though abundant) 
resource in terms of memory, CPU time, I/O capabilities, and so on, to be shared by 
numerous applications. Here, we focus on the CPU time. The resource sharing usually is 
controlled by the resource allocation (scheduling) algorithms [175] which, simply put, 
provide each application with a certain resource in form of x CPU time out of y time units 
[175], [176]. Generally a resource budget is desirable to define the maximal resource 
consumption of each application and ensure reasonable resource sharing. Indeed, the 
traditional static priority scheduling [177] works well only when each task has a 
predictable workload, whereas the rate-based algorithms [175], [176], [178] actually 
enforce a resource budget for each application.  
In the context of message verification, the resource consumption/requirement will be 
measured by the number of messages verified given a certain cryptographic technique 
and content verification algorithm. Thus, our algorithm and analysis will be generic and 
independent of the concrete message verification algorithms adopted in VANETs. 
In VANETs, the resource requirement of message verification may vary greatly due to 
the wide range of the number of Beacons (nm) received per second. It is commonly 
suggested in the VANET community, for example by DSRC [10], that the common 
beaconing period (T) is 100ms, and the common communication range (R) is 300m. Thus,  
 nm=?R/T=10?R.                                (3.1) 
Here, ? is the node density of the concerned neighborhood, in unit of node per meter. 
One node has ?R 1-hop neighbors within its communication range, each of which will 
broadcast 10 (1/T) Beacons per second. Thus, (3.1) follows. In urban scenarios it is 
common for one node to have tens of 1-hop neighbors and thus to receive hundreds of 
Beacons per second, resulting in the excessive resource consumption by message 
verification. Besides, ? generally changes significantly in different geographic locations 
and time periods. The variances in nm, and the variances in resource consumption thus 
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caused, will negatively affect the resource allocation algorithms as discussed in [175], 
and potentially harm other VANET applications in this way.  
Thus, it is critical to ensure that message verification follows its resource budget, 
which can be expressed in the number of Beacons (NM) one node is allowed to verify per 
second. It also can equivalently be expressed as the number of neighbors (NB) one node 
can maintain if it verifies all Beacons from its neighbors. Thus,   
 NM = NB ? 1/T.                                 (3.2) 
Equation (3.2) follows, since each neighbor will broadcast 1/T Beacons every second.  
Two dimensions of resource budget will be investigated here: hard vs. soft and static 
vs. dynamic. The hard budget needs to be strictly met in any statistic period to prevent 
any application from violating its resource budget in a resource stringent environment. 
The soft one only needs to be statistically followed, serving as the application design 
guideline [179], [180]. The resource budget may remain static over a long period. Or it 
can be dynamically determined by the scheduler of the operation system [178] based on 
the runtime resource requirements of all applications. Hereafter, the types of resource 
budget will always be clarified whenever necessary. 
3.2.2 Related Work 
So far, the resource issue has been only insufficiently addressed in the existing 
schemes for message verification. First, the existing source verification and content 
verification algorithms generally focus on the functionalities, without systematically 
considering the overall resource consumption.  
The well-known cryptographic techniques for message verification include ECDSA 
[181], RSA [182], group signature [40], etc. RSA and group signature may not be 
suitable for VANETs due to their excessively long signatures compared to ECDSA. 
ECDSA is recommended in WAVE [9] for VANETs, but it is computationally 
demanding as shown in various performance evaluations [171], [183]-[186]. For instance, 
an evaluation of ECDSA on a Pentium platform [185] shows that one signature 
verification requires 31ms and 47ms for ECDSA P224 and P256, respectively. Thus, one 
node with the same configuration can only verify 32 (in case of P224) and 21 (in case of 
P256) Beacons every second. Additionally, the computation platform installed in vehicles 
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is unlikely to be cutting-edge for cost considerations. Thus, if ECDSA is to be 
implemented in VANETs, its resource requirement must be brought under the control of 
resource budget. Exemplary content verification schemes include [66]-[68], which, 
though not so computation extensive as the cryptographic algorithms, still will incur 
significant resource consumption in face of massive message exchanges. 
Besides, many schemes [45], [71], [187]-[191] have been proposed specifically for 
efficient message verification in VANETs. However, as we will show shortly, these 
schemes fail to be resource-aware, application-friendly and secure at the same time, and 
thus can be further improved by RAMV.  
In both TESLA [187] and TDAS [188], each message contains a hashed value hash(v), 
and v will be revealed in the next message from the same sender. The receiver can thus 
verify the received message by performing the relatively lightweight hash function. 
However, the receiver needs to wait for the next message to verify the current message, 
which will lead to high communication overhead and latency. Besides, any message loss 
will make its previous message unverifiable. The on-demand verification scheme [189] 
only verifies those messages which can raise an alert or warning to the applications, to 
reduce resource consumption. This, however, will leave most messages unverified so that 
the data forging attack cannot be detected in time. The batch verification schemes [190], 
[191] allow the receiver nodes to verify multiple messages in a batch. Their common 
drawback lies in the latency incurred by the accumulation of received messages, which is 
undesirable to the messages with high application significance.  
[45] proposes group signature-based self-signing certificates to reduce the size of 
certificates, and further proposes only attaching certificate to every 1 out of ? messages. 
Thus, the resource consumption of verifying certificate is significantly reduced. However, 
as stated in [45], the signature part of each message still needs to be verified. Thus, 
excessive resource consumption can still occur in [45]. Similarly, [71] proposes several 
approaches to reduce the resource consumption of beaconing in VANETs, including only 
attaching certificates and signature to 1 out of n messages at the sender’s side, as well as 
only verifying 1 out of m messages at the receiver’s side. So far, [71] is the most relevant 
scheme to RAMV. However, [71] does not investigate the impacts of these approaches 
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on the safety implications and security strengths of message verification, nor presents a 
systematic way to configure the relevant parameters.   
In [192], the authors propose to solve the scalability issues in VANET communications 
with relevance-based message transmission. Each node estimates the application 
relevance of its messages and schedules the transmission of its messages accordingly. 
Thus, with limited bandwidth the messages with greater application relevance will be 
broadcasted first, ensuring maximal application benefits to the whole VANETs. Though 
the focus of this work is orthogonal to RAMV, the concept of application relevance is 
indeed useful to our work.  
Thus, it is necessary for RAMV to ensure resource-aware, application-friendly and 
secure message verification in VANETs, which has not been satisfactorily addressed yet. 
3.3 RAMV Overview 
RAMV differentiates the received Beacons based on their application significance to 
meet the stringent resource and security requirements. As shown in Figure 3.1, this 
differentiation is performed by three modules: Distance-Based Resource-aware 
Verification (DBRV), Event Triggered Verification (ETV) and Piggybacked Invalid 
Message Notification (PIMN).  
In DBRV, the application significance of each received Beacon will be ranked based 
on the distance between the receiver and the sender, since the Beacons from the near-by 
neighbors are more important to the driving safety of the receiver. DBRV will provide a 
strategy for message verification based on the current resource budget, with which the 
specific message verification algorithms such as ECDSA [181] will selectively verify the 
received Beacons. DBRV ensures that the more important Beacons will be directly 
verified with a higher probability, better supporting the traffic safety applications. The 
verification results will be adopted by the relevant reputation schemes or misbehavior 
detection schemes to update the evaluations on the corresponding senders. Among all 
received Beacons, the valid ones and the unchecked ones will be processed by the traffic 
safety applications.  
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Figure 3.1 The overview of RAMV with message flows 
If one traffic safety application regards one unchecked Beacon (BC) as critical, the 
ETV module will signal the verification algorithms to immediately verify BC. Thus, any 
critical Beacons, no matter how far their senders are, will be verified before they affect 
the traffic safety applications.  
Whenever an invalid Beacon (BI) is identified in DBRV, the PIMN module will 
construct a notification of BI to broadcast the verification result of BI by piggybacking it 
to the next outgoing Beacon. On the other hand, the notifications piggybacked in the 
received Beacons will be processed by PIMN to infer the properties of the previously 
unchecked Beacons. These indirect verification results will also be adopted by the 
reputation schemes.  
Thus, by enabling each node to focus its resource on Beacons important to traffic 
safety, DBRV and ETV ensure reliable traffic safety applications while following the 
resource budget. PIMN enables each node to learn the property of each received Beacon 
either by direct verification or from the piggybacked notifications, ensuring security 
strengths. As such, RAMV streamlines the existing message verification algorithms to 
enable resource-aware, application-friendly and secure message verification in VANETs. 
3.4 DBRV 
As previously discussed, DBRV enables each node to spend its resource budget in 
verifying the Beacons with high application significance. A novel concept, relevance 
rank, is proposed in the first place to model the Beacons’ application significance.  
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Figure 3.3 The exemplary relevance ranks in the multi-lane model 
3.4.1 Distance-Based Relevance Rank 
In the context of traffic safety applications, the Beacons from the nearby neighbors are 
more relevant to the receiver, since the driving states of such neighbors will potentially 
have bigger impact on the receiver. Thus, the concept of relevance rank is proposed 
based on the distances between the neighboring nodes.   
Single-lane Model: In the single-lane scenario, node A’s relevance rank to node B, 
denoted as RBA, can be calculated by node B as:   
 ? ?: ( ), / 2BAR X X Nei B XZ AB? ? ? .             (3.3) 
In (3.3), Nei(B) is the set of B’s 1-hop neighbors, and Z is the middle point of line 
segment AB . The operator | | either calculates the set cardinality or the line segment 
length, as defined by the context. Hence, RBA is equal to the number of nodes between A 
and B, and indicates how relevant A is to B compared to B’s other neighbors. In single-
lane scenarios, the relevance ranks of node B’s neighbors are shown in Figure 3.2.  
Multi-lane Model: If node B is in a road junction or a road with multiple lanes, RBA 
will be    
 ? ?: ( ) & & / 2BAR X X Nei B BX AB? ?? ? ?? ?? ? .        (3.4) 
In (3.4), RBA is now determined by the absolute distance ranks of node B’s neighbors. 
(3.4) ensures that B will have exactly two neighbors with the same relevance rank, as 
shown in Figure 3.3. Similar to the single-lane model, this multi-lane model also 
considers the spatial symmetries of the neighborhood.  
Both absolute distances and relative positions among the neighboring nodes are 
considered in relevance rank to comprehensively reflect the application relevance of 
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different senders’ Beacons. Generally, only the sender and the receiver in the same 
driving direction are considered for relevance rank, except for the road junctions.  
It is feasible for each node to calculate the relevance rank of each of its neighbors. In 
VANETs, each node can figure out its surrounding road layouts with the help of GPS, so 
it can choose the proper relevance rank model correspondingly. According to DSRC [10], 
Beacons contain the positions of the senders, with which each node can learn the current 
positions of all its 1-hop neighbors. Thus, each node can calculate the relevance ranks of 
its neighbors with (3.3) and (3.4). In case of other messages, relevance rank can be 
similarly defined based on their application-specific properties, as indicated by the 
application relevance concept in [192]. As another example, the messages for epidemic 
information broadcast may define the relevance rank based on the information 
similarities of such messages. That is, one receiver may assign the relevance rank 0 to the 
message with the most new information, assign the relevance rank 1 to the message with 
the second most new information, and so on.  
With each received Beacon differentiated, the receiver can schedule its verification 
operations accordingly based on its current resource budget, either soft or hard. 
3.4.2 Probabilistic Message Verification based on Soft Budget 
A probabilistic message verification algorithm is proposed here to enable each node to 
schedule its message verification to meet its soft resource budget. If the receiver has 
fewer 1-hop neighbors than its resource budget NB, it will verify all received Beacons 
without violating NB. Otherwise, Beacons with relevance rank 0 will always be verified to 
ensure driving safety and other Beacons will be probabilistically verified to meet the 
resource budget.  
This algorithm is performed with the help of a filtering probability p, which is decided 
based on NB as we will discuss shortly. A node, say node A, will verify the Beacon from 
X?Nei(A), with a probability PAX determined by the relevance rank RAX and p as  
 AXRAXP p? .                                   (3.5) 
Specifically, as shown in Figure 3.4, when a Beacon is received its verification 
probability (Thres) is calculated based on p and the sender’s relevance rank with (3.5). A 
random test will be performed to decide whether to verify it or not based on Thres. 
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/*This function probabilistically verify received Beacons.*/
1 Probabilistic_Authen(msg)
2     R = Find_Rank(msg);      //get the relevance rank  
3     Thres = p^R;                    //probability threshold
4     Coin = uniform();            //random number in [0, 1]
5     Flag = 0;                         //indicator initialization
6     If Coin < Thres               //will verify msg
7         Flag = Authenticate(msg);         
8     Else                                  //will not verify
9         Set Flag to Unchecked ;    //regard msg as authentic
10     EndIf
11     If Flag is Valid or Unchecked          
12         Update_Rank(msg);  //Update the relevance rank
13     Endif
14 EndofFunction
 
Figure 3.4 The detailed probabilistic verification algorithm 
Here, for brevity the receivers verifying one Beacon are called the active receivers of 
this Beacon, while the receivers choosing not to verify it are called idle receivers. If one 
Beacon is detected to be invalid, it will be discarded. Otherwise, the sender’s position 
will be updated, and the relevance ranks of all neighbors will be updated accordingly 
based on (3.3) or (3.4).  
The filtering probability p is determined based on the resource budget NB (or 
equivalently, NM). The feasible values of RAX are 0, 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, etc. as shown in Figure 
3.2 and Figure 3.3. Therefore, on average the resource consumption of A is:  
 nc = 2(1 + p + p2 + p3 + …) ? 2/(1?p).               (3.6) 
The resource consumption nc should be smaller than the resource budget, so  
 nc ? NB.                                      (3.7) 
To give the resource budget a margin, let the equation hold in (3.6). Thus, it follows: 
 p ? (NB?2)/NB.                                 (3.8) 
Thus, (3.8) can be used to derive p based on NB. For instance, if NB is 4, p can be set to 
any value no bigger than 1/2. With p derived as such, any node could perform 
probabilistic message verification without violating the soft resource budget (NB). 
3.4.3 Probabilistic Message Verification based on Hard Budget 
To ensure that in any statistic period, say 10 seconds, each node’s resource 
consumption nc is strictly less than its resource budget NB, the procedures shown in 
Figure 3.4 will be modified so that the probability in (3.5) will be strictly followed. Here, 
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each node maintains a counter vector CV, the rth element of which is [ ] 1/ rCV r p? ?? ? ? . 
Thus, CV indicates how frequently the messages with different relevance ranks should be 
verified. Each node keeps track of how many messages with relevance rank r are 
unchecked with another vector RV.  
The procedures in Figure 3.4 will be updated as follows. Once a Beacon with relevance 
rank r is received, RV[r] will be increased by 1. If RV[r] is equal to CV[r], this Beacon 
will be verified, and RV[r] is reset to 0. Otherwise, this Beacon will not be verified. In 
this process, the probability of the messages with relevance rank r being verified is 
strictly less than that indicated by (3.5). Thus, the resource consumption of each node 
will be strictly less than NB as indicated by (3.6). 
3.4.4 Simplistic Resource-Aware Message Verification 
A simplistic algorithm for scheduling message verification according to the resource 
budget is proposed here. With this algorithm, each node will only verify the Beacons with 
a relevance rank less than or equal to ? ?/ 2 1BN ?? ?? ? . Here, the hard (soft) resource budget 
can be met by any node, which will always have resource consumption of 
2 / 2B BN N?? ?? ? . Intuitive and simple to implement, this algorithm can serve as an 
alternative to the probabilistic algorithms. 
3.5 PIMN 
In DBRV, except when NB and p are big enough or the node density is extremely low, 
idle receivers generally will exist for each Beacon. To enable such idle receivers to learn 
the validity/invalidity of each Beacon, a novel PIMN module is proposed here. 
3.5.1 Detailed Procedures 
The main procedures of PIMN consist of three parts, as shown in Figure 3.5.  
Beacon Processing: The active receiver verifies the received Beacon with the help of 
DBRV, as shown in Figure 3.5. If one invalid Beacon (BI) is detected, one notification to 
accuse BI is constructed and added to the notification pool, which contains the pending 
notifications of all previously identified invalid Beacons.  
59 
 
 
Figure 3.5 The detailed procedures of PIMN 
Notification Processing: Upon receiving a Beacon (Bi), the receiver will process the 
notifications piggybacked, if any, in Bi as follows.  
Case I: If one notification accuses a Beacon which has already been verified by this 
node, or has not been received yet, this notification will be disregarded.  
Case II: If Bi has been (either directly or indirectly) verified as a valid Beacon, these 
piggybacked notifications are regarded as acceptable, and will be processed by the 
following approaches. Otherwise, if Bi has been verified (either directly or indirectly) as 
invalid, the notifications will simply be discarded.  
For the acceptable notifications, the following approaches can be applied to determine 
the property of the accused Beacons, i.e. to indirectly verify the accused Beacons.     
Approach I: The receiver evaluates the accused Beacon (Ba) based on all notifications 
about Ba. Ba is regarded as invalid if multiple (more than 2) notifications accuse it. 
Otherwise Ba is regarded as valid due to the lack of evidence.      
Approach II: The receiver starts to verify the accused Beacon (Ba) even if only one 
acceptable notification about Ba is received. The property of Ba can thus be immediately 
figured out at the cost of one more message verification operation.  
Both approaches allow the idle receivers to learn the invalid Beacons based on the 
received notifications. Their performance and security implications will be analyzed in 
details in section 3.7.  
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Beacon Transmission: When it is time to broadcast a new Beacon (Bn) based on the 
periodic beaconing timer, the node will first construct Bn based on its driving status. Then 
all the notifications in the notification pool will be piggybacked in Bn. The piggybacking 
approach is adopted here to reduce the bandwidth requirement. 
3.5.2 Evaluation of Beacons and Notifications 
The following strategies for evaluating Beacons and notifications are given to strictly 
define the terms of valid/invalid Beacons and acceptable notifications. 
Without being directly verified by one receiver ni, a Beacon Bi is regarded as valid by 
ni if, 1) ni has waited for a Beaconing period T without receiving any piggybacked 
notification about Bi, or 2) ni receives one or more acceptable notifications IN(Bi) but still 
confirms the validity of Bi with either Approach I or Approach II as discussed above.  
Similarly, a Beacon Bi is indirectly verified as being invalid if ni receives one or more 
acceptable notifications IN(Bi) and confirms the invalidity of Bi with Approach I or 
Approach II as discussed above.  
One notification IN(Bi) is regarded as acceptable only if its bearer Beacon (Bj), the 
Beacon to which IN(Bi) is piggybacked, is directly or indirectly verified to be valid.  
Thus, any unchecked Beacon can be indirectly verified based on only acceptable 
notifications with a bounded latency. Given that in VANETs most Beacons are valid and 
most nodes are honest in sending out notifications, most unchecked Beacons will be 
regarded as being valid after T due to the absence of any notification. Only very few 
unchecked Beacons are invalid, which can be indirectly verified as being invalid after 2T: 
the receiver only needs to wait for T to get the piggybacked notification, and at most 
another T to verify that the notification is acceptable. This latency is acceptable, since the 
unchecked Beacons are not quite relevant to the receiver as determined in DBRV. 
3.5.3 Adaptive Organization of Notifications 
A normal Beacon has the following packet format: {NID, PID, Data, Signature, 
Cert(NID)}. Here, NID is the sender’s real identity, or pseudonym if privacy is concerned 
here. Adopted in privacy protection schemes [113], [125], a pseudonym is a temporary 
identifier without any obvious connection to the real identity of a node. If pseudonym is 
adopted here, RAMV can still successfully update the relevance ranks of the neighbors 
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without knowing their real identities. Actually, mainly concerning the locations of the 
neighbors, RAMV is oblivious to whether NID is a real identity or a pseudonym. Thus, 
RAMV is compatible to the common privacy protection schemes [113], [125] for 
VANETs, and will not pose any hurdles to privacy protection. PID is the packet ID of the 
Beacon, locally assigned by the sender. Data is the application specific data structure 
containing driving states. Signature is the sender’s digital signature of the hash of the 
NID, PID and Data to ensure message integrity. The piggybacked notifications will also 
be included in this signature to ensure message integrity. Cert(NID) is the certificate of 
the NID, which may not be present in every Beacon according to [45], [71].  
As shown in Figure 3.5, each notification of one Beacon (Bi) has the format 
{NID||PID}, since NID and PID concatenated together can uniquely identify Bi. The 
content of Bi is not needed in the notification, since the interested receivers of the 
notification are supposed to have received Bi. Each notification needs several bytes in the 
Beacon, and without loss of generality here both NID and PID are assumed to be 4 bytes. 
The number of pending notifications in each node may change greatly with the 
environments, so the space required for the piggybacked notifications will also change. 
This uncertainty in space requirement is undesirable for Beacon construction, so here an 
adaptive notification organization technique is proposed as shown in Figure 3.6 to ensure 
a relatively constant space requirement in various scenarios.  
Beacon Flag NID||PID BFCNID||PID
Notifications
Figure 3.6 The format of piggybacked notifications 
As shown in Figure 3.6, the 1-byte Flag field is used to indicate the format of the 
piggybacked notifications. If there are no more than 2 notifications, the attached 
notifications will be in the plain format. Here the piggybacked part will be no longer than 
17 bytes long. If there are more notifications to attach, the bloom filter [193] coefficients 
(BFC) can be used instead to indicate the Beacons in this notification. The main idea is to 
hash the {NID||PID} of each notification, resulting in a value v. Each bit in v with value 
‘1’ will be used to set the corresponding bit in the BFC. On the receiver side, each 
{NID||PID} of the previously received Beacons will be hashed similarly, and the resulted 
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value v* will be checked against BFC. If each ‘1’ bit of v* has a corresponding ‘1’ bit in 
BFC, this Beacon is included in the notification. Thus, BFC with a specific size can 
indicate various numbers of Beacons. Here we set the filter (BFC) size m=128 bits and 
the hash round k=6, which is sufficient to indicate dozens of Beacons. The total length of 
the notification will also be 17 bytes in this case. 
3.6 ETV 
As previously discussed, DBRV ensures that the Beacons with high relevance ranks 
will be directly verified, while PIMN enables other Beacons to be indirectly verified with 
a bounded latency. This differentiation is proper to the routine Beacons containing 
normal driving states. However, the safety-critical Beacons, which may contain warning 
of abrupt braking or mechanical malfunctions of the sender, need to be verified by all 
receivers immediately to ensure driving safety. To this end, the Event-Triggered 
Verification (ETV) module is proposed.  
As shown in Figure 3.1, ETV serves as a bridge between the safety applications and 
the message verification algorithms. Once the safety applications detect an unchecked 
Beacon (Bi) as safety-critical, ETV will pass Bi back to the message verification 
algorithms for immediate verification. Afterward, the safety applications will process Bi 
according to the verification result. In ETV, the detection of safety-critical Beacons can 
and only can be performed by the specific safety applications. With simple internal 
message buffer operation ETV can pass the safety critical Beacon to the message 
verification algorithms. The technical details may be too platform-specific to be 
elaborated on here. However, the feasibility of ETV is evident from the above reasoning, 
and also justified by the existing on-demand verification scheme [189].  
Though the main idea of ETV is similar to that of the on-demand verification [189], 
ETV is actually more effective and powerful with the help of DBRV and PIMN. In [189] 
only the critical Beacons will ever be verified, thus the misbehaving nodes broadcasting 
invalid Beacons will not be detected in time if such Beacons are not regarded as critical 
by the receivers. Moreover, [189] actually has a security loophole. Suppose an adversary 
A broadcasts a sequence of invalid routine Beacons? ?iB? , each with incrementally invalid 
data about its driving states, so they will not be verified by any receivers. As a result, A’s 
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neighbors will use ? ?iB? to build an invalid model of A, ( )A iM B?? .  In the end, if A sends 
out a safety-critical Beacon 1iB
?
? , which is invalid but seems consistent with the preceding 
? ?iB? , 1iB?? will not be detected by [189] as being invalid due to the invalid model 
( )A iM B
?? . Comparatively, in RAMV with the help of DBRV and PIMN each node 
practically verifies both the signature and the content of each received Beacon, either 
directly or indirectly. The invalid Beacons ? ?iB?  will be identified and discarded once 
received, and the reputation of node A will be significantly decreased. Eventually, the 
false critical Beacon 1iB
?
? will not be trusted by any receivers with ETV.   
Regarding resource consumption, generally most Beacons are not critical Beacons and 
contain only routine information. Thus, no significant overhead will be incurred by ETV 
for additionally verifying the unchecked critical Beacons. Besides, the resource budget 
margin provided in DBRV will cover the overhead of ETV, if any. If in any case critical 
Beacons become prevalent, ETV can simply override the scheduling of DBRV and spend 
the resource budget mainly on the safety critical Beacons, so that the safety-critical 
Beacons will be always verified. 
3.7 Analysis of RAMV 
In subsections 3.4.2, 3.4.3 and 3.4.4, three algorithms have been proposed for DBRV: 
probabilistic message verification based on soft budget, probabilistic message verification 
based on hard budget, and simplistic resource-aware message verification. Hereafter, 
RAMV-S, RAMV-H and RAMV-SIM are used to denote RAMV adopting these 
algorithms, respectively. Whenever proper, RAMV will be compared to two alternative 
baseline schemes: BSL1 and BSL2. BSL1 represents the simplest best-effort message 
verification schemes, where each node attempts to verify all received Beacon. BSL2 
adopts the main idea of [71], making each node verify 1 Beacon out of every nt received 
Beacons. In both BSL1 and BSL2, in case of insufficient resource, after a period TP the 
buffered Beacons will be simply discarded. 
3.7.1 Quantitative Properties 
Here we analyze RAMV’s quantitative properties by comparison with BSL1 and BSL2. 
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3.7.1.1 Resource Consumption 
Let ncb1, ncb2, nch, ncs and ncsim denote the resource consumption per second of BSL1, 
BSL2, RAMV-H, RAMV-S and RAMV-SIM, respectively. Suppose one node has Ni 1-
hop neighbors at time i. Further suppose this node has a total resource of NA. 
In case of BSL1, ncb1=Ni if Ni ? NA; ncb1=NA if Ni > NA. Thus, BSL1 results in varying 
resource consumption even when the resource is sufficient. When Ni becomes larger than 
NA, resource depletion will happen to the VANET nodes.   
In case of BSL2, ncb2=Ni/nt. BSL2 only rigidly scales down the resource consumption 
with a factor of 1/nt without considering the available resource, and varying resource 
consumption can still be caused by the varying Ni. 
Comparatively, from subsection 3.4 we have ncsim?NB, ncs=2/(1?p)?NB, and nch<NB. 
Besides, as we will show in subsection 3.7.3 and the simulation results, the additional 
message verification caused by ETV and PIMN is negligible compared to that of DBRV. 
Thus, overall RAMV results in relatively stable resource consumption bounded by the 
resource budget (NB), which is more desirable than both BSL1 and BSL2. 
3.7.1.2 Active Receivers of One Beacon 
In RAMV, the number of active receivers (na) of a Beacon follows two theorems.  
Theorem 1: Among all receivers at least one active receiver exists for any Beacon.  
Proof: From both single-lane model and multi-lane model of relevance rank, any node 
A at least has 1 neighbor B such that RBA=0. Meanwhile, all resource-aware algorithms in 
section 3.4 ensure that B will directly verify every Beacon from A if RBA=0.    
Theorem 2: In RAMV-S and RAMV-H, E[na] also follows (3.6). In RAMV-SIM, 
na=NB. 
This theorem can easily be proven with the similar reasoning as shown in section 3.4.   
Thus, RAMV ensures that any Beacon will be verified by at least 1 active receiver. 
Comparatively, BSL1 may actually leave a bunch of Beacons unchecked at the end of Tp, 
when resource is insufficient. In BSL2, one Beacon will be verified by any of its 
receivers with probability (nt?1)/nt. Thus, the probability that this Beacon is not verified 
by any receiver is ( 1) /i iN Nt tn n? , which is non-zero as long as nt is bigger than 1.  
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3.7.1.3 False Positive Ratio and False Negative Ratio 
The false positive ratio is the probability that the receiver mistakes a valid Beacon as 
being invalid, and the false negative ratio is the probability that the receiver mistakes an 
invalid Beacon as being valid. The false positive ratio and false negative ratio are denoted 
as RP and RN, respectively.  
In BSL1, the probability that one received Beacon will be verified by the receiver, 
Pr{Directly Verified}, is min(NA/Ni, 1). Thus, if the receiver has sufficient resource it will 
verify all received Beacons, with RP=RN=0. When resource is insufficient, if the receiver 
regards all unchecked Beacons as invalid (let pm denote the ratio of invalid Beacons), RP 
= (1?pm)(Ni?NA)/Ni and RN=0; if the receiver regards unchecked Beacons as valid RP=0 
and  RN = pm(Ni?NA)/Ni. Thus, in BSL1, either RP or RN will be positive when the 
resource is insufficient. In case of BSL2, Pr{Unchecked}=(nt?1)/nt. Thus, with similar 
reasoning, RP or RN will also be quite large as long as nt is bigger than 1, no matter 
whether the resource is sufficient or not.  
In RAMV, with PIMN each Beacon is either directly verified by the receiver, or 
indirectly verified based on the presence or absence of notifications. Thus, RP is the 
probability that one valid Beacon BV is regarded as invalid due to the false notifications 
from some misbehaving neighbors. However, as discussed in section 3.5, with Approach 
II for indirect verification, this is impossible. With Approach I, RP will be negligible, 
since the collusion among multiple misbehaving neighbors is required to successfully 
deceive the receiver.  
In RAMV, RN is the probability that one invalid Beacon BI is regarded as valid due to 
the absence of any notifications. This is actually the probability that the notifications 
from na active receiver of BI are all lost due to transmission collision or reception error, 
which generally is negligible when na is reasonably big. Thus, in RAMV, RN is negligible 
as shown in the simulation results in section 3.8.   
In summary, RAMV will result in much smaller RN and RP than both BSL1 and BSL2. 
Thus, RAMV can better support both traffic safety applications and reputation schemes 
in face of limited resource budget and high node density. 
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3.7.2 Security Properties  
Given a resource budget, RAMV enables each node to directly verify as many 
important Beacons as possible to ensure reliable traffic safety applications. With PIMN 
each node can indirectly verify the Beacons which have not been directly verified, as 
discussed in subsection 3.5.2. Besides, RAMV also ensures that any Beacon will be 
verified by at least 1 neighbor, so that any invalid Beacon can be promptly detected by 
the receivers. Thus, RAMV shows salient safety and security properties while meeting 
the resource budget, as long as its design goals will not be disrupted by any potential 
attacks, which will be thoroughly investigated next.  
In VANETs, it is reasonable to assume that most nodes will participate in RAMV 
honestly. The fact that a hardware security module (tampering-proof hardware) [36] can 
be used to protect the cryptographic materials implies that the Sybil attack will be quite 
impossible in VANETs. Even if one node somehow manages to launch the Sybil attack, 
the Sybil attack can be detected and handled by the existing schemes [64], and this node 
may be punished by the misbehaving node eviction schemes [90] or with reputation 
schemes [80], [86]. Thus, in RAMV we only consider the following attacks.  
Invalid Data: One misbehaving node may intentionally send out Beacons with false 
position data. As discussed before, several neighbors of this node will work as active 
receivers and detect the invalid data through content verification. PIMN will ensure that 
most receivers of such Beacons will learn of their invalidity. Even based on the wrong 
positions, this node’s Beacons will be verified as those of the normal nodes. Thus, it is 
impossible to allure any node into verifying more messages than its resource budget by 
broadcasting invalid positions. 
One node may also send out numerous false safety-critical Beacons, which will incur 
additional resource consumption in the ETV module of the receivers and disrupt DBRV. 
Fortunately, ETV ensures that such fake critical Beacons will all be timely verified, so 
that the reputation of this node will be decreased sharply. After a while the Beacons from 
this node will be ignored and this node may be evicted from VANETs, as in [90].   
Bad-mouthing: One node may send out a notification to wrongly accuse another node 
of broadcasting invalid Beacons in the bad-mouthing attack. As discussed in subsection 
67 
 
3.7.1, the false positive ratio of RAMV is negligible and the bad-mouthing attack can be 
effectively handled. Additionally, as discussed in PIMN, this node needs to attach its 
digital signature for the invalid notification, which can serve as proof to countermeasure 
against itself. In case of Approach II for indirect verification, one node may attempt to 
allure its neighbors into verifying more Beacons by attaching numerous invalid 
notifications to its Beacons. However, this attack can be easily detected by its neighbors, 
and its future notifications can be simply ignored. Thus, the resource consumption of any 
node will not be disrupted by the bad-mouthing attack. 
3.7.3 Computation Complexity 
To further corroborate the salient properties of RAMV in reducing resource 
consumption, the computation complexity of RAMV will be analyzed here.  
In DBRV, the relevance ranks of all the (Ni) neighbors need to be updated upon 
receiving a Beacon. Thus, DBRV requires 10Ni?Ni=O(Ni2) comparisons for relevance 
rank updating each second. In PIMN, assuming that each node will send out invalid 
Beacons with probability pm, 10Ni?pm piggybacking operations will be required per 
second. In reasonable scenarios pm is small and this overhead is much smaller than the 
normal beaconing. In ETV, only 1 buffer operation will be incurred by each safety-
critical Beacon, since the verification of the safety critical Beacon can be covered by the 
resource budget in DBRV. Assuming that the safety critical beacons are quite rare, this 
overhead of ETV is still acceptable.  
Thus, DBRV incurs the biggest computation overhead among all modules of RAMV. 
However, most traffic safety applications also require regular update of the neighbor 
locations. Thus, the computation overhead of location and relevance rank update can 
actually be shared by RAMV and traffic safety applications. Even counting DBRV’s 
computation overhead as it is, the overall computation overhead of RAMV may still be 
acceptable compared to the computation extensive cryptographic and mathematic 
operations of message verification algorithms. 
3.7.4 Application Significance 
RAMV makes message verification scalable and resource-aware in VANETs in face of 
increasing node density and massive message exchanges. Though proposed explicitly for 
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Beacons, RAMV is also easily applicable to other messages by slightly modifying the 
concept of relevance rank as discussed before. In VANETs, there will be many types of 
periodic messages necessitated by numerous applications, as discussed in section 3.1. 
Thus, RAMV is especially appealing to the realistic deployment of VANETs. 
3.8 Simulations 
A NS2 [169] based simulation with realistic vehicle mobility traces generated by 
MOVE [170] is constructed to evaluate RAMV. Totally 200 nodes are simulated within a 
2000 by 3000 meters region. The simulation parameters are summarized in Table 3.1. In 
this simulation, each node on average has about 20 1-hop neighbors. Here for 
convenience, the resource consumption is measured with the unit of node as discussed in 
(3.2). RAMV will be compared with BSL1 and BSL2 in the following two scenarios. 
 
3.8.1 Limited Resource Scenarios 
In this scenario, VANET nodes do not have sufficient resource for message 
verification, either due to computation extensive cryptographic algorithms, or high node 
density. This scenario is common for realistic VANETs. Without struggling with 
technical details, we suppose that each node can only verify 120 Beacons or maintain 12 
neighbors per second (NA=12). As previously discussed, BSL1 and BSL2 will simply 
discard the Beacons pending for verification at the end of each second. In BSL2, we set nt 
to 2, so that each node will verify every other received Beacon. In RAMV, resource 
budget NB will be 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, and filtering probability p will change 
accordingly.  
Resource Consumption (NC): In Figure 3.7, the NC statistics for RAMV, BSL1, BSL2, 
as well as NB, are shown. Figure 3.7 shows that all RAMV versions have NC curves lower 
than the NB curve and satisfyingly meet the resource Budget NB. Note here that the 
resource consumption of RAMV includes that caused by PIMN and ETV.  
Table 3.1 
Simulation parameters of RAMV 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
# of vehicles 200 Bit-rate 6 Mbps 
Road length 10km T 100ms 
R 300m Average velocity 20m/s 
MAC 802.11 Simulation Time 200s 
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Figure 3.7 The resource consumption statistics of BSL and RAMV 
As discussed in section 3.7, generally RAMV-SIM, RAMV-S and RAMV-H follow 
their resource budget increasingly more strictly. Thus, the differences between their NC 
statistics in Figure 3.7 are reasonable. Comparatively, the resource consumption of BSL1 
basically reaches NA, so no sufficient resource is left for the other applications. BSL2, by 
only verifying one half of all received Beacons, leaves some resource for other 
applications. However, being not resource-aware, given higher node density even BSL2 
will also face resource depletion.  
In Figure 3.7, the fact that NC of BSL1 is slightly smaller than 12 is caused by the 
Beacon loss in VANETs. The Beacon loss can be caused by the reception errors at the 
receiver side due to high vehicle mobility, or by MAC layer collisions of several 
simultaneously transmitting nodes. As indicated by the recent proof of concept tests [194] 
of the VII Consortium, Beacon loss is common in realistic VANETs. Thus, any receiver 
may only receive fewer than 10 Beacons from one neighbor per second, so the actual 
resource consumption of any node will be reduced. The Beacon loss also contributes to 
the gaps between the NC curves of RAMV and the NB curve in Figure 3.7.    
Number of Active Receivers (na): As shown in Figure 3.8, the na data of all RAMV 
versions are larger than 1, and closely follow (3.6). Thus, the simulation results here 
corroborate Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 in subsection 3.7.1. In the lower sub-figure, the 
violation ratio (RO) rigorously records the ratio of the Beacons with na=0 to all Beacons. 
Thus, RO is the probability that one Beacon will not be verified by any receivers. For all 
RAMV versions, RO is practically 0 (on the order of 10?4), which is much lower than 
those of BSL1 and BSL2, as shown in Figure 3.8.   
70 
 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
2
4
6
8
10
12
p
n a
 
 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0
0.1
0.2
p
R
O
 
 
BSL1 BSL2 RAMV-H RAMV-S RAMV-SIM nat
 
Figure 3.8 The numbers of active receivers of BSL and RAMV 
Thus, with limited resource, RAMV practically ensures that any Beacon will be 
verified by at least one receiver, better supporting VANET applications than both BSL1 
and BSL2. The theoretical na, nat, is also shown in Figure 3.8, and the difference between 
nat and the na curves of RAMV is also caused by Beacon loss in VANETs. 
Ratio of Verification (RV): In Figure 3.9, RV1 indicates the probability that one 
received Beacon will be directly verified in BSL1, BSL2 and RAMV. RV2 is the 
probability that one Beacon will be either directly or indirectly verified in RAMV. As 
shown in Figure 3.9, RV2 of RAMV-S, RAMV-H and RAMV-SIM is almost 1.0 for any 
NB, while RV1 is generally smaller than 0.5. This shows that with limited resource budget 
only a portion of all received Beacons can be directly verified in RAMV. With the help 
of PIMN, almost all the remaining Beacons will be indirectly verified. Thus, in RAMV 
the false negative ratio RN, which is equal to pm(1?RV2), is negligible, so RAMV ensures 
satisfying security strengths with limited budgets.  
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Figure 3.9 The ratios of verification of BSL and RAMV 
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Comparatively, both BSL1 and BSL2 need to rely on direct verification of the Beacons. 
When resource is not sufficient, as configured here, the RV1 curves of both BSL1 and 
BSL2 are about 70% and 50%, respectively. Thus in BSL1 and BSL2 about 30% and 
50% received Beacons of any node will not be verified and their properties remain 
unknown, which is potentially harmful to the traffic safety applications and relevant 
security applications (e.g. reputation schemes). 
3.8.2 Unlimited Resource Scenarios 
In the idealistic scenario where each node always has unlimited resource to verify all 
received Beacons, the resource consumption variances (VC) of BSL1, BSL2, and RAMV 
will be compared. Here, the resource consumption NC of each node is calculated per 10 
seconds. VC is defined as100( ) /M MC C CN N N? , where MCN is the average of NC over all 
periods. Basically, bigger VC indicates higher variance of the resource consumption, and 
VC=0 means that the resource consumption remains constant for every 10 seconds. As 
shown in Figure 3.10, both BSL1 and BSL2 have the same variances, which are much 
larger than those of RAMV in most periods. Basically, RAMV-H, RAMV-S and RAMV-
SIM result in almost the same VC, which are within ?5% most of the time. Thus, RAMV, 
as previously discussed, can reduce the resource consumption variance of the individual 
nodes and better support the resource allocation algorithms.  
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Figure 3.10 The resource consumption variances of BSL and RAMV 
72 
 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
5
10
15
20
25
p
N
C
 
 
NB
BSL1
BSL2
RAMV-H
RAMV-S
RAMV-SIM
 
Figure 3.11 The full-fledged resource consumption statistics 
In Figure 3.11, the full-fledged resource consumption (NC) curves are shown, with NB 
set to 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, 20, 25, 35, and 1000. Figure 3.11 proves again that 
RAMV can satisfyingly meet the preset resource budget NB, resulting in configurable and 
predictable resource consumption. Although resource is assumed to be unlimited in this 
scenario, it is still meaningful to reduce the resource consumption as long as the relevant 
safety and security strengths will not suffer, as is the case with RAMV. 
3.9 Summaries 
Taking into consideration both the resource budget and the security requirements on 
message verification, RAMV is resource-aware, application-friendly and secure at the 
same time. Within RAMV, DBRV allows each node to spend its resource budget on the 
most relevant messages. ETV ensures that any critical messages which contain or raise a 
warning will be verified promptly, so that traffic safety will not suffer from DBRV and 
PIMN. The novel techniques in PIMN enable any node to learn the property of all 
received messages, so that the security of message verification is also ensured. Basically, 
RAMV allows the neighboring nodes to share the computation overhead in verifying the 
messages, and to share the message verification results. In this sense, the scalability 
issues in message verification are effectively handled.  
Though only Beacons are explicitly considered in this chapter, RAMV can be easily 
applied to other types of messages in VANETs with the necessary modifications 
proposed in this chapter.  
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In conclusion, RAMV provides an efficient and secure solution to the verification of 
the numerous messages in VANETs, which threatens excessive resource consumption. 
RAMV can work in VANETs independently of the underlying cryptographic techniques, 
controlling the resource consumption of message verification to a desired budget. Besides, 
the safety and security requirements of message verification are all properly met. Thus, 
RAMV securely and realistically tackles the scalability issues in message verification in 
VANETs, which makes RAMV especially appealing to VANETs. 
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Chapter 4 Joint Privacy and Reputation 
Assurance3 
In VANETs, privacy protection makes it challenging to maintain the reputation history 
of any node, while reputation management requires real-time reputation manifestation at 
risk of easier vehicle tracking. In this chapter, a Joint Privacy and Reputation Assurance 
(JPRA) scheme [145], [146] is proposed to reconcile these conflicts and support the 
synergistic coexistence of both schemes in VANETs. JPRA adopts a localized reputation 
management model where the behavior evaluation, reputation aggregation and reputation 
manifestation of each node are collectively performed by this node and its 1-hop 
neighbors. Within this model, a reputation relay algorithm and a neighbor-assisted 
reputation update algorithm support secure and efficient reputation management in face 
of node mobility and privacy protection. Besides, a conditional reputation discretization 
algorithm allows privacy-preserving reputation manifestation for the honest nodes. 
Theoretical analysis and simulations show that JPRA efficiently and synergistically 
supports reputation schemes and privacy schemes. Considering the necessity of both 
privacy protection and reputation management, JPRA is especially appealing to VANETs. 
4.1 Introduction 
As previously discussed, proper security provisioning is necessary [5], [20] to meet the 
critical security requirements of VANETs, such as data integrity, node authentication, 
reputation management, privacy protection, and so on. Extensive research has been 
conducted for each security requirement, as reviewed in our book chapter [5]. However, 
the conflicting requirements of different security schemes still call for thorough 
investigation to ensure their synergistic coexistence in VANETs.  
This chapter is focused on jointly supporting reputation management and privacy 
protection in VANETs. Consisting of behavior evaluation, reputation aggregation and 
reputation manifestation, reputation management [103] serves to reward the 
                                                 
3 The material contained in this chapter was submitted to IEEE Transactions on Mobile 
Computing. © 2012 IEEE. See Appendix C for a copy of the copyright permission from 
IEEE. 
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honest/complying nodes and punish the misbehaving ones in VANETs. Keeping the 
location and identity information of each node secret, usually with pseudonym changes, 
privacy protection is essential to the privacy-sensitive users [5] of VANETs. However, 
with different design goals, reputation management and privacy protection impose 
conflicting requirements to each other. Briefly speaking, reputation management requires 
that each node be continuously monitored to maintain a precise reputation history for this 
node. However, privacy protection mandates that each node, after changing its 
pseudonym, should not be recognized by its neighbors. Additionally, the manifested 
reputation of any node may provide an additional clue to the adversaries, potentially 
harming its privacy. These conflicting requirements, to be further discussed in section 4.2, 
have not been comprehensively investigated in literature. Thus, here a novel Joint Privacy 
and Reputation Assurance (JPRA) scheme is proposed to reconcile the inherent conflicts 
of these schemes and efficiently support both in VANETs.  
JPRA adopts a localized reputation management model to facilitate efficient behavior 
evaluation, reputation aggregation and reputation manifestation in VANETs. In this 
model, each node uses a neighbor-certified reputation label to reflect its reputation 
history and its 1-hop neighbors 4  hold short-term reputation opinions for its recent 
behaviors. A novel reputation relay algorithm is proposed to ensure that the complete 
reputation information of any node is always locally maintained by itself and its 
neighbors, in face of frequent network topology changes caused by high node mobility 
and pseudonym changes. A neighbor-assisted reputation label update algorithm allows 
each node to honestly update its reputation label with the aid of its neighbors, which is 
made privacy-preserving with partially blind signature [195] based procedures. Moreover, 
to make reputation manifestation privacy-preserving, a conditional reputation 
discretization algorithm allows honest nodes to manifest a same reputation.  
By comprehensively considering the unique characteristics of VANETs and the 
challenging conflicts of both schemes, JPRA supports the synergistic coexistence of both 
reputation management and privacy protection in VANETs. Extensive theoretical 
                                                 
4 In this chapter, we only consider the 1-hop (direct) neighbors of each node. Thus, in 
this chapter each neighbor is a 1-hop neighbor, unless explicitly stated otherwise.  
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analysis and realistic simulations validate the effectiveness and efficiency of JPRA. Thus, 
JPRA is especially appealing to VANETs, considering the necessity of both schemes.  
4.2 Related Work 
In VANETs, privacy protection aims to conceal the real identity of each node from the 
potential adversaries, such as its neighbors and external observers [109]. To this end, 
pseudonyms, instead of real identities, are used in VANET communications [5]. A 
pseudonym is an temporary identifier without any obvious connection to the real identity, 
usually consisting of a node’s public key certificate, IP address and MAC address [113]. 
However, by observing the location history and service accessing history of one node 
with the same pseudonym, an adversary may derive personal information to deduce its 
real identity. Thus, pseudonym change is commonly adopted [45], [62], [109], [113], 
[117], [119], [122], [124], [125], [127] to break down the location history and service 
accessing history of each node by making this node, after a pseudonym change, a totally 
new node. To this end, most privacy protection schemes enable several neighboring 
nodes to synchronize their pseudonym changes and remain silent for a random period 
afterward. This way, after resuming normal communications, these nodes become 
indistinguishable to the adversary with the location information and pseudonyms 
contained in their communications. Furthermore, when reputation is considered, it is also 
necessary to prevent the manifested reputation from uniquely identifying any node 
among its neighborhood, in order to make pseudonym change effective.   
In VANETs, reputation management evaluates how honest/complying one node is 
regarding one specific application protocol with behavior evaluation, reputation 
aggregation and reputation manifestation. Specifically, the protocol-specific behaviors of 
each node will be evaluated by its neighbors. For instance, [76], [90], [143] allow the 
neighbors of each node to evaluate its periodical beacons and [78]-[80], [115], [155] 
allow the evaluation of the routing and data relaying behaviors. Generally, each neighbor 
will form its own opinion about this node’s behaviors, called a reputation segment here.  
Reputation aggregation refers to forming an overall reputation based on all reputation 
segments and the reputation history of one node. Existing reputation schemes [93], [95], 
[97], [98], [104], [105], [107], [196] propose reputation metrics and algorithms to 
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evaluate the reputation of each node for specific application protocols. For VANETs, one 
critical question is how reputation aggregation should be performed. In general mobile ad 
hoc networks, reputation aggregation can be performed in a centralized manner where a 
central authority aggregates the reputation segments for all nodes. Or it can be performed 
in a peer-to-peer manner where each node keeps the reputation segments for all other 
nodes and aggregates the reputation segments by querying the network. However, the 
centralized approach is unsuitable to VANETs, since in VANETs each node may only 
have a sporadic access to the central authority. The peer-to-peer approach will incur 
tremendous communication and storage overhead for each node, due to the high node 
mobility and numerous nodes of VANETs. Thus, the only feasible reputation aggregation 
approach for VANETs is for each node and its 1-hop neighbors to locally aggregate its 
reputation.  
Reputation manifestation makes the reputation of each node visible and verifiable to its 
interacting parties. To make the reputation of each node trustworthy, it should be 
vouched for by a trustworthy entity, for example a central authority or a set of nodes.   
Thus, by breaking down the pseudonym history of each node, privacy protection 
makes it even more challenging to precisely evaluate the behavior history of each node. 
Similarly, it becomes difficult to aggregate the reputation segments for any node with 
changing pseudonyms. Reputation manifestation also becomes difficult, since each node 
can simply evade its reputation by changing its pseudonym. On the other hand, the 
reputation manifested by each node becomes an additional property for this node, which 
could be exploited to profile this node and harm its privacy. To support both privacy 
protection and reputation management in VANETs, such conflicting requirements and 
VANETs’ unique characteristics need to be thoroughly investigated.  
Up to now, only [108] proposes a probabilistic reputation scheme to jointly consider 
privacy and reputation in VANETs. In [108], each node aggregates its own reputation in 
its Tamper-Proof Device (TPD) [11], [197], based on the reputation segments of its 
neighbors. However, a special TPD for reputation management cannot support various 
application protocols in VANETs, while adding various TPDs to support different 
application protocols may not be acceptable due to the incurred cost. Besides, [108] 
ignores the common attacks to reputation aggregation, e.g., blocking negative reputation 
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segments. More importantly, by directly manifesting the reputation value of each node, 
the privacy of each node may be harmed. Thus, JPRA is proposed as a novel and 
comprehensive solution to such challenging issues. 
4.3 Background and Overview 
4.3.1 Network Model and Assumptions 
VANETs consist of the ad hoc domain and the infrastructure domain [5]. The ad hoc 
domain is formed by vehicles with Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) [9] 
transceivers. Each node has multiple pseudonyms certified by the VANET (certificate) 
Authority and can change pseudonyms at will. A standard tamper-proof device (TPD) 
[11], [197] in each node keeps its cryptographic elements confidential and allows the 
usage of only one pseudonym at any time. Thus, the Sybil attack [63] is difficult in 
VANETs. To support traffic safety applications, each node periodically (with a period 
between 100 ms and 500 ms) broadcasts beacons containing its driving states, such as 
location, speed and driving direction [10]. It is assumed that the majority of nodes in 
VANETs are honest and complying regarding various application protocols.  
In the infrastructure domain, RSUs serve to interface vehicular nodes and the VANET 
Authority, which is in charge of all major management and security functions in 
VANETs. Due to cost considerations, RSUs are sparsely deployed in VANETs, usually 
in road intersections. It is assumed that RSUs and Authority are always trustworthy. 
4.3.2 JPRA Overview 
JPRA adopts a localized reputation management model. As shown in Figure 4.1, in 
JPRA, the complete reputation information of each node (say node A) consists of a 
reputation label (RLA) to indicate its long-term reputation and short-term reputation 
segments generated by its neighbors. Certified by K (K>0) neighbors, RLA serves to 
honestly reflect A’s long-term reputation history. Thus, to facilitate reputation 
manifestation and behavior evaluation, each neighbor of A should learn RLA in time 
(Condition 1). To facilitate local reputation aggregation, at any time the 1-hop neighbors 
of A should keep all the reputation segments for A (Condition 2). Within this localized 
reputation management model, three novel algorithms are proposed to efficiently support 
both reputation management and privacy protection.  
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Figure 4.1 The system overview of JPRA 
First, a novel reputation relay algorithm is proposed to meet both Condition 1 and 
Condition 2 in face of frequent network topology changes caused by high node mobility 
and pseudonym changes. Secure and efficient procedures are designed for A’s new 
neighbor to learn RLA in time, and for A’s leaving neighbor to delegate its reputation 
segment to A’s staying neighbors. In this way, A’s complete reputation information is 
always maintained by itself and its neighbors, which makes reputation history 
maintenance and reputation aggregation efficient in VANETs.  
Secondly, a neighbor-assisted reputation label update algorithm securely and 
efficiently updates RLA in case of the expiration of RLA, A leaving the current network 
cluster or A’s imminent pseudonym change. This way, at any time A will carry a valid 
and up-to-date reputation label. Especially, partially blind signature [195] based 
procedure is proposed to ensure that A’s new reputation label will be certified by K 
neighbors without revealing its new pseudonym in case of A’s pseudonym change.  
Thirdly, to make reputation manifestation both precise and privacy-preserving, a 
conditional reputation discretization algorithm is proposed to enable the 
honest/complying nodes to manifest a same reputation label. As such, the reputation label 
cannot be exploited to harm the privacy of such honest/complying nodes.     
With these novel algorithms, JPRA reconciles the challenging conflicts of reputation 
management and privacy protection, efficiently and synergistically supporting both.  
4.3.3 Adversary Model 
In JPRA, the most powerful adversary to the location privacy of vehicular nodes, 
namely the Global Passive Adversary (GPA) [117], [119], will be considered. A GPA can 
monitor all VANET communications to reconstruct the location history and application 
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accessing history of each node. When one node changes its pseudonym, GPA may 
attempt to link the old and new pseudonyms based on various information items, such as 
the movement trajectories, the application accessing, and the reputation values of the 
involved pseudonyms. Thus, if the manifested reputation of one node remains constant 
and unique within its neighborhood during the pseudonym change, its pseudonym change 
becomes futile. Given that the privacy protection schemes [45], [62], [109], [113], [117], 
[119], [122], [124], [125], [127] have already considered other information items, JPRA 
only needs to prevent the reputation manifestation from harming the pseudonym changes. 
Regarding reputation management, the misbehaving nodes may selectively block the 
negative reputation segments from its neighbors and only accept the positive ones in 
reputation update. The misbehaving nodes may change their pseudonyms in order to get 
rid of their low reputation values. The misbehaving nodes may also launch a bad-
mouthing attack by intentionally giving wrong reputation segments for its neighbors. 
Similarly, given that the bad-mouthing attack has been considered in the reputation 
aggregation algorithm, JPRA will be focused on the other two attacks.    
Besides, in VANETs, one node may refuse to or fail to comply with the required 
communications due to misbehaviors or MAC layer collisions. JPRA will ensure reliable 
and efficient communications in face of these misbehaviors and malfunctions. 
4.4 Localized Reputation Management 
As previously discussed, JPRA locally manages the reputation of each node so that 
reputation aggregation can be resilient to the frequent network topology changes in 
VANETs. To this end, both reputation relay and reputation label update need to be 
securely and efficiently supported.   
A network topology change may be incurred by the relative movement of nodes, as 
shown in Figure 4.2. When node A enters node B’s communication range, A needs to 
learn B’s reputation label RLB and B needs to learn RLA. To this end, a reputation label 
notification procedure is proposed. Hereafter, due to the symmetry of procedures, we will 
describe the procedures in JPRA in the light of one single node arbitrarily selected out of 
two neighboring nodes. While in B’s communication range, A will monitor B’s behaviors 
and form a reputation segment RSAB for B.  
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Figure 4.2 The message flows and interactions of an exemplary reputation relay 
Before leaving B’s communication range, A needs to delegate RSAB to one staying 
neighbor of B, so that RSAB will be aggregated in B’s future reputation label update. To 
this end, a reputation segment delegation procedure is proposed. Thus, reputation relay 
includes both reputation label notification and reputation segment delegation. 
Similarly, a pseudonym change will also result in the network topology change as 
shown in Figure 4.2. Specifically, the case where A changes its pseudonym to A’ is 
similar to, regarding network topology, the case where node A leaves B and node A’ 
comes to B’s communication range.  
On the other hand, to make its reputation label up-to-date and trustworthy, each node 
needs to update its reputation label from time to time assisted by its neighbors. It is 
critical to ensure that each node will honestly update its reputation label based on the 
reputation segments of its neighbors, without harming its own privacy. 
For clarity, the notations commonly used in the following subsections will be listed 
here. PRX and PUX indicate the private key and the public key of node X, respectively. 
PUX{Msg} is the message Msg encrypted with PUX. {Msg}PRX is the digital signature of 
Msg generated with PRX. H(Msg) is the hash value of Msg generated by a standard hash 
function, for instance SHA-2 [168]. 
4.4.1 Reputation Label Notification 
There exist three scenarios for reputation label notification: a) two nodes meeting each 
other, b) one node joining a new network cluster, and c) one node resuming its 
communications after a random silent period following a pseudonym change. To ensure 
efficient and reliable reputation label notification in face of node misbehaviors and 
communication issues, it is necessary to enable the neighboring nodes to collaboratively 
notify two newly meeting neighbors of each other’s reputation label in all these scenarios.  
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Figure 4.3 The detailed procedure of reputation label notification 
In VANETs, with received beacons each node A can learn the locations of its 
neighbors (Nei(A)) and maintain a directed graph ? = <?, ?> to model its neighborhood. 
Here, the vertex set ? contains both A and Nei(A). The edge set ? contains two directed 
edges (XY and YX) for two nodes X and Y, if X, Y?? and their distance is no larger than R. 
Here, R is the common communication range of vehicular nodes. Based on ?, node A 
uses a binary value Labeled(XY) to indicate whether node X has learnt node Y’s 
reputation label or not. As shown in Figure 4.3, A will continuously check ? and try to 
make each edge in ? labeled, that is, to make all nodes in ? learn one another’s reputation 
label. Specifically, the detailed algorithm consists of the following major procedures. 
Beacon Triggered Timer Setting: As shown in the left branch of Figure 4.3, upon 
overhearing a beacon, A will update ? based on the location information in this beacon. 
Afterward, A will check the edges adjacent to A in ? (XA, X ?Nei(A)) for the unlabeled 
edges, each of which indicates one node in need of RLA. For each such unlabeled edge, A 
will set up a timer TXA for sending (via uni-cast) RLA to node X with the duration   
 txa = I(|Mid(A,X)|)T0×dAX/R.                      (4.1) 
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Here, Mid(A,X) is the set of nodes geographically between A and X. I() is an indicator 
function which outputs 1 for non-zero inputs and outputs 0 for the input of zero. T0 is the 
unit duration for such timers, which could be configured based on network parameters of 
VANETs. dAX is the distance between A and X. Thus, (4.1) ensures that A will 
immediately send RLA to X if there is no neighbor between A and X. However, A will first 
wait for the intermediate neighbors to send RLA so that more neighbors of node X can 
also overhear RLA to increase the effective coverage of RLA.  
Then, A will check the edges without A in ? (XY, X, Y?Nei(A)) for the unlabeled edges 
such that A is geographically between the two nodes adjacent to each edge. For each such 
edge, say XY, if A knows RLY A will set up a timer TXY with the duration as  
 txy= T0dAX/R.                                   (4.2) 
Equation (4.2) ensures that the node nearest to X will be the first to forward Y’s 
reputation label (RLY) to X, so that most of X’s 1-hop neighbors can overhear RLY as well.  
Reputation Label Overhearing: Upon overhearing a reputation label RLX, as shown in 
the middle branch of Figure 4.3, A will first store RLX. Based on the position of the 
sender of RLX, A can figure out its neighbors which can also overhear RLX. Then, the 
associated unlabeled edges in ? will be labeled and the associated timers will be canceled.  
Timer Expiration: When a timer TXY expires as shown in the right branch of Figure 4.3, 
A will send the required reputation label RLY to the desired receiver X via uni-cast.  
Afterward, A will also mark the associated edges in ? as labeled by checking the nodes in 
Nei(A) which can also overhear RLY.   
The above procedures are based on uni-cast communications, so MAC layer collision 
is reduced. Thus, with this algorithm, the neighboring nodes can cooperatively perform 
efficient and reliable reputation relay when two nodes becomes new neighbors in any 
scenarios. Even if some neighbors may refuse to relay reputation labels, these two new 
neighbors can learn each other’s reputation label as long as they have one cooperative 
neighbor in common or both nodes are honest.  
The above procedure is suitable to the cases where two nodes meet each other due to 
relative mobility or node A joins a network cluster. However, when node A resumes its 
communications after its pseudonym change, none of its neighbors has any idea of its 
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reputation label RLA. Thus, A should first broadcast RLA as soon as it resumes 
communications. On the other hand, A’s neighbors will follow the above procedures to 
notify it of the reputation labels of its neighbors.  
4.4.2 Reputation Segment Delegation 
In JPRA, when two neighbors leave each other’s communication range, each node 
needs to delegate its reputation segment for the other to one staying neighbor of that node. 
In this way, all the reputation segments of any node will be locally available for future 
reputation update.  
Within the same network cluster, two nodes (A and B) may leave each other’s 
communication range due to their relative movement. In this case, A and B will find the 
best neighbors to keep their reputation segments for each other based on the expected 
remaining connected time (CT). For instance, B will estimate the CT of each node X in 
Nei(A)?Nei(B) regarding A, as  
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.              (4.3) 
In (4.3), vA and vX are the current speed of A and X, respectively. dXA is the distance 
between X and A. Thus, bigger value of CTXA indicates that X may remain as A’s neighbor 
for a longer time, which enables X to better aggregate the reputation segment for A.
Similarly, the best neighbor could be also selected based on other metrics, for instance, 
the reputations of the neighbors.  
Suppose node D has the largest CTDA, B will send (via uni-cast) its reputation segment 
for A (RSBA) to D. Upon receiving RSBA, D is expected to aggregate RSBA with its own 
reputation segment for A, RSDA. Similarly, A will also send RSAB to the node with the 
largest CT value regarding B.
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Figure 4.4 The example of node B leaving a network cluster 
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Node B may leave the current network cluster and entering a road segment without any 
1-hop neighbors (called network void), as shown in Figure 4.4. In this case, the reputation 
label update procedure will be triggered, as discussed in subsection 4.4.3. Additionally, B 
needs to delegate its reputation segments for all its 1-hop neighbors. To be efficient, B 
will broadcast a message containing all reputation segments to be delegated. Each 
reputation segment is encrypted with the public key of the intended receiver, as    
RS_Delegation = {Payload={Type, TSP, Y, PUY{rsBX}, X, PUX{rsBZ} …}, 
{H(Payload)}PRB}.  
Here, Type indicates the type of this message, and TSP is the timestamp generated by B. 
The certificate of node B is not contained in RS_Delegation, due to its presence in B’s 
beacons. Thus, upon overhearing this message, each node can find the reputation segment 
intended for itself. To ensure that each neighbor will receive this reputation segment, 
node B may broadcast this message for nt times, where nt is determined by the probability 
that B can receive the beacons from its neighbors, as discussed in subsection 4.4.3.  
In case that B decides to change its pseudonym, it also needs to delegate its reputation 
segments for its neighbors similarly to the scenario of leaving the current network cluster. 
4.4.3 Neighbor-Assisted Reputation Label Update 
To keep its reputation label up-to-date and trustworthy, each node A needs to update its 
reputation label (RLA) with the aid of its neighbors, if 1) (Event 1) the remaining valid 
time of RLA is smaller than a preset threshold tm; 2) (Event 2) A is leaving the current 
network cluster or 3) (Event 3) A will change its pseudonym. Overall, to update A’s 
reputation label involves two challenging procedures: a) to aggregate the reputation 
segments generated by A’s neighbors, and b) to get the new reputation label of A certified 
by K neighbors. Here, K is a security threshold to trade off the trustworthiness of the 
reputation label and the communication overhead, the configuration of which will be 
discussed in detail in subsection 4.6.3.  
Here, it is challenging to ensure that A updates RLA honestly and has only one valid 
RLA at any time. It is critical to conceal the connection between A’s pseudonyms during 
reputation label update. To address these challenges, a secure and privacy-preserving 
neighbor-assisted reputation label update algorithm is proposed with three phases.   
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4.4.3.1 Phase 1: Reputation Segments Aggregation 
To update its reputation label, node A will first broadcast an RS_Query message to 
notify its neighbors of its intention to collect the reputation segments, as shown in Figure 
4.5. Upon receiving RS_Query, each of A’s neighbors, say node X, will check whether it 
has a reputation segment for A or not. If not, RS_Query will be ignored. Otherwise, X will 
broadcast its reputation segment for A (RSXA) with a period TP for nrx times, as shown in 
Figure 4.5. Here, nrx is  
 1/rx axn p? ? ?? ? .                                 (4.4) 
In (4.4), pax is the probability that each beacon from A is successfully received by node 
X, which can be estimated by X based on the timing information in A’s beacons. Thus, 
(4.4) ensures that with a high probability at least one copy of RSXA will be successfully 
received by A. By setting TP to 100 ms, within one second A can receive all reputation 
segments from its neighbors. Then, A will broadcast the aggregated reputation segments 
so that A’s neighbors can also learn all reputation segments for A.  
To ensure data integrity and authenticity, secure message formats are designed for both 
RS_Query and RSXA, as follows.  
RS_Query={Payload={Type=Query, Event, TSPA}, {H(Payload)}PRA}. 
RSXA ={Payload={Type=RS, Target=A, rsxa, TSPX}, {H(Payload)}PRX}. 
 
Figure 4.5 The detailed message flows of reputation label update  
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Here, Type indicates the message type and Event specifies the event trigger. TSPA is 
the current timestamp generated by A. Target indicates the target of the reputation 
segment and rsxa is the reputation value generated by X for A. Similarly, for efficiency the 
sender’s certificate is not present in these messages.  
4.4.3.2 Phase 2: Reputation Label Update 
After collecting the reputation segments, A will calculate its new reputation label as 
 rla* = Update(rla, {rsxa…}).                      (4.5) 
Besides, each neighbor of A, say Y, will also calculate its version of rl(y)a, as  
 rl(y)a = Update(rla, {rsxa…}).                      (4.6) 
Here, the function Update() can be adopted from the existing reputation aggregation 
schemes [93], [95], [97], [98], [104], [105], [107], [196]. For instance, a simple Update() 
function will be introduced in our simulation in section 4.7. As previously discussed, in 
Phase 1 A and its neighbors have received the same set of reputation segments ({rsxa…}) 
for A, so they will form the same reputation label for A in (4.5) and (4.6). 
Based on rla*, A will construct its reputation label update request RLUA*, and 
broadcast it as shown in Figure 4.5. Upon overhearing RLUA*, each node is able to verify 
RLUA* according to the following rules. First, rla* should be consistent to the reputation 
label calculated by itself. Secondly, the starting time and ending time in this message 
should be correct. Once a node X accepts RLUA* as being valid, it will set up a timer TRX 
based on its distance to A, with the duration   
 trx = uni(dXA/R)?TP.                             (4.7) 
In (4.7), uni(x) is a function to randomly select a value in the range [0, x], following 
the uniform distribution. If TRX expires, X will send its signature on RLUA* in RSPX to A 
(via unicast) as shown in Figure 4.5. Each node will keep track of the RSPs already sent 
to A. Once K RSPs are overheard, each node with a running timer will cancel its timer.  
To ensure message integrity, authenticity, and privacy protection, secure message 
formats are designed for these messages.  
RLUA* = {Payload={Type, TSP, TS, TE, A, rla*}, {H(Payload)}PRA}. 
Here, TS and TE indicate the starting and ending time for this reputation label. 
Generally, TS should be the current time and TE should be set to TS+TC, where TC is a 
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preset period for reputation label update as discussed in subsection 4.6.4. If A plans to 
change its pseudonym (Event 3), it will apply a function blind() on its new pseudonym 
(AN) in RLUA*, so that RLUA* becomes 
RLUblind(AN)*= {Payload={Type, TSP, TS, TE, blind(AN), rla*}, {H(Payload)}PRAN}.  
The blind() function can be found in any common partially blind signature scheme 
[195]. With partially blind signature, another node can sign RLUA* without any clue of 
AN. After obtaining a signature on RLUblind(AN)*, A can reverse the blind() function in the 
signature to get a correct signature for its intended message:  
RLUAN* = {Payload={Type, TSP, TS, TE, AN, RLA*}, {H(Payload)}PRAN}.  
Thus, with partially blind signature [195], A can get a correct signature of RLUAN* 
containing, without revealing its new pseudonym AN to the signers. Besides, as discussed 
in subsection 4.6.1, A is forced to generate a valid RLUblind(AN)* with its valid pseudonym 
AN, to make its new reputation label acceptable to its future neighbors.  
The message format of RSPX is RSPX={H(RLUA*)}PRX. After receiving K RSPs, A can 
construct a complete reputation label packet as RLA*={RLUA*, {RSPX…}, {CERTX…}}, 
where CERTX is the certificate of node X. Thus, with valid signatures from K nodes, RLA* 
will be accepted as being valid by A’s future neighbors. 
4.4.3.3 Phase 3: RL Revocation Notification (RRN) Broadcast 
In case of Event 2 and Event 3, if the remaining valid time (tr) of RLA is larger than the 
threshold tm, RLA needs to be revoked to ensure that at any time each node (A) only has 
one valid reputation label. In this way, even if the new RLA* is worse than RLA, A is 
forced to use RLA* in its future communications.  
To this end, each neighbor X, in sending out RSPX as discussed above, will also send 
out a revocation for the current reputation label RLA as REVX={H(RLA)}PRX. The 
reputation label revocation notification (RRN) is constructed as RRNA = {A, {REVX…}, 
{CERTX…}}. After collecting K RSP messages and K REV messages, node A is expected 
to construct and send out RRNA. To ensure reliability, each neighbor (X) of A will start a 
timer TNX with the duration as  
 tnx = uni(dXA/R)?TP.                             (4.8) 
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If TNX expires, X will send out RRNA. Upon overhearing a valid RRNA, each node with 
a running timer will cancel its timer.  
To notify all relevant nodes of this revoked RLA, RRNA will be broadcasted to all nodes 
which may become the neighbors of A within the duration of tr. To this end, RPB-MD 
[166] or any controlled flooding scheme can be adopted to broadcast RRNA to all the 
nodes within a certain relative distance (L) from A.  
In highway scenarios, it suffices to make A’s future neighbors for the next tr learn 
RRNA. Thus, based on the feasible speed difference ?v, the relative distance L can be 
estimated as  
 L = tr??v.                                    (4.9) 
Then, from (4.9) RRNA needs to be sent to all nodes within distance L from A. The 
communication overhead is L/R in idealistic broadcast scenarios.  
In downtown areas, A and its neighbors may make a turn at any road intersection. Thus, 
RRNA should be disseminated to any neighbor of A no matter how A turns at the road 
intersections. Here, to be efficient and reliable, we propose that in each road intersection 
one neighbor of A broadcasts RRNA to the vehicles in the future road segment A is about 
to turn to. In this case, the distance travelled by A within time tr is  
 L = tr×vM.                                     (4.10) 
In (4.10), vM is the speed limit in the concerned downtown area. Thus, the 
communication overhead becomes L/R revocation message relaying.  
4.5 Reputation Considerations 
To avoid reinventing the wheel, here the details of the reputation management schemes 
are omitted and only relevant considerations specific to JPRA will be discussed.  
4.5.1 Reputation Label Verification 
Considering the possibility of one misbehaving node evading its bad reputation label 
with pseudonym change, here several rules for reputation label verification are presented. 
Specifically, the reputation label RLA of a node A is regarded as valid, if all following 
conditions are met: a) the pseudonym in RLA is the same as the pseudonym currently used 
by node A; b) the TE parameter in RLA is still larger than the current system time; c) RLA 
contains K valid signatures and d) RLA is not revoked with a RL revocation notification 
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(RRN). On the other hand, a node without a valid reputation label will be treated by its 
neighbors as a node with the lowest possible reputation value in JPRA. If this node wants 
to get a valid reputation label again, its neighbors will only certify a reputation label with 
the lowest reputation value for it. Specially, when a node A joins a network cluster with 
RLA just expiring less than TC/2 ago, its neighbors will still update A’s reputation label 
based on RLA. This is to allow for the possibility that A unfortunately runs into an 
abnormally large network void.    
The above rules, together with reputation relay and reputation label update, allow each 
node to timely update its reputation label. Besides, any node trying to evading its bad 
reputation will be punished with the lowest reputation value, so that each node is 
encouraged to timely update its reputation label in VANETs.  
4.5.2 Conditional Reputation Discretization 
The reputation of each node may uniquely identify this node within its neighborhood, 
so its pseudonym change can be easily traced by the GPA. Here, we first model the 
tradeoff between privacy and reputation. Suppose a synchronized pseudonym change 
involves n nodes. Without loss of generality, suppose the reputation’s range is [0, 1], with 
0 being the smallest value. Let ?r be the definition (accuracy) of the manifested 
reputation, so that the each node’s reputation can only be one value out of ?(?r) = {0, ?r, 
2?r, …, 1}. For brevity, we assume that each node’s reputation at the time of the 
pseudonym change is a uniform distribution over ?(?r). Considering any node with a 
certain reputation, the probability that its reputation is unique among these n nodes is 
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In (4.11), |?(?r)| = 1/?r+1. So, from (4.11) we have 
 ? ? 1( ) 1/ (1 ) nuniP n r ?? ? ? .                          (4.12) 
For n?2, Puni(n)?1 as ?r?0; Puni(n) decreases as ?r increases. Thus, (4.12) formally 
shows the intrinsic tradeoff between reputation manifestation and privacy protection. 
On the other hand, the manifested reputation cannot be too ambiguous either. 
Otherwise, the design goals of reputation management may be contradicted. To achieve a 
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proper tradeoff between the precision and ambiguity of the manifested reputation, here a 
conditional reputation discretization algorithm is proposed to differentiate the honest 
nodes and the misbehaving nodes. This algorithm forces each node to manifest its 
reputation as  
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Here, rv is the exact reputation value as calculated by A and its 1-hop neighbors based 
on rla and the aggregated reputation segments in (4.5) and (4.6). The value rt is a system 
level reputation threshold, which is the reputation value of one typical honest node with 
only random errors. Thus, rt can be easily determined based on the nature of the 
concerned application and the reliability of common vehicle nodes. rt usually should be a 
value quite close to 1.0, e.g., 0.95.   
The discretization in (4.13) ensures that any node with a reputation value bigger than rt 
will manifest a common reputation value rt. Thus, the reputation manifestation will not 
harm the privacy of such nodes. Comparatively, the other nodes with a reputation value 
smaller than rt will have to display their own exact reputation value, which may harm its 
privacy. Thus, each node is encouraged to comply with the application protocols by not 
only reputation considerations but also privacy considerations.  
Formally, let pm?[0, 1] be the ratio of misbehaving nodes in VANETs. Then, among 
the n nodes in a synchronized pseudonym change, the probability of one honest node 
manifesting a unique reputation label is the probability that the other n?1 nodes are all 
misbehaving. So, 
 Pr{Unique|Honest} = (pm)n?1.                     (4.14) 
In (4.14), pm commonly is close to 0, so Pr{Unique|Honest} is also close to 0. 
Comparatively, each misbehaving node has ?r?0, so its manifested reputation will be 
most likely to be unique.  
Besides being novel, this algorithm is also feasible in VANETs. First of all, (4.13) 
necessarily trades off the precision of the reputation value for the support of privacy 
protection. As previously discussed, by manifesting the exact reputation value each node 
may display a unique property in communications, which may make its pseudonym 
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changes futile. Thus, to make reputation manifestation compatible with privacy 
protection, the only option is to discretize the exact reputation value, as in (4.13). 
Secondly, one common philosophy adopted in many reputation aggregation algorithms 
[93], [95], [97], [98], [196] is that the reputation will be decreased sharply when one node 
with a high reputation misbehaves. Another common philosophy is to adopt a forgetting 
factor to put more weight on the current behaviors of each node in reputation aggregation. 
Thus, in JPRA any node deviating from the application protocol will find its reputation 
quickly decreasing to a value smaller than rt. Thus, our algorithm still serves to 
encourage the complying behaviors in VANETs.  
4.5.3 Feasibility of JPRA 
Generally, the common reputation schemes [93], [95], [97], [98], [104], [105], [107], 
[196] can be supported by JPRA, since they all assume a certain entity to aggregate 
reputation for each node. In JPRA, each node will serve as such an entity to aggregate its 
own reputation, assisted and monitored by its neighbors. In this sense, JPRA can support 
reputation schemes for VANETs.  
On the other hand, though JPRA assumes a partially blind signature in VANETs, 
JPRA can still work with a certificate scheme based normal public key cryptography 
algorithms. In this case, in neighbor-assisted reputation label update each node (A) can 
establish a session secret key with each of its 1-hop neighbors while broadcasting 
RS_Query, which can serve as the blind() function. Here, though A’s new pseudonym is 
known to its 1-hop neighbors, it will be still concealed from GPA, the most powerful 
privacy adversary. Due to high node mobility, A’s 1-hop neighbors keep changing, so A’s 
privacy can still be protected during its reputation label updates.  
However, the trust schemes based on the chain of recommendation or authentication 
[100], [102] cannot be supported in JPRA. Such trust schemes involve not only the close 
relation between reputation and pseudonym, but also the long latency between evaluating 
one node and reevaluating the same node. Thus, the neighbor monitoring approach in 
JPRA is not suitable for such trust schemes. The coexistence of such trust schemes and 
privacy protection will be investigated in our future work.  
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4.6 Property and Performance 
4.6.1 Security Properties 
JPRA is resilient to various attacks to privacy and reputation. First, no node can block 
the negative evaluations (reputation segments) from its neighbors, since its reputation 
aggregation is monitored by its neighbors. Thus, any node can only get a valid reputation 
label certified by its neighbors. Secondly, JPRA ensures that at any time each node can 
either manifest a valid reputation label or be treated as a node with the lowest reputation 
label. Thirdly, in case of pseudonym change, neighbor-assisted reputation label update 
ensures honest reputation label update, so no node can evade its reputation by pseudonym 
change. Lastly, with conditional reputation discretization, by observing the reputation 
labels no one can gain any additional information about one honest node.  
With the partially blind signature-based procedure in JPRA, one malicious node A may 
attempt to create a reputation label, with the correct rla and the pseudonym of another 
node B. A’s neighbors cannot detect this discrepancy in the pseudonyms. However, such 
an attack cannot work unless A and B are colluding, since it’s impossible for A to guess 
the next pseudonym of B. If A and B are colluding, which is very rare in VANETs due to 
high node mobility, by doing so A and B as a whole do not gain anything in light of 
reputation value. Thus, such an attack has no practical significance. Besides, each node A 
is forced to generate RLUblind(AN)* with valid digital signature, even though at the time of 
reputation label update its neighbors cannot verify the digital signature. Otherwise, after 
its pseudonym change, its new reputation label will be rejected by its neighbors due to the 
invalid digital signature in RLUblind(AN)*. 
Besides, in JPRA the conditional discretization of reputation value can further punish 
the misbehaving nodes by assigning to them unique reputation labels. Thus, the privacy 
concerns will drive the common nodes to comply with the specific application protocols 
to keep their reputation higher than the threshold.  
4.6.2 The High Efficiency of JPRA 
In light of communication overhead, JPRA is more efficient than any possible 
approach to implement reputation schemes for VANETs. The common reputation 
schemes imply two design principles: 1) to ensure reliability, all nodes able to monitor 
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one node should generate reputation segments for this node; 2) all reputation segments 
for one node should be aggregated to form an authentic reputation for this node. With 
these principles, the aggregation of the reputation segments from each node’s (A) 1-hop 
neighbors, the dominating part of communication overhead, will be necessary in any 
possible implementation approach. For instance, one approach is to aggregate A’s 
reputation segments in a centralized entity in VANETs, which may incur higher 
communication overhead due to multi-hop communications necessary for any node to 
access this centralized entity. Another approach is to aggregate A’s reputation segments 
into A itself, as adopted in [108] and JPRA, which only incurs 1-hop communications. 
Indeed, in JPRA the aggregation of reputation segments only occurs when made 
necessary by node mobility or pseudonym changes, as discussed in subsection 4.4.3. 
Each neighbor of A will locally aggregate its reputation segments for A first, and relay the 
aggregated reputation segment to A only when required by A. Thus, in principle JPRA is 
more efficient than any other approach to implement reputation schemes in VANETs.  
4.6.3 Communication Overhead & Latency Analysis 
Here, the communication overhead and communication latency incurred by each of the 
algorithms of JPRA are theoretically estimated.  
4.6.3.1 Reputation Label Notification 
As discussed in subsection 4.4.1, when two nodes (say A and B) enter each other’s 
communication range, two reputation label messages need to be sent to notify them of 
each other’s reputation label. Thus, the communication overhead here is constant and 
independent of the network conditions, for example the presence of misbehaving nodes.  
Regarding communication latency, the timer duration depends on the distance (d) 
between B and its nearest neighbor, or B and A if there is no neighbor in between. Thus, 
assuming the nodes between B and A are uniformly distributed for simplicity, we have  
 
1/ ,
,
Neighbors
d
R NoNeighbor
??? ?? .                        (4.15) 
Here, ? is the node density, with unit of node/meter. Following the norm of traffic 
modeling, we assume that the node distribution follows the Geographic Poisson 
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Distribution [198] in VANETs. Thus, the probability that there is no neighbor 
(Pr{NoNeighbor}) or there are multiple neighbors (Pr{Neighbors}) between A and B can 
be estimated as 
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Thus, without considering the misbehaving nodes, the communication latency for one 
reputation label message can be derived from (4.15)-(4.17) as   
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Here, ?0 is the average latency for a successful MAC access in VANETs. Thus, (4.18) 
shows that the expected latency is smaller than (?0+T0). Even considering the probability 
that any intermediate node may refuse to relay RLA, the largest possible latency is still 
bounded by (?0+T0) when A needs to send RLA to B by itself.  
Besides, if a node B just joins a new network cluster or resumes communication after a 
pseudonym change, suppose there totally are na nodes within B’s communication range. 
The reputation label exchange will incur exactly na reputation label messages, including 1 
message from B and (na?1) messages from B’s neighbors. Besides, regardless of the 
misbehaving nodes, the total latency is  
 ? = na?0 + T0.                                  (4.19) 
Equation (4.19) holds, since the maximal timer duration is T0, and each reputation label 
message will incur ?0 due to the uni-cast communications. Thus, the latency of reputation 
label notification in this case mainly depends on the node density around each node.  
4.6.3.2 Reputation Segment Delegation 
As discussed in subsection 4.4.2, when two neighbors leave each other, the total 
communication overhead is at most 2 reputation segments. Similarly, due to the lack of 
timers in this process, the communication latency is at most 2?0. 
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If a node B leaves a network cluster or stops communication for pseudonym change, 
let nt indicate the number of rebroadcasts of node B for reliable reception of the 
reputation segment message. Thus, the total communication overhead is nt reputation 
segment messages, and the latency is nt × TP, where TP is the period for rebroadcasts. 
4.6.3.3 Reputation Label Update 
Assume that there are na nodes within the neighborhood. According to the procedures 
in subsection 4.4.3, the overhead and latency incurred by each message in reputation 
label update are shown in Table 4.1.  
 
Thus, the communication overhead and latency for reputation label update are: 
 CO = nrx(na+1)+1+K.                            (4.20) 
 TL = (3nrx+1)TP+K?0.                            (4.21) 
Due to the presence of na in CO and K in TL, CO and TL are the dominating part of 
communication overhead and latency of JPRA. Thus, the selection of K has obvious 
impact on the system performance of JPRA, which will be discussed in detail next.  
4.6.4 Configuration of System Parameters 
In JPRA the system parameters, such as the security threshold K, the reputation update 
period TC and the remaining valid time threshold tm, need to be properly configured. Here 
the parameter configurations are discussed based on the regional traffic conditions and 
parameters, so that JPRA will work smoothly in any geographic region. We reasonably 
assume that each region has somewhat uniform traffic parameters such as node density 
and average speed, and the RSUs in this region can timely notify the vehicles of the 
system parameters of JPRA. In highway scenarios, the concerned region can be a 
segment of highway; in downtown scenarios, the concerned region can be a city area.  
With previous discussions, following considerations about TC and tm can be derived.   
Time Sufficiency: TC must allow sufficient time for the neighboring nodes to update 
their reputation labels one by one. Given K, the latency incurred by one reputation label 
Table 4.1 
Overhead and latency analysis of reputation label update 
 RS Query RS  Update Request Certificate 
Com. Overhead 1 nrx(na?1)+ nrx nrx K 
Com. Latency 0 nrxTP+ nrxTP nrx TP TP+K?0 
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update is TL, as shown in (4.21). In a specific region, on average each node has na=2?R 1-
hop neighbors, where ? is the average node density. Due to the high node mobility, the 
remaining valid time of the reputation labels of these vehicles may follow a uniform 
distribution between 0 and TC. Thus, we have  
 TC ? naTL.                                    (4.22) 
Besides, tm should be larger than the typical latency of a reputation label update (TL). 
Network Void Crossing: TC should be large enough so that a node leaving a network 
cluster should be able to reach the next network cluster with a still valid reputation label. 
Specifically, in highway scenarios, we model the road as a 1-D line segment, with the 
nodes following the Geographic Poisson Distribution (GPD) [198]. Then within a road of 
length d, the probability that there are i (i?0) nodes is  
 Pr{ } ( ) / !i dX i d e i?? ?? ? .                        (4.23) 
In (4.23), X is the random variable indicating the number of vehicles. Thus, regarding a 
road segment of length d, the probability that there is no vehicle is  
 Pr{ 0} dX e ??? ? .                              (4.24) 
Given the condition that there is a network void (NV) before a certain node, the 
expected length of a network void is  
 
0
[ | ] 1/xE d NV R xe dx R? ??? ?? ? ? ?? .             (4.25) 
Suppose that a node normally leaves the current network cluster with a minimal speed 
difference ?vm. Then,  
 TC ? E[d]/?vm = R/?vm +1/(??vm).                 (4.26) 
In downtown areas, the presence of network void mainly is caused by the traffic lights. 
Thus, we only need to consider the speed limit (vM) and length (dM) of the longest road 
segment in the concerned area. That is,  
 TC ? dM/vM.                                   (4.27) 
Thus, given realistic traffic parameters, another lower bound of TC can be estimated 
based on either (4.26) or (4.27).  
Remaining Valid Time tr: One misbehaving node may intentionally change its 
pseudonym right after it receives a reputation label to increase the communication 
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overhead of its neighbors. In this case, tr = TC. Generally, the overhead caused by the 
dissemination of the reputation label revocation notification (RRN) should be smaller 
than that of a reputation label update. Thus, in highway scenarios, the overhead of a 
revocation broadcast is  
 OH=tr??vm/R = TC??vm/R.                       (4.28) 
Thus, combining (4.28) and (4.20) we have  
 OH?CO ??TC ??R[nrx(na+1)+1+K???vm.             (4.29) 
Similarly, for downtown areas by combining (4.10) and (4.20) we have  
 OD?CO ??TC ??R[nrx(na+1)+1+K]/vM.              (4.30) 
Thus, one upper bound of TC can be estimated with (4.29) or (4.30). 
Reputation Management Requirement: TC should be smaller than the reputation 
update period as required by the specific reputation management scheme.   
On the other hand, based on regional traffic parameters and application requirements, 
the upper bounds and lower bounds of K can also be determined, as discussed below.  
Sufficient Neighbors: In reality, we need to ensure that at any time the probability that 
one node has more than K neighbors is larger than a preset value p0, as set by VANET 
administrators. In highway scenarios, the probability of any node has more than K 
neighbors is 
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Letting pK?p0, we can derive one upper bound of K in highway scenarios with (4.31).   
In downtown areas, we regard one road segment as being good as long as its network 
density can support K+1 nodes within 2R distance. Thus, we can numerically figure out 
the proper value of K, so that the proportion of the good road segments is no less than p0.  
Misbehaving Nodes: K should be large enough so that the probability that there are 
more than K+1 misbehaving nodes among na nodes is smaller than a preset value p1.  
 1Pr{ 1} ( , ) (1 )
a a
n n ii
m ai K
n K C n i p p ?? ?? ? ? ?? .         (4.32) 
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In (4.32), nm is the number of misbehaving nodes in the concerned neighborhood. Let 
this probability derived by (4.32) be smaller than p1, we can get one lower bound of K.   
Thus, based on regional traffic conditions the feasible ranges of the system parameters 
of JPRA can be determined. The configuration of these parameters will be performed by 
the traffic engineering staff and is out of the scope of this chapter. 
4.7 Simulation Results 
To showcase the application of JPRA in VANETs, here JPRA is adopted to support a 
simple reputation scheme in the context of privacy protection, where each node changes 
its pseudonyms with a period of 100 seconds. The reputation scheme is based on beacon 
evaluation, where each node verifies and evaluates the content of the beacons from its 
neighbors. With existing beacon verification schemes [76], [90], [143], we focus on 
reputation aggregation to reflect each node’s beaconing behaviors. For simplicity, we 
design the following reputation aggregation algorithm.  
Reputation segment: Suppose during the last period node A receives n beacons from 
node B. A period starts when A and B become neighbors, or when A updates its reputation 
label for the last time. Let nb indicate the number of invalid beacons. Then, the reputation 
segment for node B is  
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.                           (4.33) 
Reputation aggregation: Based on the reputation segments and its current rv value, the 
reputation of node B can be updated. First, the average reputation segment rs is calculated. 
Then, the reputation change ?rv is calculated as   
 
(1 ) , (0,1]
, [ 1,0]
rv rs rs
rv
rv rs rs
? ? ??? ? ? ? ? ?? .                    (4.34) 
The reputation is updated as rv rv rv? ? ? , which implements the Update() function in 
subsection 4.4.3. Equation (4.34) ensures that the reputation of any node will be changed 
a lot when the reputation segments is inconsistent with its current reputation, which is a 
common practice in the existing reputation schemes.  
100
1km
2km
Figure 4.6 The road layout used in the simulation of JPRA 
For brevity, only downtown scenarios are simulated as shown in Figure 4.6. Each road 
segment consists of two lanes in each direction. 250 nodes drive around with an average 
speed of 20m/s. Each node periodically sends out beacons. To simulate random errors, 
each honest node will send out invalid beacons with a probability of 0.5%. Each 
misbehaving nodes, by contrast, will send out invalid beacons with a higher preset 
probability ?. The number of misbehaving node, NB, is also configured in this simulation.  
IEEE 802.11a is adopted in NS2 [169] to simulate DSRC communication, due to its 
similarity to DSRC. Vehicle mobility trace is generated by MOVE [170]. The simulation 
parameters are listed in Table 4.2.
For comparison, we simulate JPRA (K=1, 2, 3, 4) as well as a baseline scheme and the 
probabilistic reputation scheme [108]. The baseline scheme, representing reputation 
schemes without considering privacy protection, enables the neighbors of each node to 
keep its reputation segments based on its behaviors. To form a reputation for one node, 
all its neighbors need to be queried for reputation segments. In face of pseudonym change,
the reputation segments of any node will be lost and this node can assume a new 
reputation value. In the probabilistic reputation scheme [108], blocking negative 
reputation segments is easy and reputation values are manifested in its real value.   
 
Table 4.2 
Simulation parameters of JPRA 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
# of vehicles 250 Bit-rate 6 Mbps 
Road length 25 km Beacon Period 200 ms 
R 300m Simulation Time 700 s 
MAC 802.11a TP (T0) 100 ms 
TC 100 s tm 1 s 
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4.7.1 Reputation Values 
To evaluate each scheme’s capability of calculating the authentic reputation values in 
face of misbehaving nodes, the average reputation values of honest nodes and dishonest 
nodes are evaluated. Here, each misbehaving node generates invalid beacons with a 
probability ?, which changes from 0.1 to 0.5 with a step size of 0.05. Each misbehaving 
node may try to block 100% or 50% of the negative reputation segments, if possible. For 
brevity, we only show the simulation results for NB = 20 and K=2 for JPRA.  
The average reputation values of the misbehaving nodes in each scheme are shown in 
Figure 4.7. In the following figures, we use PR to indicate the probabilistic reputation 
scheme and use BS to indicate the baseline scheme. Figure 4.7 shows that, in the 
probabilistic reputation scheme, the reputation will always be 1.0 if each misbehaving 
node can block all negative reputation segments. Even if each misbehaving node can only 
block 50% of the negative reputation segments, its reputations will still be much higher 
than those estimated by JPRA.  
With the baseline scheme, though the misbehaving nodes cannot block the negative 
reputation segments, they can surely discard their previous low reputations by changing 
pseudonyms. We can safely predict that the misbehaving nodes will have even higher 
reputations if they can change their pseudonyms with a smaller period. 
By comparison, JPRA prevents any misbehaving nodes from blocking the negative 
reputation segments and from evading the low reputations by changing their pseudonyms. 
Thus, JPRA calculates the lowest reputations for the misbehaving nodes, which correctly 
reflect their misbehaviors.  
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Figure 4.7 Reputation values of misbehaving nodes estimated by various schemes 
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Figure 4.8 Reputation values of honest nodes estimated by various schemes 
Besides, the reputations of the honest nodes in cases of JPRA, BS and PR are almost 
the same, as shown in Figure 4.8. However, even for the honest nodes, the reputation 
estimated by BS is a little bit higher than those of JPRA and PR, due to the fact that by 
changing its pseudonyms each node can assume a reputation of 1.0. By setting the 
reputation threshold rt to 0.985, the manifested reputation of each honest node, 
JPRA(Actual), is the same, which is very close to its actual reputation (JPRA (Disp)).  
4.7.2 Futile Pseudonym Change Ratio 
For any node, its pseudonym change becomes futile if its manifested reputation is 
unique among its neighborhood. Here, the futile pseudonym change ratio is defined as the 
number of futile pseudonym changes over the total number of pseudonym changes. Since 
the baseline scheme is based on reputation query, it is not evaluated here.  
In Figure 4.9, the futile pseudonym change ratio of the honest nodes and misbehaving 
nodes of JPRA are labeled “JPRA Good” and “JPRA Bad”, respectively. Similarly, the 
futile pseudonym change ratio of honest and misbehaving nodes of the probabilistic 
scheme are “PR Good” and “PR Bad”, respectively. As shown in Figure 4.9, the 
probabilistic scheme makes most pseudonym changes futile for any node, since the exact 
reputation value tends to be unique. By comparison, in JPRA, with conditional reputation 
discretization the honest nodes can well preserve its privacy through pseudonym change, 
while the misbehaving nodes’ pseudonym changes are mostly futile. Thus, JPRA protects 
the privacy of honest nodes and punishes the misbehaving nodes in both privacy and 
reputation schemes. 
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Figure 4.9 The privacy violation ratios of JPRA and PR 
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Figure 4.10 The communication overheads of JPRA, BS and PR 
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Figure 4.11 The successful collusion ratio of misbehaving nodes in JPRA 
4.7.3 Overhead and Successful Collusion Ratio 
To compare the communication overhead, here the total communication packets of 
these schemes are shown in Figure 4.10. In the probabilistic reputation scheme, each 
beacon will trigger a reputation segment, as discussed in [108], so its communication 
overhead is much higher than other schemes. In the baseline scheme, to know the current 
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reputations of its neighbors, each node needs to query the reputation of each of its 
neighbors for a period Tq. Here, we assume that Tq = 10s, 50s or 100s, respectively.  
As shown in Figure 4.10, the communication overhead of JPRA with any K is 
comparable to the baseline scheme with Tq=50s and Tq =100s. In JPRA, with the 
reputation label update period (TC) set to 100s, the actual reputation label update interval 
is about 50s, considering the additional reputation label updates triggered by Event 2 and 
Event 3. Thus, the communication overhead of JPRA is smaller than that of the baseline 
scheme given the same reputation update period. Additionally, the probabilistic 
reputation scheme has the highest communication overhead.  
For different K values, the successful collusion ratios for any misbehaving nodes in 
JPRA are investigated. To allow for the most stringent scenarios, we assume that there is 
a successful collusion in reputation label update if there are currently (K+1) misbehaving 
nodes in the neighborhood. Figure 4.11 shows that the successful collusion ratio is 
generally smaller than 10% for K?2 and NB?20. Please note that there are totally 250 
nodes in the simulation, so NB = 20 indicates that 8% nodes are misbehaving nodes, 
which is untypically high for a realistic VANET. On the other hand, considering that 
many misbehaving nodes may not collude, the actual successful collusion ratio will be 
much lower than those shown in Figure 4.11. Thus, we can assume that for a realistic 
VANET, any K value no less than 2 will be proper for JPRA.  
In summary, simulation results show that JPRA can synergistically support both 
reputation management and privacy protection in VANETs, outperforming the existing 
schemes in terms of both reputation management and privacy protection. Besides, the 
communication overhead of JPRA is lower than the existing schemes. 
4.8 Summaries 
JPRA jointly supports privacy protection schemes and reputation management 
schemes by reconciling their conflicting requirements, so that both can be synergistically 
implemented in VANETs. Furthermore, JPRA enables them to enhance each other with 
additional support. Specifically, JPRA further encourages the common nodes to 
cooperate in VANETs by decreasing the privacy achieved by the misbehaving nodes. 
Additionally, the reputation label update for reputation management will not harm the 
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privacy protection schemes. Thus, considering the significance of reputation management 
and privacy protection, JPRA is essential to VANETs. Even better, JPRA incurs the 
lowest communication overhead in supporting both privacy schemes and reputation 
schemes, as discussed in subsection 4.6.2 and subsection 4.7.3. Thus, JPRA is a practical 
and novel solution for jointing supporting privacy and reputation in VANETs. 
In the future, we will continue to consider the conflicting requirements of trust 
schemes and privacy protection, and jointly support both types of schemes in VANETs. 
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Chapter 5 Short-Time Certificates-Based 
Privacy Protection5 
The short-time certificate schemes bring new constraints and implications to privacy 
protection in VANETs, especially the possible power abuse of RSUs and VANET 
authority. This chapter investigates such issues, based on which a short-time certificate-
based privacy protection (STCP2) scheme [147] is proposed. STCP2 adopts a privacy-
aware RSU deployment algorithm to optimize the deployment of RSUs with realistic cost 
and privacy constraints, properly handling the power abuse of RSUs and VANET 
authority. Furthermore, a secure and privacy-preserving pseudonym update algorithm 
allows each node to enhance its privacy by pseudonym changes at one RSU, against 
various privacy adversaries. Theoretical analysis and simulations show that STCP2 
ensures proper privacy protection in VANETs with short-time certificates.  
5.1 Introduction 
To fully realize the application potentials of VANETs it is necessary to address the 
challenging security requirements of VANETs [5]. Central to any security scheme is a 
certificate scheme for each vehicular node to securely prove its identity with a certificate 
issued by the authority of VANETs. Recently, two approaches to manage certificates in 
VANETs, long-time and short-time certificates, are commonly followed. The long-time 
schemes follow the certificate management for general networks, where the certificate 
revocation list (CRL) is necessary to revoke the certificates of the misbehaving nodes. 
Thus, such schemes usually incur heavy communication overhead by CRL distribution. 
By contrast, short-time certificate schemes assign to each node a certificate with a short 
lifetime, so that each node has to update its certificate frequently. Here, CRL distribution 
is unnecessary, since the authority can simply refuse to update the certificate to evict a 
misbehaving node. Thus, free of CRL distribution, short-time certificates are appealing to 
VANETs.  
                                                 
5  The material contained in this chapter was submitted to IEEE Transactions on 
Vehicular Technology. © 2012 IEEE. See Appendix C for a copy of the copyright 
permission. 
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Currently, most privacy protection schemes assume a long-time certificate 
management scheme, where each node is equipped with multiple certificates to form its 
pseudonyms and can change its pseudonyms at will. Frequent pseudonym change [113], 
[117]-[119], [121], [124], [127] is critical to the protection of nodes’ privacy, as 
discussed in section 5.2. However, with short-time certificates, each node has only one 
pseudonym at any time. To change its pseudonym, each node needs to get access to the 
authority via an RSU for certificate update. Thus, privacy protection faces different 
assumptions and constraints with short-time certificates. Specifically, since each RSU can 
monitor the pseudonym changes of all passing-by nodes, the possible power abuse of 
RSUs and the authority needs to be considered in privacy protection. Besides, it is 
necessary to make the certificate update procedures at each RSU both secure and 
confidential, since this is the only feasible pseudonym change opportunity for any node.  
To thoroughly address these issues, a Short-Time Certificates-based Privacy Protection 
scheme, STCP2, is proposed in this chapter. STCP2 identifies and investigates the critical 
privacy implications of short-time certificates. The deployment of RSUs in VANETs 
under the constraints of deployment cost and privacy protection is optimized with a novel 
privacy-aware RSU deployment algorithm. With this algorithm, the vehicular nodes will 
still get a minimal privacy assurance in case of the power abuse of RSUs and the 
authority. A secure and privacy-preserving pseudonym update algorithm enables each 
node to confidentially change its pseudonym with the help of the RSUs. Thus, with 
STCP2, privacy protection in VANETs becomes both cost-effective and feasible with 
short-term certificates, as shown by extensive theoretical analysis and simulations.   
5.2 Related Work 
To support traffic safety applications each node needs to broadcast beacons to 
announce its driving states such as location, speed and heading direction, with a period 
varying from 100ms to 500ms [10]. Thus, by monitoring beacons from one node, an 
adversary can obtain the exact movement trajectory of this node and breach its privacy. 
To protect the privacy of vehicular nodes, pseudonym change [113], [117]-[119], [121], 
[124], [127] is commonly adopted in VANETs to break down the movement trajectory 
(location history) and application accessing history of each node. A pseudonym is a 
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temporary communication ID which has no obvious connection to the real identity of one 
node, and a pseudonym usually is the combination of a certificate, an IP address and a 
MAC address [113]. Though several privacy protection schemes, for instance [134], 
[199], only consider the certificate in pseudonym changes, such schemes will not be 
effective without the synchronized IP and MAC address change.  
Most existing privacy protection schemes [113], [117]-[119], [121], [124], [127] for 
VANETs assume long-time certificates, so that CRL distribution is necessary to revoke 
the certificates of misbehaving nodes. In VANETs, with numerous nodes and multiple 
pseudonyms per node, the size of CRL tends to be huge. Besides, VANETs’ dynamic 
nature makes CRL distribution both challenging and bandwidth demanding [200]. 
Though several schemes [50], [54]-[56] have been proposed for efficient CRL 
distribution, they generally involve complicated control procedures for VANETs.  
Thus, short-time certificate schemes [57]-[60] for VANETs have been proposed to 
avoid CRL distribution. In such schemes, the certificate for each node has a short lifetime, 
so that to evict a misbehaving node the authority only needs to refuse to update the short-
time certificate of this node. Thus, being CRL-free, the short-time certificate schemes 
tend to be efficient and easy to manage. Indeed, WAVE [201] has listed short-time 
certificate schemes as a suitable alternative certificate management approach.   
With short-time certificates each node can only change its pseudonym assisted and 
monitored by an RSU, which brings forth new privacy implications. So far, such 
constraints have not been thoroughly investigated yet, which is one major task of STCP2. 
Specifically, with short-time certificates the possible power abuse of the RSUs and 
VANET authority needs to be considered, which has not been considered in existing RSU 
deployment schemes. For instance, [202] considers the optimization of RSU deployment 
in light of driving delay time and overhead time, without considering the possible privacy 
risks of the deployed RSUs. Besides, though [202] considers the incremental deployment 
of RSUs, it is unclear whether the additional RSUs can be optimally deployed or not. 
[128] proposes a flow-based privacy model to estimate the privacy strength of each 
intersection, and optimize the placement of mix zones in a given region. However, [128] 
relies on precise traffic flow statistics for any road intersection and ignores the possible 
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privacy risks of the RSUs. More importantly, [128] fails to consider RSU deployment in 
a progressive manner, which will be necessary in realistic VANET deployment.  
Besides, the certificate update procedure at each RSU should be both secure and 
confidential, to enhance the location privacy of the vehicular nodes. However, existing 
short-time certificate schemes [57]-[60] are mainly focused on the update of 
cryptographic materials, without considering the privacy adversary. In [129], a scheme to 
set up mix zone [131] for VANETs is proposed to enable vehicular nodes to change their 
pseudonyms without being monitored by the external adversaries. However, the IP and 
MAC addresses of each node are not considered in pseudonym change, and the more 
powerful internal privacy adversaries (as discussed in section 5.3.3) are not properly 
handled. Besides, [129] ignores the impact of encrypted beacons on traffic safety 
applications. By comparison, STCP2 will consider both internal and external adversaries 
to location privacy.    
5.3 Background and System Model 
In this section, the network model and underlying assumptions of STCP2 are presented, 
based on which the problem statement of STCP2 will be given. 
5.3.1 Network Model and Assumptions 
VANETs consist of an ad hoc domain and an infrastructure domain [4], [36], [37]. The 
ad hoc domain is comprised of smart vehicles equipped with DSRC [8] transceivers and 
GPS receivers. For traffic safety, each node will broadcast beacons every 100ms to 
500ms [10]. To securely participate in VANET communications, each node needs a valid 
short-time certificate issued by the Trust Authority (TA). Each node has a standard 
tamper-proof device (TPD) [11] to protect the cryptographic materials associated with its 
short-time certificate, especially its private key. With TPD, it is difficult for any 
unauthorized entity to access the private key of any node, and it is difficult for any 
vehicular node to intentionally reveal its own private key.  
The infrastructure domain consists of RSUs and the management entities, for instance 
Trust Authority (TA). TA is in charge of all management functions and security functions 
of VANETs, including identity management of RSUs and vehicular nodes. Equipped 
with DSRC transceivers, RSUs serve as vehicular nodes’ access points to TA. RSUs 
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usually are deployed at road intersections, probably working together with the traditional 
traffic lights. The communications between RSUs and TA are assumed to be error-free 
and instantaneous. It is assumed here that TA and RSUs are difficult to compromise.   
5.3.2 Privacy Implications and Problem Statement 
With short-time certificates, each node uses a short-time certificate issued by TA and 
its IP/MAC addresses as its pseudonym in communications. Each node needs to update 
its certificate whenever it runs into the communication range of an RSU, as shown in 
Figure 5.1. To be both secure and efficient, certificate update relies on only 1-hop 
communications. Thus, with short-time certificates each node needs to change its 
pseudonym assisted and monitored by an RSU. Thus, critical assumptions of privacy 
protection with short-time certificates can be identified and justified below.   
? The real identity of each node should be kept secret to any entities except for TA, as 
commonly assumed in the existing privacy protection schemes.  
? The pseudonym changes of any node should not be traced by any entities except for 
RSU and TA. Due to the nature of 1-hop communications, it is evitable that an RSU 
can monitor the pseudonym change of any passing-by vehicles.  
? Minimal Privacy Assurance: The exact movement trajectory of any node should not 
be figured out by any entity, including TA and RSUs. This represents the lowest 
privacy any node can achieve if, in any case, both TA and RSUs are compromised. 
Even if TA and RSUs are not compromised, the concerns about power abuses of TA 
and RSU may deter the privacy-sensitive users from participating in VANETs. Thus, 
based on common senses and the current research on privacy concerns in VANETs 
[203], such a minimal privacy assurance is desirable for VANETs.  
 
Figure 5.1 The network model of VANETs with short-time certificates 
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? Regional Considerations: We consider VANETs in a specific geographic region. In 
reality most privacy protection decisions are relevant to specific locations, such as a 
downtown area, one resident neighborhood and a hospital neighborhood [204]. 
Besides, in the initial stage of VANET deployment, RSUs may be deployed in 
certain regions by the local transportation authorities. Thus, it is more likely that 
each local area will have its own VANET deployment plan and policies. As 
discussed later, the algorithms proposed in STCP2 can be easily extended to a huge 
VANET, for instance, a network formed by all vehicles in the USA. 
Based on the realistic assumptions presented above, STCP2 addresses two critical 
problems. First, RSU deployment in VANETs should be optimized in lights of privacy 
protection, cost and application support. Secondly, the pseudonym update procedure of 
each node needs to be both secure and privacy-preserving. 
5.3.3 Adversary Model 
Similar to [113], [117]-[119], [121], [124], [127], three powerful adversaries are 
considered in STCP2, including the Global Passive Adversary (GPA), the Local Passive 
Adversary (LPA) and the Local Active Adversary (LAA). Among them, the GPA can 
overhear all communications within the whole VANETs; the LPA can only overhear the 
communications within certain local regions. The LAA, besides overhearing the 
communications within certain local regions, can also actively communicate with other 
nodes and RSUs. Thus, the LAA is able to get the cryptographic materials present in 
VANETs, as the normal vehicular nodes do. Realistically, the GPA and the LPA are 
external observers which intend to gain economic interests or to harm the common 
VANET nodes by breaching the location privacy. The LAA is the compromised nodes 
(internal observers) of VANETs.   
TA and RSUs generally are constrained by privacy related policies and legislations, so 
that they generally will not breach the location privacy of vehicular nodes. However, to 
be safe, in STCP2 the extreme cases of power abuse and compromise of TA and RSUs 
are also considered, as discussed in subsection 5.3.2. 
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5.4 Privacy-Aware RSU Deployment 
RSUs have significant impacts on the security, privacy, application, as well as the cost 
of VANETs. Specifically, many security schemes, such as reputation management and 
certificate update, benefit from the presence of RSUs as trust anchors. RSUs are also 
desirable to various traffic safety, traffic management and commercial applications, 
serving as access points to the infrastructure entities. Thus, to better support security and 
applications, RSUs should be deployed as densely as possible in VANETs. On the other 
hand, one RSU, once compromised or in case of power abuse, may also serve as a 
sampling point for one node’s movement trajectory. Besides, each RSU incurs a certain 
deployment and maintenance cost, which will limit the number of RSUs to be deployed.   
Here, RSU deployment will be investigated to achieve the desirable tradeoff among 
privacy requirements, safety requirements and cost constraints.  
5.4.1 Minimal Privacy Condition 
As discussed in subsection 5.3.2, it is necessary to provide the minimal privacy 
assurance to the vehicular nodes in VANETs. Thus, in any region ?=<V, E> the RSUs 
need to satisfy the minimal privacy assurance. Here, V is the vertex set, containing all the 
intersections and points of interests in this region. E contains the road segments. A 
sufficient and necessary condition of the minimal privacy assurance is stated as follows.  
Weak Minimal Privacy Condition (WMPC): Between any adjacent vertex of one 
RSU and any adjacent vertex of another RSU, there exist at least two RSU-free paths.  
Proof: Suppose the deployed RSUs in VANETs satisfy WMPC. In a typical road 
topology as shown in Figure 5.2, consider two RSUs (R1 and R2). Each RSU can figure 
out the driving direction of any passing-by node up to its adjacent vertices. When a node 
moves from R1 to R2, R1 and R2 cannot figure out the exact movement trajectory of this 
node. In terms of topology, this node could have followed the path R1-A-R2, or R1-A-B-C-
D-E-F-G-H-A-R2. Thus, WMPC is a sufficient condition of the minimal privacy 
assurance. On the other hand, suppose that between an adjacent vertex of R1, say A, and 
an adjacent vertex of R2, say B, there is only one or no RSU-free path. Then, from above 
discussions, the path R2-B-A-R1 can be completely monitored by R1and R2. Thus, this path 
violates the minimal privacy assurance. Thus, WMPC is also a necessary condition.  
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Figure 5.2 The alternative travel paths between two RSUs 
WMPC is weak in the sense that only the topology information is considered in the 
above discussions. If R1 and R2 have sufficient information about the average vehicle 
speed and the traffic light status of the nearby road intersections, they probably could 
differentiate a node following the path R1-A-R2 from a node following the path R1-A-B-C-
D-E-F-G-H-A-R2. However, WMPC is still meaningful, considering the uncertainties in 
the vehicles’ movement in reality. For instance, one vehicle may stop beside a shop or an 
office building for a period, instead of moving continuously. Besides, we can extend 
WMPC to the Strong Minimal Privacy Condition (SMPC).  
Strong Minimal Privacy Condition (SMPC): The RSUs satisfy WMPC. Besides, for 
any RSU-free path (Path1), there must exist at least another RSU-free path (Path2) such 
that |TravelTime(Path1) ? TravelTime(Path2)| ? ?.  
Here, TravelTime() estimates the average travel time of a route. ? is a parameter set by 
the VANET administrator, with which these two RSU-free paths cannot be differentiated 
based on the travel time of one vehicle. Similarly, it can be proven that that SMPC is both 
sufficient and necessary for the minimal privacy assurance. Without realistic traffic 
statistics, it is difficult to adopt SMPC in the deployment of RSUs. Thus, next we use 
WMPC for privacy-aware RSU deployment.    
Indeed, WMPC provides an upper bound (NM) on the number of RSUs in a given 
region ?=<V, E>. Let VI ? V be the set of vertices selected for RSU deployment. Then 
NM can be obtained by solving the following optimization problem.  
 /
max | |
. | ( , ) | 2, , , ( ), ( )
I
I
V i j i j I i i j j
I
V
st Path a a v v V a Nei v a Nei v
V V
? ? ? ? ?
?
.  (5.1) 
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In (5.1), Nei(vi) is the set of adjacent vertices of node vi. / ( , )IV i jPath a a  is the set of 
paths between vertex ai and aj without any vertices in VI. If ? is a perfect grid with N?N 
vertices as shown in Figure 5.2, the range of NM can be estimated as follows 
 2 2( 4 ) / 4 / 4MN N N N? ? ? .                     (5.2) 
Formula (5.2) can be derived by counting the RSUs in any two consequential rows or 
columns in this perfect grid. In these two rows, one row must be RSU-free, and the other 
row can have at most 1 RSU for every two consequential vertices. Thus, considering the 
edges in this perfect grid, (5.2) follows.  
A region of an arbitrary shape can be divided into smaller squares, each of which can 
be approximated with a perfect grid. For each square, (5.2) can be used to estimate its 
maximal number of RSUs. Eventually, the NM for the whole region can be estimated. To 
provide minimal privacy assurance, WMPC should be satisfied in RSU deployment, 
which has not been considered in [128], [202]. 
5.4.2 Progressive RSU Deployment Algorithm 
In reality, a cost budget may mandate that only NB RSUs can be deployed in the 
concerned region ?. These NB RSUs need to be deployed to maximize the support to 
security and applications, while still meeting WMPC. Besides, in the future additional 
RSUs should be deployed in a consistent and progressive way. Specifically, given that NB 
RSUs have been optimally deployed, the deployment of additional n RSUs can result in 
the optimal deployment of (NB+n) RSUs. To this end, a progressive RSU deployment 
algorithm (PRDA) is proposed to minimize the longest RSU-free shortest path (LR) in ?. 
Here, LR is the length of the longest pair-wise shortest paths in ? which have no RSU. 
Obviously, the smaller LR is, the smaller will be the travel time for any vehicle at any 
position in ? to reach the next RSU. In this sense, by minimizing LR, PRDA can 
maximize the support to security and applications. Thus, PRDA needs to solve the 
following optimization problem   
 
min | |
. | | | |, /
& | | &
R R
R X X I
I I B
L P
st P P P SPath V
V V V N WMPC
?
? ? ?
? ?
.                 (5.3) 
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In (5.3), PR is the longest shortest path in ?, and SPath/VI is the set of all-pair shortest 
paths in ? excluding these paths containing a vertex in VI. To solve problem (5.3), PRDA 
is designed as shown in Figure 5.3.  
In PRDA, WMPC is checked for any candidate vertex for RSU deployment, so the 
resulted VI will surely meet this condition. Besides, in selecting any vertex, LR is 
minimized, so the resulted VI will be optimal in minimizing LR. Specifically, two salient 
properties hold for PRDA. PRDA is progressive in its nature, so it is especially suitable 
for the realistic RSU deployment. In the initial stage only a few RSUs can be deployed 
and more will be further deployed when the budget permits in the future. Besides, the 
optimality of PRDA in minimizing LR is obvious from Figure 5.3.  
Thus, PRDA is a progressive and optimal method of deploying RSUs with privacy 
considerations. By making sure that most vehicles traveling longer than LR within this 
region will run into at least one RSU, the safety experience of each vehicle is ensured. 
Besides, TA is able to estimate the lifetime of the short-time certificates to ensure that 
any normally travelling node will be able to run into another RSU before its certificate 
expires. In the future, PRDA can incorporate the speed limit and average traffic volume 
of each road segment to make the RSU deployment more comprehensive. We leave this 
extension work to the traffic engineers with sufficient domain knowledge in assessing 
realistic traffic statistics. 
 
Figure 5.3 The detailed algorithm of PRDA 
Inputs: ?, V, E, NB 
Outputs: VI, max(Path) 
Initialization: VI=?, Path=? 
Algorithm: 
 P=Floyd(?, V, E);      //all-pair shortest paths 
 Path=QuickSort(P);            //quick sort; 
 for i=1, 2, …, NB 
  pm1=max(Path);           //current longest path 
  pm2= next_max (Path);     //second longest path 
  while((v=pm1?pm2)== 0 || VI?{v} does not meet WMPC) 
   pm2 = next_max(Path); 
                        end-of-while 
  v = pm1 ? pm2; 
                        VI=VI?{v}; 
                        Path = Path/<v>;      //remove all paths containing v 
          End-of-for 
 Return VI and max(Path); 
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5.4.3 Analysis and Simulation of PRDA 
5.4.3.1 Theoretical Analysis  
First, the computation complexity of PRDA is reasonable. For a region ? with N 
vertices, there will be N(N?1)/2 ? N2/2 pair-wise shortest paths. Thus, the quick sort 
algorithm [205] adopted in Figure 5.3 will incur a computation complexity of O(N2lgN). 
Additionally, Floyd’s all-pair shortest path algorithm [206] in Figure 5.3 has computation 
complexity O(N3). Thus, PRDA has an overall computation complexity of O(N3), which 
allows its application to large regions with thousands of vertices.  
Secondly, we would like to show the necessity of checking WMPC in PRDA by 
estimating the road segments which are completely monitored by randomly deployed 
RSUs. Here, for brevity we model a region ? with an n?n perfect grid, where all road 
segments have the same length d. Thus, the total road segment length (LT) in ? is 
2n(n?1)d. We model the RSU deployment in ? without considering WMPC as randomly 
deploying the nb RSUs. For ease of estimation, we only consider the road segments which 
are adjacent to two RSUs at the same time.  
Suppose one vertex v has one RSU. Then, v has 4 adjacent edges. Let p0 indicate the 
probability that one adjacent vertex of v will be selected in RSU deployment. Then,  
 20 ( 1) / ( 1)bp n N? ? ? .                          (5.4) 
Equation (5.4) holds, since there are still (N2?1) vacant vertices and (nb?1) RSUs left. 
Thus, the length of the covered edges which are adjacent to v, l1, can be approximated as  
 4 3 2 11 0 0 0 0
3 2 1
4 3 2
4 4 4
l p d p d p d p d? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? .  (5.5) 
Thus, the total length of covered edges can be roughly estimated as  
 1 / 2T bl n l? .                                   (5.6) 
The ratio of covered edges is  
 /T T Tr l L? .                                   (5.7) 
From (5.5), (5.6) and (5.7), rT is always non-zero, which means that certain road 
segments will violate the WMPC condition. Thus, it is necessary to consider WMPC in 
RSU deployment, to prevent any road segment from being completely monitored.  
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5.4.3.2 Simulation of RSU Deployment 
To show the effectiveness of PRDA, we simulate RSU deployment in downtown 
Marquette, MI, which has 519 vertices. In this simulation, we change the number of 
available RSUs (NB) from 1 RSU to 100 RSUs.   
For comparison, we also randomly select NB vertices for RSU deployment, and 
evaluate its LR. For each given NB, the LR values of the random RSU deployment and 
PRDA are shown in Figure 5.4. Given one NB, PRDA can achieve much lower LR than 
the random RSU deployment. Besides, with any given NB, LR of PRDA is significantly 
reduced from the original value (about 16000 meters) without any RSU.  
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Figure 5.4 The LR statistics of PRDA and random RSU deployment 
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Figure 5.5 The lm and LM statistics of PRDA and random RSU deployment  
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Figure 5.6 The ratio of covered road segments of random RSU deployment  
Besides, with NB RSUs deployed, the distance (li) of each vertex to its nearest RSU is 
investigated. Specifically, LM is the maximal li of all vertices, and lm is the average li of 
all vertices. Figure 5.5 shows the LM and lm of both PRDA and random RSU deployment. 
It shows that PRDA will result in smaller LM than random RSU deployment, so that with 
PRDA each vehicular node can go to the nearest RSU sooner.   
The ratio of monitored road segments, in case of the random RSU deployment, is 
shown in Figure 5.6. In Figure 5.6, the theoretical ratio is estimated based on (5.7). The 
curve labeled with Random is the ratio of covered road segments with RSUs randomly 
deployed. Figure 5.6 shows that by randomly deploying RSUs, some road segments will 
surely be completely monitored by the RSUs. Vehicular nodes traveling on such road 
segments will not meet the minimal privacy assurance.  
In summary, PRDA optimizes the RSU deployment in VANETs with realistic budget 
constraints, ensuring the minimal privacy assurance to nodes and maximizing the support 
to security and applications. Being progressive, PRDA is especially appealing to the 
future massive deployment of VANETs. With RSUs deployed, it is necessary to 
investigate the pseudonym update procedures at each RSU, as discussed next. 
5.5 Secure and Privacy-Preserving Pseudonym Update 
As previously discussed, with short-time certificates each node can only update its 
pseudonym with the help of an RSU. Thus, it is critical to make the pseudonym change of 
each node secure and privacy-preserving against both external and internal observers. To 
this end, here a secure and privacy-preserving pseudonym update algorithm is proposed 
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with three procedures: location cloaking, synchronized pseudonym update and random 
mobility trace auditing. Among them, location cloaking conceals the mobility trace of 
vehicular nodes nearby an RSU from the external observers, namely the GPA and the 
LPA. Synchronized pseudonym update enables each node to change its pseudonym with 
the aid of an RSU and become a totally new node to any external observer. Besides, 
random mobility trace auditing can detect LAAs in STCP2. This way, the privacy of 
vehicular nodes can be properly protected against GPA, LAA and LPA. 
For clarity, the notations commonly used in the following subsections will be listed 
here. PRX and PUX indicate the private key and the public key of node X, respectively. 
PUX{Msg} is the message Msg encrypted with PUX. {Msg}PRX is the digital signature of 
Msg generated with PRX. H(Msg) is the hash value of Msg generated by a standard hash 
function, for instance SHA-2 [168]. ? indicates broadcast and ? indicates uni-cast. * 
indicates multiple entities. 
5.5.1 Location Cloaking 
To conceal the mobility trace of each node nearby one RSU, the RSU configures a 
location Cloaking Region (CR) with a length D (D>0) in each direction, as shown in 
Figure 5.7. In CR each node encrypts its beacons with a shared secret key SKi. To avoid 
negative impacts on traffic safety, the RSU also configures a Buffering Region (BR) with 
length R outside CR, as shown in Figure 5.7. R is the communication range of vehicular 
nodes, and each node in BR will send out plaintext beacons while decrypting the received 
encrypted beacons with SKi. Thus, properly configuring D as discussed in subsection 
5.5.4, the movement trajectories of nodes in CR will be concealed from GPA and LPA. 
 
Figure 5.7 One exemplary set-up of location cloaking around an RSU 
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5.5.1.1 BR and CR Management 
The management of BR and CR can be illustrated by one node (A) running across this 
RSU, which will first enter BR, then enter CR and eventually leave CR.   
Entering BR: Upon entering BR, A will overhear encrypted beacons from the nodes in 
CR, and it will broadcast a SK_REQ message to its neighbors to query the current SKi 
used in CR.  One of its neighbors in BR, say B, will send SKi to A in SK_RSP, as follows. 
A?*: SK_REQ = {Data={Type=Key_REQ, TSPA}, {Hash(Data)}PRA}. 
B?A: SK_RSP = {Data={Type=Key_RSP, PUA{SK_Package}, TSPB}, 
{Hash(Data)}PRB}. 
Here, TSPA and TSPB are the timestamps of node A and B, respectively. With 
certificates in beacons, in both SK_REQ and SK_RSP the senders’ certificates are not 
included. SK_Package contains the current SKi, D as well as their activation time. In 
SK_RSP, the SK_Package is encrypted with PUA, so it is only accessible to A.  
In this process, the nodes in BR may follow a contention based approach, e.g., RPB-
MD [166] or LEAPER [142], to ensure reliable and trustworthy transmission of SK_RSP.  
Entering CR: Based on D and the position of the RSU, A can figure out the boundary 
of CR. Upon entering CR, A will encrypt its beacons as follows. 
A?*:  Encrypted_Beacon = SKi{Plaintext_Beacon}. 
Here, Plaintext_Beacon is a standard beacon containing the sender’s driving states [10]. 
Thus, only the vehicular nodes in CR and BR, as well as the RSU, can get access to the 
beacons of A, so A’s movement trajectory in CR is concealed from any external observers.  
Leaving CR: When A leaves CR, it will broadcast plaintext beacons again. However, 
as long as it overhears encrypted beacons, it will still use SKi to decrypt them.  
With each node following the above procedures, BR and CR around the RSU can be 
automatically maintained. In CR, if A changes its pseudonym, the external adversaries 
can only rely on the time points of A entering CR and existing CR to connect its 
pseudonyms. Thus, location cloaking serves as the random silent period for pseudonym 
changes, which is widely adopted in privacy protection [113], [117]-[119], [121], [124], 
[127]. Unlike random silent period, location cloaking does not stop any node from 
beaconing, so it imposes no negative impact on traffic safety applications. 
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5.5.1.2 Update of the Secret Key 
It is necessary for the RSU to keep SKi both fresh and secure, so that the SKi obtained 
by any passing-by LAA will not be useful for long. To this end, the RSU may choose to 
update the secret key SKi with a new key SKi+1 at a randomly selected time point by 
broadcasting a SK_Update message.  
RSU?*: SK_Update = {Data={Type = Key_Update, TSPRSU, SKT{SK_Package_New}, 
{PUX, PUX {SKT}} … }, {Hash(Data)}PRRSU}. 
Here, SK_Package_New contains the new SKi+1, D and their activation time. SKT is a 
temporary secret key to encrypt SK_Package_New. The RSU will, for each of its 1-hop 
neighbor X, encrypt SKT with the public key of X (PUX). Thus, only the nodes regarded 
by RSU as its 1-hop neighbors can access SK_Update sent by the RSU. For instance, in 
Figure 5.8, the RSU will encrypt SKT with PUA and PUB.   
Upon receiving a SK_Update message from the RSU or another node, each node 
within BR or CR will similarly construct a SK_Update message for its neighbors in BR 
or CR which are farther away from the RSU. For instance, in Figure 5.8, the SK_Update 
message sent out by node B will be encrypted in such a way that only node C and node E 
can access it. This way, the nodes out of the communication range of the RSU can also 
receive multiple SK_Update messages from different nodes, which can be verified 
against each other to ensure the authenticity of SK_Package_New. Within a limited 
latency as discussed in subsection 5.5.4, all nodes within BR and CR will receive 
SK_Package_New. At the defined activation time, SKi+1 and the new D will take effect.  
In the above procedures, for clarity we assume that all nodes will be honest and 
cooperative in sending out the SK_Update message. Actually, many existing schemes, 
e.g., LEAPER [142], can be adopted to detect the dishonest nodes tampering with 
SK_Update, and reputation schemes [93]-[95] can be adopted to punish such nodes.  
 
Figure 5.8 One exemplary secret key update procedure  
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Thus, by changing the secret key from time to time, the RSU can effectively reduce the 
potential harm of the LAAs. Actually, one LAA needs to go back to this RSU frequently 
to get the current SKi. As discussed in subsection 5.5.3, this adds much difficulty to any 
LAA in continuously monitoring the nodes nearby one RSU.  
5.5.2 Synchronized Pseudonym Change 
To confuse the external observers, the pseudonym change of any node should be 
confidential. To this end, the RSU will help the nodes update the short-time certificate 
and change IP/MAC addresses in their pseudonyms. For brevity, here the technical 
details of short-time certificate schemes are ignored, and we focus on the secure message 
exchanges to support any given short-time certificate scheme, for example ECPP [207].  
When a node A enters the cloaking region (CR), it will request a certificate update 
from the RSU as follows.  
RSU?A:  CER_REQ={{Data={Type, IP_OPT, TSPA}, {Hash(Data)}PRA}}. 
RSU?A: CER_RSP = {Data={Type, PUA{New_Cert}, TSPRSU}, 
{ Hash(Data)}PRRSU}. 
Here, IP_OPT indicates whether A is willing to change its IP/MAC address or not. 
New_Cert contains the necessary parameters for short-time certificate update. With 
CER_RSP formatted as above, New_Cert is only accessible to A. Upon receiving 
CER_RSP, A will store the new private/public key pair and new short-time certificate, 
and use them in its communications after the following IP/MAC exchange.  
Let SW indicate the set of nodes willing to exchange their IP/MAC addresses. The RSU 
will select the nearby nodes in SW, and randomly shuffle their IP/MAC addresses. Two 
nodes are regarded as nearby if they may be mistaken as each other after the pseudonym 
change, as discussed in subsection 5.5.4. Then, the RSU will broadcast an IP_SW 
message as follows.  
RSU?*: IP_SW = {Data=SKi{Type, TSPRSU, {A, IP_MACA,} {B, IP_MACB}, …, 
{Dummy Assignment}}, {Hash(Data)}PRRSU}. 
Here, a valid IP address and MAC address will be assigned to any node in SW. For each 
node unwilling to change its IP/MAC addresses, the RSU will put a dummy assignment 
in the IP_SW message. After receiving IP_SW, the nodes in SW will assume the new 
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IP/MAC addresses. Besides, all nodes will start to use their new short-time certificate. To 
improve the effectiveness of IP/MAC exchange, the following complementary 
procedures are also proposed.  
? Each node, if it keeps its IP/MAC intact, will add a random latency t to its next 
communication activity after receiving IP_SW. This t is obtained based on the 
statistics of latency caused by resetting IP/MAC addresses [113]. Thus, by 
monitoring the communication timing of each node, the external adversaries cannot 
figure out whether any node has changed its IP/MAC addresses or not. 
? Each node will keep record of IP_SW messages for future dispute resolution. If any 
node arbitrarily usurps the IP/MAC of another node, such disputes can be resolved 
based on the IP_SW traces of the involved nodes.   
Thus, the IP/MAC exchange maximizes the anonymity set of each node (A) while still 
allowing for each node’s application considerations. Here the anonymity set of A consists 
of the nodes which seems to the adversaries likely to be node A with a new pseudonym. 
Due to the presence of the dummy assignments, an external adversary cannot 
differentiate the nodes changing IP/MAC addresses from those keeping their IP/MAC 
addresses. To an external adversary, each node entering CR becomes a totally different 
node upon exiting CR, and the adversary can only rely on the timing information to 
connect the pseudonyms of one same node, as discussed in subsection 5.5.4.   
5.5.3 Random Mobility Trace Auditing 
It is necessary to detect and evict the LAAs from VANETs, since each LAA imposes 
great harms to the privacy of vehicles. Specifically, entering BR or CR, one LAA can 
obtain the up-to-date secret key SKi issued by the RSU, and monitor the pseudonym 
changes of its neighbors. Thus, one single LAA can make the CR futile. Furthermore, one 
LAA may collude with the GPA in decrypting all communications nearby one RSU. With 
the help of sufficient LAAs, the GPA could decrypt the beacons sent by the nodes in all 
CRs within VANETs.  
Thus, here we identify the most cost-effective and harmful attack strategies of LAA 
and GPA. Depending on the number of LAAs required to obtain the up-to-date secret 
keys from all RSUs in VANETs, the feasible attack strategies are shown below.  
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? Fixing one LAA to one RSU: Each LAA may continuously monitor the 
communications of one RSU by remaining static or circling around this RSU.  
? Continuous Usage of LAAs: The GPA may organize a number of LAAs to 
continuously run from one RSU to another. At any moment, it will be ensured that at 
least one LAA is within the communication range of one RSU.  
? Advanced Usage of LAAs: To further blend the mobility pattern of LAAs with that 
of the normal nodes, the LAAs will only be active in VANETs for a given duration 
T0 within a period T.  
To detect the LAAs adopting the above strategies, here a random mobility trace 
auditing algorithm is proposed. Specifically, the RSUs in VANETs can collectively 
obtain the mobility trace of each node, including the time points, positions and directions 
of this node running into and leaving each RSU. Each day, a period T will be randomly 
selected from 24 hours, in which all the node mobility traces will be analyzed. An alarm 
will be raised if one of the following conditions is met: 1) one node stays unreasonably 
long in one intersection or repeatedly returns to one RSU; 2) one node traverses all RSUs 
or a subset of RSUs repeatedly with continuous movement; 3) one node traverses a subset 
of RSUs over a period T0. Obviously, these three alarms correspond to the above 
attacking strategies. 
If one alarm is raised, the suspicious node will be marked and its future mobility traces 
will be further monitored and analyzed. If after several periods (T) one suspicious node 
still behaves in the similar way, this issue will be reported to the TA for further 
investigations on the background of this node. Once one node is confirmed as a LAA, it 
will be evicted from VANETs, and its owner may be further punished. In the future, 
concrete parameters, such as T0, T and the alarm trigger, can be selected based on the 
traffic statistics of the concerned region, which is out of the scope of this chapter. Here, 
we will evaluate the effect of this algorithm in a theoretical setting.  
In a region ?, suppose that there are NR RSUs. Also suppose that the minimal 
spanning tree Tree of all RSUs in ? is as shown in Figure 5.9. Then, one adversary 
adopting the first strategy as discussed above will only need Nm1 = NR LAAs to 
continuously monitor all RSUs in ?.  
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Figure 5.9 The minimal spanning tree of RSUs in VANETs 
If the adversary adopts the second strategy, the minimal number of LAAs (Nm2) 
required to continuously monitor all RSUs can be estimated. Since to get the shortest 
traversal route of all RSUs is a NP-hard travel salesmen problem, here we use the length 
(Length) of the minimal spanning tree (Tree) to approximate the shortest traversal route. 
Then, Nm2 ? 2Length/R, even when all LAAs can be uniformly spaced in Tree and 
moving from one RSU to another without any overlapping. Length is on the order of NR, 
and as long as the average edge is Tree is longer than R, Nm2 is much larger than NR.  
If the adversary adopts the third strategy, the minimal number of LAAs (Nm3) required 
to monitor all RSUs will be further increased, as   
 Nm3 ? Nm2 ? T/T0.                               (5.8) 
Formula (5.8) holds, since to avoid being detected each LAA can only continuously 
run no longer than T0 out of T.  
Thus, with this algorithm, the negative impacts of LAAs can be significantly reduced. 
To continuously monitor all RSUs, at least Nm3, instead of Nm1, LAAs are required. On 
the other hand, if only k LAAs are available, the number of monitored RSUs will be 
reduced from k RSUs to kNR/Nm3 RSUs. To further increase Nm3, TA only needs to 
increase the ratio of T/T0, at cost of higher computation complexity. However, each LAA 
is a compromised node, which incurs much higher cost to the adversary. Thus, this 
algorithm can make deploying LAAs in VANETs practically infeasible for any adversary. 
5.5.4 Performance Analysis 
We theoretically analyze the performance of the privacy-preserving pseudonym update 
procedure, including the communication overhead and the expected privacy of each node.  
Communication Overhead: Here, for simplicity, we assume that the RSU will update 
its SK with an average period TSK. Let PSK_REQ, PSK_RSP, PSK_UP and PIP_SW indicate the 
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packet size of SK_REQ, SK_RSP, SK_Update and IP_SW messages, respectively. Then, 
within TSK, the overall communication overhead consists of three parts: SK notification, 
SK update and IP/MAC swap. The certificate update messages will be present even 
without STCP2, so they are not counted as the communication overhead here.  
For clarity, here we consider a typical 4-way road intersection. Let ?1, ?2, ?3, ?4 
indicate the average node arrival rate of each entry point around the RSU. Then, within 
TSK, the average new nodes are TSK(?1+?2+?3+?4), each of which requires notification of 
the current SK. Thus,  
 CO1 = TSK(?1+?2+?3+?4)(PSK_REQ+PSK_RSP).           (5.9) 
Let ? indicate the average node density around RSU. Then, each node within (D+R) 
distance from the RSU will need to send out a SK_Update message, so that  
 CO2 = 4?(D+R)PSK_UP.                           (5.10) 
Due to the presence of the dummy IP/MAC entries, the RSU can arbitrarily configure 
its period TIP for broadcasting IP_SW messages. Thus, IP/MAC exchange causes   
 CO3 = PIP_SWTSK/TIP.                             (5.11) 
Thus, based on (5.9), (5.10) and (5.11), the average communication overhead for every 
TSK is  
 co = (CO1 + CO2 + CO3).                          (5.12) 
Once the practical traffic parameters are plugged in, the communication overhead of 
STCP2 can be estimated. This overhead can be controlled to an acceptable level by 
changing TSK and TIP. Besides, in (5.12) the overhead incurred by SK update depends on 
the node density and D, so co can be controlled by changing D.   
Average Privacy: Given D, the path length of a node A in CR is 2D. Suppose that the 
minimal and maximal average speeds of A in CR are vmin and vmax. Thus, the minimal and 
maximal time A spends in CR are ?tmin = 2D/vmax and ?tmax = 2D/vmin. Let ta be the time 
point of A’s entry, then [ta+?tmin, ta+?tmax] define the possible time range of A’s exit from 
CR. Thus, the nodes existing from CR within the time range [ta+?tmin, ta+?tmax] may be 
mistaken as A by GPA and LPA. Let SA be the set of nodes can be mistaken as A. Then,  
 | SA | = (?tmax ? ?tmin)(e1+e2+e3+e4).                 (5.13) 
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In (5.13), ei is the departing rate of each exit point. Assuming that this intersection has 
no parking lot, then (e1+e2+e3+e4) = (?1+?2+?3+?4). So,  
 | SA | = (?tmax ? ?tmin) (?1+?2+?3+?4).               (5.14) 
Based on (5.14), the privacy of A can be estimated as  
 PA = log|SA|.                                   (5.15) 
Equation (5.15) is based on the common entropy-based privacy definitions as in [117], 
[119]. Thus, from (5.13) to (5.15), the average privacy of each node can be controlled by 
the RSU by configuring D. Besides, the RSUs with higher traffic volumes will ensure 
higher privacy for any node. Thus, the privacy-aware RSU deployment algorithm should 
consider the traffic volume of each road intersection, which will be our future work.  
Especially, D has direct impact on both communication overhead co and privacy PA for 
any nodes. As shown in (5.12), bigger D results in higher co, while smaller D results in 
lower PA. Thus, it is up to the VANET administrators to configure a proper D for each 
RSU, trading off the desired PA and the acceptable co based on the traffic conditions 
around this RSU. For example, D should at least be bigger enough to make PA larger than 
0, so that by passing by one RSU each node will generally increase its location privacy. 
5.6 Property and Simulations 
Here, the salient properties and potential applications of STCP2 are identified with 
detailed discussions. Besides, simulation results will be presented to corroborate the 
theoretical analysis of STCP2. 
5.6.1 Privacy Protection Significance 
As previously discussed, the short-time certificate schemes are appealing to the future 
VANETs. Thus, by thoroughly investigating the privacy impacts of short-time certificate 
schemes and proposing novel algorithms to ensure privacy protection, STCP2 paves the 
way of adopting short-term certificates in VANETs.  
Specifically, the progressive RSU deployment algorithm ensures the minimal privacy 
assurance for the common vehicular nodes even against the TA and RSUs. Thus, this 
minimal privacy assurance removes the common doubts about the short-time certificate 
schemes and makes them acceptable to the real-world users of VANETs. This algorithm 
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also considers the average travel distance between the deployed RSUs, maximizing the 
support to the traffic management, traffic safety applications of a given number of RSUs.  
The privacy-preserving pseudonym update algorithm protects the location privacy of 
any nodes against the GPA, the LPA and the LAA. The secure message exchanges 
proposed in subsection 5.5.2 make certificate update confidential and secure. The 
IP/MAC exchange also ensures that the complete pseudonym of each node is changed 
nearby the RSU, so that to the GPA and the LPA this node will become a totally new 
node. The random mobility trace auditing will significantly increase the cost of LAA 
attacking to any given concerned regions. In summary, this privacy-preserving 
pseudonym update algorithm comprehensively considers the critical privacy challenges 
nearby the RSUs and ensures location privacy of vehicular nodes with novel procedures. 
With STCP2, each RSU can serve as a mix-zone [131], which is the foundation of many 
privacy protection schemes for VANETs.  
5.6.2 Application Significance 
With STCP2 implemented in VANETs, each RSU provides not only security and 
safety assurance, but also privacy enhancement to each node. Thus, the privacy strength 
of each travel route can be considered when a node selects its travel routes. 
Conventionally, travel time and travel distance are generally considered in route selection, 
as applied in GPS devices and digital map website. With STCP2, the privacy strength of 
each alternative route can be estimated based on the number of RSUs and the privacy 
strength of each RSU in each route. Then, the trade-off between privacy strength and 
travel cost can be achieved based on the preference of drivers. This potential privacy-
aware route selection further exemplifies the application significance of STCP2. 
5.6.3 Simulations 
Here we run numerical simulations to verify the salient properties of STCP2 in light of 
privacy protection. First, to show the reduction in LAAs’ negative impacts with the 
implementation of STCP2, the numbers (Nm1, Nm2 and Nm3) of required LAAs to monitor 
all RSUs following three different attacking strategies discussed in subsection 5.5.3 are 
investigated. Based on simulated RSU deployment in Downtown Marquette, MI as 
discussed in subsection 5.4.3, Nm1, Nm2 and Nm3 are shown in Figure 5.10.  
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Figure 5.10 The required numbers of LAAs of different attacking strategies 
As shown in Figure 5.10, for a given number of RSUs (NR), Nm2 is about 5 times of 
Nm1. Let T/T0 be 2, Nm3 is twice of Nm2. For instance, when there are 20 RSUs in this 
region (NR = 20), the cost of deploying LAAs is increased from 20 LAAs to about 200 
LAAs. Thus, the cost of deploying LAAs to continuously monitor all RSUs will increase 
significantly with STCP2. Additionally, STCP2 also significantly decreases the negative 
impacts of a given number of LAAs. In summary, by effectively detecting LAAs, STCP2 
ensures that the nodes in CR only need to consider GPA and LPA.    
Next, we investigate the privacy strength and communication overhead of STCP2 
against the GPA and the LPA. Due to the lack of accurate traffic data collected in real 
roads, realistic vehicle mobility trace is simulated with MOVE [170]. Constrained by 
computation and memory requirements of simulating large VANET, a simplified 
roadmap with 5 intersections and one RSU, as shown in Figure 5.11, is adopted here.  
RSU
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Figure 5.11 The road layout in the simulation of pseudonym changes 
In this road layout, there are two road segments to both directions between any two 
adjacent intersections. The length of each road segment is 1.5 km, so the total road length 
is 36 km. The vehicles are evenly distributed to 4 flows as show with 4 red arrows, with 
the average vehicle arrival rate ?i (i=1, 2, 3, 4). The total number of nodes changes from 
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100 to 360, with a step size of 20 vehicles. The average speed is 15 m/s, with on average 
the maximal speed of 30 m/s and the minimal speed of 5 m/s. For brevity, here we only 
show the simulation results for D = R = 300 meters.  
The average privacy achieved by each node entering CR, as estimated in (5.15), is 
shown in Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13. In Figure 5.12, the average privacy (PA) achieved 
by each node entering this CR is shown, together with the minimal PA and maximal PA of 
all nodes. For any given ?i, the minimal PA is larger than 2 bits, which means that this 
node has at least 4 nodes in its anonymity set SA. On average, each node can achieve a 
privacy of 4 bits. The occasional drops in minimal PA  and maximal PA  are caused by the 
randomness in node mobility.  
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Figure 5.12 The average privacy of each node with minimal and maximal values 
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Figure 5.13 The average privacy of each node with 95% confidence level 
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Figure 5.14 The average communication overhead per 100 seconds 
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In Figure 5.13, the average PA and its 95% confidence intervals are shown for any 
given vehicle arrival rates ?i. The confidence interval is quite small for any given ?i, 
indicating that PA can closely indicate the privacy achieved by each node entering CR.  
The average communication overhead co as estimated in (5.12) is shown in Figure 5.14 
for a given TSK = 100s. As ?i increases, co also increases from about 50 messages per 
100s to about 170 messages per 100s. Given that these messages can be constructed with 
reasonable sizes, the communication overhead of STCP2 is reasonable for VANETs.    
In summary, the simulations prove that STCP2 can significantly increase the cost of 
deploying LAAs in VANETs. Besides, the privacy of each node running by the RSU can 
be ensured with acceptable communication overhead. 
5.7 Summaries 
In this chapter, STCP2 is proposed to protect the location privacy of vehicular nodes 
with short-time certificates. STCP2 identifies the critical privacy implications of short-
time certificate schemes, each of which might make short-time certificates unacceptable 
to VANETs without careful investigation. Then, a progressive RSU deployment 
algorithm is proposed in STCP2 to optimize the deployment of RSUs given a cost budget. 
The minimal privacy requirement of vehicular nodes is ensured in this algorithm, and the 
support to safety and security application is maximized. Eventually, the privacy-
preserving pseudonym update algorithm makes the implementation of short-time 
certificates both secure and privacy-preserving.  
Thus, STCP2 makes privacy protection in VANETs with short-time certificates both 
cost-effective and feasible, paving the way of adopting short-time certificates in VANETs. 
The potential applications enabled by STCP2, as discussed in subsection 5.6.2, make 
STCP2 even more appealing to VANETs.  
As the future work, more realistic traffic statistics will be considered in STCP2 to 
make RSU deployment and the configuration of D more adaptive to realistic VANETs. 
Besides, more concrete cost-effect analysis of the possible attacking strategies of LAAs 
could be useful to help set the proper parameters in the random mobility trace auditing 
algorithm based on the realistic traffic statistics in any given region. 
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Chapter 6 Value-Added Applications 
To further realize the application potentials of VANETs, in this chapter three 
promising value-added applications are identified and supported with novel solutions. 
Specifically, three novel schemes to support these value-added applications, namely 
VAAD [150] for VANET-based ad dissemination, GPAS [148], [149] for location-
sensitive surveys and VehicleView [151] for vehicle sensor data collection, have been 
designed by Congyi Liu and me. My focus is on designing the architectural and security 
(privacy) solutions for these schemes, while Congyi Liu’s focus is on ensuring efficient 
message dissemination and collection in these schemes. Thus, in this chapter, besides the 
big picture of each scheme, only the novel security and privacy solutions in VAAD [150], 
GPAS [148], [149] and VehicleView [151] are presented in detail. Our publications [148] 
[151] and manuscripts [149], [150], [152] provide the complete designs of each scheme.    
6.1 Promising Value-Added Applications 
With V2V and V2R wireless communications, VANETs provide a handy platform to 
various value-added applications involving vehicles and drivers/passengers. To such 
applications, vehicular communications generally incur lower cost than other 
communication technologies, e.g., cellular communications. Indeed, value-added 
applications can get a free-ride on vehicular communications, since traffic safety 
applications more than justify the cost of VANET implementation [208]. Besides, due to 
the close relation between each vehicle and its location information, value-added 
applications relying on the vehicle location information may be better supported in 
VANETs. Thus, VANETs can enable more cost-effective solutions to such applications.  
On the other hand, value-added applications may financially benefit VANET users, 
VANET administrators and service providers. Especially, the revenue from such value-
added applications may enable the VANET administrators to further upgrade VANETs. 
The presence of appealing value-added applications may encourage more drivers 
(vehicles) to actively participate in VANETs.  
To further realize the economic potentials of VANETs, we propose secure and cost-
effective solutions to three promising value-added applications. Specifically, a VANET-
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based Ambient Ad Dissemination (VAAD) scheme [150] is proposed as a secure solution 
to VANET-based ad dissemination with practical cost and effect control. A General-
Purpose Automatic Survey (GPAS) scheme [148], [149] is proposed as a secure and cost-
effective solution to the location-sensitive surveys in VANETs. VehicleView [151], [152] 
is a secure and cost-effective solution to the large-scale and long-term collection of 
vehicular sensor data in VANETs. Actually, each of these schemes provides the first 
comprehensive solution to the corresponding application.  
Besides their distinct novelties, these schemes share two salient features. First, a 
practical application model with an incentive-centered architecture is proposed for each 
application, so that the conflicting requirements of the involved entities are properly 
traded off. Secondly, proper security and security assurance is provided to each scheme, 
so that it can be readily implemented in realistic VANETs with various adversaries, 
including misbehaving vehicular nodes and rogue service providers.   
6.2 Scheme Overview  
Here, the overview of each proposed scheme is presented, based on which the common 
performance, security and privacy challenges are identified and discussed.  
6.2.1 VANET-based Ambient Ad Dissemination (VAAD) 
Considering numerous commercial service providers (SPs) and vehicles available in 
VANETs, VANET-based ad dissemination shows great market potential. However, 
without potent cost and effect control, arbitrary ad disseminations from various SPs may 
cause unnecessary distractions to the drivers and message storms to VANETs. 
Furthermore, the conflicting requirements of the involved parties remain to be carefully 
addressed. Specifically, each SP, to achieve the best advertising effect, wants to broadcast 
its ads to as many vehicles as possible, while the drivers generally only want to be 
notified of the local services. To VANETs as a whole, ad dissemination should be 
scalable to avoid message storms in face of increasingly more ads. Yet, the security and 
privacy issues of ad dissemination also call for thorough investigation. 
As discussed in detail in [150], the existing schemes for ad dissemination in VANETs 
only, at best, partially tackle the above-mentioned challenges. Thus, VAAD [150] is 
proposed to ensure secure ad dissemination with pragmatic cost and effect control.  
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Figure 6.1 The system overview of VAAD 
To balance the conflicting requirements of the involved parties, an incentive-centered 
architecture is proposed for VAAD, as shown in Figure 6.1, where the SP needs to pay 
other entities for their services in ad dissemination. Constrained by the incurred cost, the 
SP will set a realistic advertising effect requirement in terms of the number of ad 
receivers and the ad rebroadcast frequency. The VAAD Manager (VM) is introduced to 
interface and coordinate the involving parties in VAAD. Upon receiving a dissemination 
request from SP with cost and effect specifications, VM will obtain proper authorization 
from the VANET Authority for this ad. With the authorization, VM can request one RSU, 
usually the RSU nearest to the SP, to act as the source RSU (SRSU) to disseminate the ad.
With this incentive-centered system architecture, two novel algorithms are proposed to 
support pragmatic cost and effect control for ad dissemination in VAAD.  
Distance-based Gradient Ad Dissemination: Inspired by the ad posting pattern in the 
physical world, a distance-based gradient ad dissemination algorithm is proposed in 
VAAD to maximize the ad effects given a cost budget. With this algorithm, the ads will 
be disseminated in such a way that the ad messages form a virtual ad post in VANETs. 
The key idea is to attenuate the density of a particular ad with a gradient p?[0,1) as the 
distance increases by a unit road segment (L) from the source RSU (SRSU), as shown in 
Figure 6.2. When vehicles drive around, they will receive ad packets about local services 
as if they were driving by real ad posts in the physical world. That is, the closer one 
vehicle is to a SP, the more frequently it will receive the ads from this SP. As such, the 
location relevance of ads is exploited to increase the actual advertising effect given a 
realistic cost budget. 
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Figure 6.2 The ad density gradient in highway scenarios 
Cash-in: To encourage vehicular nodes to strictly follow the ad dissemination 
requirements as defined by VM and the source RSU, certain incentive will be rewarded 
to each honest ad forwarder. A novel cash-in algorithm is designed to ensure that each ad 
forwarder can securely and indisputably prove its ad forwarding services, and obtain its 
deserved incentive from CC in a privacy-preserving way. 
6.2.2 GPAS: a General-Purpose Automatic Survey System 
The framework of a general-purpose automatic survey system (GPAS) was proposed 
by us in [148] to support the location-sensitive surveys based on VANETs. Here a 
location-sensitive survey is often interested in the traffic, transportation, traveling and 
commercial information of one specific area, such as the driving experience in a 
downtown area and the possible placement of a new fast food shop nearby a road 
intersection. For a location-sensitive survey, only the survey respondents related to the 
concerned geographic location will be able to provide useful information. Thus, the 
common survey methods [209] by telephone, mail, website or email, will not be efficient 
in locating the relevant survey respondents for such surveys. Besides, such conventional 
methods generally are costly, mainly relying on human efforts in information gathering 
and processing. Comparatively, the relevance between each vehicular node and its 
location makes VANETs a handy platform for the location-sensitive surveys.  
The architecture of GPAS [148] is shown in Figure 6.3. GPAS requests each survey 
customer to pay incentives to the eligible survey respondents and the relevant entities for 
their services. Thus, constrained by the incurred cost, each survey customer will 
judiciously initiate its surveys and set reasonable quality requirements for each survey, 
which will make GPAS scalable in the face of numerous potential surveys. On the other 
hand, incited by incentives, the eligible vehicular nodes will become more willing to 
respond to the survey requests.   
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Figure 6.3 The system overview of GPAS  
A survey center (SC) is proposed in GPAS to facilitate the interactions among the 
involved entities. A survey customer will send its survey request to SC, which will get a 
proper authorization from Authority for it. To efficiently disseminate the survey request 
to the eligible vehicles within the target survey region (RT), SC will request the RSUs in 
RT to disseminate the survey request. If necessary, adRSUs may also be deployed in RT to 
facilitate survey request dissemination. Here, adRSUs are lightweight reusable devices 
with DSRC transceivers and can be temporarily deployed by SC to support the concerned 
survey. To allow the eligible nodes to efficiently and securely prove their eligibility, only 
1-hop communication is adopted in survey request dissemination.  
After receiving one survey request, the eligible nodes may decide whether to respond 
to this survey based on the incentive for this survey and the efforts required. The nodes 
agreeing to respond will construct their survey responses properly, and submit their 
survey responses to SC, via the help of (ad)RSUs both inside RT and outside RT. SC will 
verify the collected survey responses and forward the valid ones to the customer.   
The major procedures of GPAS and their respective challenges are presented below.  
Survey Request Initiation & Authorization: To initiate a survey, one customer needs 
to, based on its application requirements, minimize the expected cost while ensuring the 
desirable quality requirements of its survey. Then, the survey request needs to be 
specified as an accountable and undeniable service contract between the customer and SC. 
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To ensure security, SC needs to register the survey task at the Authority and obtain 
proper authorization for it.  
Survey Request Dissemination: With the help of (ad)RSUs, the survey request will be 
disseminated to the nodes within RT. The eligibility of any node regarding this survey 
should be securely proven and survey request dissemination should be accountable, so 
that future incentive payment can be properly supported.  
Survey Response Collection: The survey responses generated by the eligible nodes 
will be collected by (ad)RSUs and forwarded to SC. While submitting the survey 
responses, the privacy of survey respondents should not be compromised. To meet the 
quality specifications of the customer, SC will verify the survey responses to remove the 
duplicate ones, which may be difficult due to the presence of pseudonyms in VANETs.  
Cash-in: After completing a survey, the customer needs to pay incentives to CC, 
Authority, SC and each honest survey respondent for their services, in a secure and 
privacy-preserving way.  
Thus, GPAS is designed to provide customized location-sensitive survey services in a 
cost-effective, secure and privacy-preserving way. The key functional, security and 
privacy challenges are identified and carefully addressed in GPAS [148], [149]. 
6.2.3 VehicleView 
Exemplified by large-scale vehicle field testing, after-sale vehicle performance 
monitoring, remote vehicle diagnostics, fuel consumption analysis, fleet management, 
driver behavior analytics, etc., the vehicle performance monitoring and analysis (VPMA) 
applications show great economic potentials. In general, the VPMA applications rely on 
the large-scale and long-term collection of vehicular sensor data. For instance, to 
optimize the future vehicle designs, one vehicle manufacturer may need to collect the 
engine states of a particular vehicle model in practical uses over (say) 5 years. Besides, 
with numerous sensors installed in each vehicle, large-scale and long-term vehicular data 
collection becomes more necessary and challenging, as indicated by the existing 
commercial vehicular telematics solutions such as OnStar [210] and Ford SYNC [211]. 
However, these commercial solutions are proprietary systems with applications 
constrained to specific car manufacturers. Besides, relying on cellular communications 
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such solutions incur service fees from the application users and require special 
communication devices in vehicles. Last, with free access to all location and speed states 
of each vehicle, such solutions impose severe privacy risks to the vehicle drivers [212].    
Thus, VehicleView [151], [152] is proposed as a secure and cost-effective solution to 
large-scale and long-term vehicular data collection based on VANETs. Exploiting V2V 
and V2R communications, VehicleView is especially cost-effective without any special 
hardware requirements to vehicles. Moreover, the relevant security and privacy issues are 
thoroughly addressed in VehicleView with novel solutions. To our best knowledge, 
VehicleView is the first scheme to support secure and cost-effective vehicular sensor data 
collection based on VANETs. 
In general, to support a specific vehicular sensor data collection application the 
application customer, say a car manufacturer, firstly will determine its information 
requirements, for instance, the data to show the engine performance degradation curve of 
a new vehicle model. Then, the customer may select a subset of vehicles as the data 
sources (target vehicles). The data requirements and incentive information, in form of a 
task request, will be sent to the target vehicles, among which some will agree to 
participate in this task as the participants. The participants will later generate data reports 
and send them to the customer through V2V and V2R communications. Eventually, the 
customer will process the collected data in an application specific way.  
 
Figure 6.4 The VehicleView overview (© 2011 IEEE. Reprinted with permission) 
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The above functions, except for the application-specific information requirement 
determination and data processing, will be supported by VehicleView as proposed in 
Figure 6.4 [151]. In VehicleView, Authority, Clearance Center (CC), RSUs and vehicular 
nodes are pre-existing entities in VANETs. The VehicleView Manager (VM) is designed 
as an interface between the customer and VANETs. To encourage and reward the 
cooperation of relevant parties, the customer needs to pay certain incentives to Authority, 
CC, VM and each vehicular participant for their services. Thus, such entities are 
economically encouraged to participate in VehicleView, and the customer is forced to 
judiciously initiate data collection tasks in VANETs.  
Specifically, VehicleView includes the following major functional components.  
Pricing: The customer needs to determine proper incentives for its data collection task, 
to meet its information requirement with a minimal cost.   
Task Registration: Once receiving a task from a customer, VM needs to register it in 
Authority for proper authorization, which is essential to ensure undeniable and 
trustworthy interactions among the relevant parties.  
Task Dissemination: The task request needs to be securely and efficiently 
disseminated to the target vehicles, which may be challenging, since the locations of 
target vehicles may be unknown due to privacy protection.  
Data Reporting: The data reports from each participant will be sent to the customer via 
V2R and V2V communications. Here, the challenge is to protect the location privacy of 
participants and ensure efficient report submission at the same time.  
Therefore, incurring only limited software updates to the existing VANET entities, 
VehicleView is especially cost-effective. With novel algorithms to address the security, 
privacy and economy challenges, VehicleView shows great application significance and 
economic potentials for VANETs. 
6.3 Critical Challenges 
These proposed schemes face critical performance, security and privacy challenges in 
VANETs, as listed in Table 6.1. In Table 6.1, the challenges imposed by these schemes 
fall into two categories, namely common challenges and unique challenges. Both types of 
challenges will be discussed in detail here.  
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Table 6.1 
Critical challenges imposed by VAAD, GPAS and VehicleView 
 VAAD GPAS VehicleView 
Common 
Challenges 
Practical Application Model 
Efficient and Privacy-preserving Incentive Distribution 
Authorization
NA Privacy-preserving Data Collection 
Unique 
Challenges 
Efficient & Reliable Ad 
Forwarding 
Surveys Quality Model Efficient Task Request 
Dissemination 
Forming Virtual Ad Post Scalable Collection of 
Survey Request Receipts 
Sensor Data Access 
Control 
As shown in Table 6.1, to design a practical application model is challenging in 
VANETs, since it is difficult to comprehensively consider the conflicting requirements of 
the involved entities. Besides, to distribute incentives to each vehicle is challenging due 
to privacy protection in VANETs, which makes the real identity and location of each 
node unknown. Furthermore, it is critical to enable the customer of each application to 
securely and accountably interact with VANET entities, which requires a secure 
authorization procedure. Last, GPAS and VehicleView involve data collection from 
vehicular nodes, which may impose risks to the location privacy of vehicular nodes. 
These common challenges will be discussed in detail in the following sections.  
Besides, each application imposes unique challenges. Next, these unique challenges 
and the corresponding solutions will be briefly discussed. The corresponding details are 
presented in our publications [148], [151] and manuscripts [149], [150], [152]. 
Efficient & Reliable Ad Forwarding: In VAAD, it is critical to ensure that each ad 
forwarder will reliably forward the ad packet. Besides, the number of ad forwarders
required to forward the ad to the requested distance should be reduced, since each ad 
forwarder requires a certain incentive from the customer. To ensure both efficient and 
reliable ad forwarding in VAAD, two novel algorithms are proposed as discussed next. 
A B C
IACK
Ad
dBC
Figure 6.5 The exemplary ad forwarding procedure in one hop
As shown in Figure 6.5, the current ad forwarder B is forwarding the ad packet to its 
downstream ad forwarder C. Here, one novel algorithm is proposed for B to select the 
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best downstream ad forwarder based on the distance between B and its neighbors, as well 
as the average successful reception ratio of its neighbors. Thus, the downstream ad 
forwarder will result in best efficiency for this hop. Besides, an ARQ (Automatic Repeat 
reQuest) [213] based algorithm is proposed to ensure reliable ad forwarding in each hop. 
For instance, by overhearing the ad forwarded by B, A will regard this overheard ad as the 
implicit acknowledgement (IACK) to the ad sent by itself to B. If no IACK is overheard, A 
may retransmit the ad until it overhears an IACK or an explicit acknowledgement from B. 
This way, each forwarder will make sure of the behaviors of its downstream forwarder.   
Forming Virtual Ad Post: In VAAD, to form the virtual ad post as shown in Figure 
6.2, the source RSU will randomly select the requested ad dissemination distance Di for 
each rebroadcast of this ad according to a proper probability distribution as discussed in 
[150]. Once Di is selected, only the ad forwarders within distance Di from the source 
RSU will be rewarded with incentives. As such, the vehicular nodes are encouraged to 
forward the ad in such a way that a virtual ad post will be formed.  
Quality Model of Surveys: In GPAS, a novel quality model is proposed as a 3-tuple (N, 
i, ?) to model the quality requirements of the survey customers. Here, N is the total 
required number of survey responses, and i is the maximal number of misbehaving 
survey respondents, each of which produces at least two survey responses. ? is the 
uncertainty level of satisfying this quality requirement. Altogether, (N, i, ?) means that 
totally N survey responses are required, and the probability of more than 2i duplicate 
survey responses is at most ?. Thus, this quality model allows the customer to control the 
bias of opinions in the collected survey responses.  
One major advantage of this quality model is that it enables the scalable verification of 
survey responses. Briefly speaking, based on a given quality requirement (N, i, ?), only k 
(0<k<N) survey responses need to be verified in order to meet this quality requirement, 
where k can be theoretically selected based on (N, i, ?) [148], [149]. This way, survey 
verification becomes scalable, which is most important to GPAS in face of increasingly 
more survey tasks.  
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Figure 6.6 The message flows of bipartite receipt collection with b=3 
Scalable Collection of Survey Request Receipts: In GPAS, after broadcasting a survey 
request, the RSU needs to collect a receipt from each receiver of the survey request. 
However, due to node mobility each node can only directly communicate with the RSU
for a limited duration. On the other hand, the transmission of one receipt from a node to 
the RSU may take up to seconds, depending on the network conditions. To ensure 
scalable collection of survey request receipts, a bipartite receipt collection algorithm 
(BRCA) is proposed in GPAS, as shown in Figure 6.6.  
The main idea of BRCA is to divide the 1-hop neighbors of the RSU into 2b clusters. 
Within each cluster, each node reduces its transmission power to cover only R/2b
distance, and sends its receipt to an aggregator. In this way, the aggregation within each 
cluster can be performed in parallel. Then, the aggregated receipt in each cluster is further 
aggregated to an upper-layer aggregator, until all receipts are aggregated at the RSU. In 
this process, novel algorithms are designed to ensure reliable aggregation and to 
configure a proper aggregation level b based on the current network conditions.  
Efficient Task Request Dissemination: In VehicleView, the data collection task needs 
to be sent to each eligible vehicle selected by the VehicleView customers. However, in 
VANETs, the real identity and location history of any vehicular node are unknown to the 
customers, so task request dissemination becomes challenging. To flood the whole 
VANET with task requests will incur heavy communication overhead. Thus, in 
VehicleView a regional query-based request dissemination algorithm is proposed for 
efficient and reliable task dissemination.  
Sensor Data Access Control: In VehicleView, the vehicle sensor data should not be 
accessed by any entity without the consent of the vehicle owner. In VehicleView, several 
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practical guidelines are proposed to ensure secure and privacy-preserving access control 
to vehicle sensor data.   
6.4 Incentive and Incentive Distributions 
In any value-added application two critical questions arise: 1) how to create a practical 
application model, and 2) how to direct the distribution of economic value. To answer 
these two questions, an incentive-centered architecture is proposed for VAAD, GPAS, 
and VehicleView by following two design guidelines.  
6.4.1 Design Guidelines 
The first guideline is that the VANET-based value-added application should follow the 
application model of the general value-added applications. The value-added applications, 
for instance, ad dissemination, survey or vehicular sensor data collection, have been 
present before the concept of VANETs was proposed. Thus, the existing application 
models are mature and reasonable, comprehensively considering the conflicting 
requirements of the involved entities. So, it is natural for VANET-based solutions to 
follow these application models.  
The second guideline is to use economic incentive to trade off the conflicting 
requirements of the involved entities. For any application, the entities benefit from this 
application need to pay incentives for the services obtained from this application. On the 
other hand, the entities providing services, for instance, data forwarding, to this 
application should be rewarded with incentives. In this way, the conflicting requirements 
of the involved parties are properly reconciled, and the involved parties are financially 
encouraged to participate in each application.  
For instance, in VAAD, the service provider (SP) who intends to broadcast its ads 
should pay incentives to the VANET Authority, Clearance Center, VAAD Manager and 
each honest ad forwarder for their services. The vehicular nodes are financially 
encouraged to forward ads for the SP to facilitate ad dissemination. On the other hand, 
the ad receivers should not be rewarded, since they will overhear the ads anyway due to 
the nature of wireless communications. Thus, the ad receivers do not provide any service 
to VAAD. Thus, the incentive model of VAAD is more practical than that adopted in 
[15], where the ad receivers will also be rewarded with incentives.   
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Figure 6.7 The pull model-based incentive distribution 
6.4.2 Efficient and Privacy-Preserving Incentive Distribution 
In VAAD, GPAS, and VehicleView, the customer or the Clearance Center needs to 
distribute incentives to each honest vehicular participant. However, in VANETs each 
node uses its pseudonym in communications for privacy protection [5]. The real identity 
and location history of any node should be kept secret from all entities except for the 
VANET Authority. Besides, suppose a node (Ni) uses a pseudonym A in participating in 
the application. Its pseudonym may have changed to A* when the incentive is distributed. 
For privacy protection, the connection between A and A* should not be known to the 
customer or the Clearance Center. Constrained by these privacy concerns, one incentive 
distribution approach is to flood VANETs with the incentive for Ni, which will incur 
unacceptable communication overhead considering the huge number of incentives. 
Thus, a pull model-based incentive distribution approach is proposed for these 
applications, as shown in Figure 6.7. Here, it is assumed that an E-cash scheme [214] is 
adopted in VANETs, so that incentives are represented with E-cash vouchers. The 
advantage of E-cash is that the voucher can be securely verified without revealing the 
identity of the voucher user, which is beneficial to privacy protection in VANETs. 
Besides, in these applications, each honest node Ni with a pseudonym A has already 
securely established a secret key SKA with the customer. In distributing the incentives, the 
customer will encrypt the E-cash voucher for node Ni with SKA. All encrypted vouchers 
for a certain application will be published in a public website, as shown in Figure 6.7. 
The original pseudonym of each node, such as A, B and C, will be used to indicate the 
owner of each encrypted voucher. Afterward, node Ni, with a new pseudonym A*, can 
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query the website to obtain the E-cash voucher intended for itself. In this process, the 
connection between A and A* will not be known to the customer. Besides, the E-cash 
voucher for each node is only accessible to this node alone. Furthermore, this pull model-
based approach is more efficient than to flood VANETs with incentives.    
6.5 Authorization of Customers 
In any application, the customer’s application contract, for example a survey request in 
GPAS, specifies the quality requirements and payment information of this customer. 
Thus, the application contract cannot be denied by the customer. Besides, the application 
Manager, for instance, the VAAD Manager for VAAD, needs to request RSUs in 
VANETs to disseminate application-specific messages. To this end, the Manager needs a 
proper authorization from the VANET Authority to convince the RSUs and the vehicular 
nodes of the authenticity of the messages it sends out.  
To meet these critical security requirements, a common authorization procedure as 
shown in Figure 6.8 is proposed for GPAS and VehicleView, which can also be adopted 
in VAAD. Here, it is reasonably assumed that both the customer and the Manager have 
obtained public/private key pairs and certificates from the VANET Authority. The 
generic formats of these messages are presented next, and the concrete message formats 
can be found in [149]-[151].  
Customer ? Manager: Contract = {PayloadCust = {IDCust, TSPCust, 
KCust?MN{Specs={QoS, Payment}, Info}, PUMN{KCust?MN}}, {H(PayloadCust)}PRCust, 
CertCust}. 
Here, IDCust is the ID of the customer, and TSPCust is the timestamp. Specs contain the 
parameters of quality and cost requirements, as well as application-specific content (Info). 
KCust?MN is a session secret key established between the customer and the Manager by the 
customer, which is further encrypted by PUMN, the public key of the Manager.  
 
Figure 6.8 The registration and authorization of an application request 
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H() is a standard hash function, such as SHA-512 [168]. Thus, {H(PayloadCust)}PRCust  
is the digital signature for this message, signed by the private key of the customer (PRCust). 
CertCust is the certificate of the customer issued by Authority. 
Thus, only the customer and the Manager can figure out KCust?MN, so the sensitive 
contents in Contract are confidential. Besides, with digital signature the customer 
explicitly specifies its application contract the manager accountably and undeniably.  
Upon receiving Contract, the Manager will assign an ID to this application contract, 
and obtain a proper authorization from Authority with the following message exchanges.  
Manager ? Authority: Registration = {PayloadMN={IDMN, IDApp, Contract, TSPMN}, 
KMN-Auth{KCust-MN}, PUAuth{KMN-Auth}, {H(PayloadMN)}PRMN, CertMN}. 
SC ? Authority: Authorization = {PayloadAuth = {TSPAuth, KMN-Auth{Auth_Token}, 
{H(PayloadAuth)}PRAuth}.  
Auth_Token = {Token={IDApp, IDMN, TSPAuth, Specs2, Info}, {H(Token)}PRAuth}. 
Here, IDMN is the ID of the Manager, and IDApp is the ID of this application request as 
assigned by the Manager. Specs2 contains the application parameters which are relevant 
to the vehicular participants. Auth_Token is an authorization token generated by 
Authority, which allows the Manager to request the RSUs to broadcast application-
specific messages for the Manager.  
Thus, the survey request from the customer is accountably and undeniably registered at 
the Manager and Authority, and the Manager obtains a proper authorization from 
Authority. With this authorization, the Manager is able to request the RSUs to perform 
specific communications for this application. The above generic message exchanges 
specify the common authorization procedure in VAAD, GPAS, and VehicleView, and 
can be instantiated based on the specific application requirements.  
6.6 Privacy-Preserving Data Collection 
As discussed in section 6.4, one node may assume different pseudonyms while 
participating in each application. Especially, in both GPAS and VehicleView, one node 
may assume a pseudonym A while receiving the task request, and assume another 
pseudonym A* while generating survey response or data report. Thus, it is necessary to 
prevent the RSUs and the customers from learning the connection between two 
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pseudonyms adopted by one vehicular node, which is the underlying requirement for 
privacy protection in VANETs. To this end, a privacy-preserving data collection 
algorithm is proposed for GPAS [148], [149] and VehicleView [151], [152], with two 
novel mechanisms: randomized submission distance and per-hop re-signing.  
Randomized submission distance: To submit its data, a node Nodei will select a 
submission distance ds with a uniform distribution over (0, DS). Here, DS > R is a 
configured threshold of ds, the configuration of which has been discussed in detail in 
[149], [151]. When Nodei is ds away from the next RSU, it will send its data to the RSU.  
Per-hop re-signing: Initially, Nodei signs its data (Data(A)) with the private key 
associated to the original pseudonym (say A). In GPAS, Data(A) is the survey response 
generated by this node; in VehicleView, Data(A) is the data report generated by this node. 
In each hop from Nodei to the RSU, Data(A) will be treated as a payload, and each 
forwarder will digitally sign it with its own private key, as shown in Figure 6.9. Thus, 
once the RSU receives the payload with a digital signature, it cannot figure out the 
originator node of this payload, so the relation between A and A* is concealed.  
In this process, Data(A) will be directly sent to the RSU by Nodei, if ds < R. Otherwise, 
the data packet will be relayed by several intermediate forwarders. If one forwarder runs 
into a network partition, it will keep the survey response and send it to the RSU when 
runs into the communication range of the RSU. To ensure that each forwarder will 
reliably forward the authentic survey response, LEAPER [142] can be adopted.  
As discussed in [149], [151], this algorithm can effectively prevent the RSUs and the 
customer from connecting the different pseudonyms used by one same application 
participant. Thus, secure and privacy-preserving data collection can be ensured in both 
GPAS and VehicleView.   
 
Figure 6.9 The privacy-preserving survey responses collection 
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6.7 Summaries 
In this chapter, VAAD, GPAS and VehicleView are presented as cost-effective 
solutions to various VANET-based value-added applications. Besides their distinct 
theoretical novelties, these schemes all feature a practical application model, as well as 
proper security and privacy assurance. To our best knowledge, these schemes are the first 
comprehensive solutions to the corresponding applications, showing great application 
potentials to VANETs.  
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Chapter 7 Future Work and Conclusions  
In this chapter the major contributions of this dissertation will be summarized, and 
discussions will be provided to facilitate the implementation of the proposed schemes. 
Then, detailed discussions of the promising future work will be presented. In the end, 
high-level conclusions will be given to conclude this dissertation.   
7.1 Major Contributions 
This dissertation addresses several critical security and privacy issues of VANETs, and 
provides novel solutions to further enhance the security and privacy of VANETs. Besides, 
novel solutions to three promising value-added applications are also provided to further 
realize the application potentials of VANETs. Besides being theoretically novel, each 
proposed scheme also considers the unique properties of VANETs. Thus, these schemes 
can be readily implemented in VANETs. By addressing the critical security, privacy and 
application issues of VANETs, this dissertation facilitates the realistic implementation of 
VANETs in the near future.  
Next, the salient properties and implementation considerations of each proposed 
scheme will be provided. Afterward, the contribution of this dissertation to the traffic 
engineering community and the VANET community will be discussed.  
7.1.1 LEAPER 
As discussed in Chapter 2, LEAPER [142] ensures reliable and trustworthy multi-hop 
communications by properly handling the malfunctions and misbehaviors in data packet 
relaying. A novel adaptive role playing (ARP) strategy is proposed in LEAPER to 
enhance the cooperation of the neighboring nodes in each hop. This strategy prevents the 
malfunctions and misbehaviors of individual nodes from harming the trustworthy data 
packet relaying in any hop. In this sense, LEAPER shows great advantage over the 
existing schemes which usually suffer from such malfunctions and misbehaviors. Besides, 
by properly configuring the tradeoff between security strength and communication 
overhead, LEAPER can achieve higher performance in terms of successful packet 
delivery. Thus, LEAPER can be implemented in VANETs to better support the 
applications which rely on multi-hop communications.  
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Figure 7.1 An exemplary communication protocol stack for vehicular nodes 
LEAPER can be easily implemented in each node as a protocol component to support 
various VANET applications. LEAPER is a protocol between the transport layer and the 
routing (network) layer in the communication protocol stack, as shown in Figure 7.1. 
Taking the QoS requirements from the transport layer, the security parameter of 
LEAPER can be configured as discussed in Chapter 2. Then, LEAPER ensures reliable 
and trustworthy packet relaying in each hop, determining the next hop based on the 
routing information from the routing layer. Our publication [142] provides sufficient 
information to design the protocol procedures of LEAPER, as well as useful guidelines to 
configure the security parameter of LEAPER. Besides, to further reduce the computation 
overhead of LEAPER, RAMV can be adopted in each trust group to allow the group 
members to adaptively share the computation load of packet verification.  
7.1.2 RAMV 
In Chapter 3 RAMV ([143], [144]) addresses the scalability issues imposed by the 
computation-extensive verification of messages, especially beacons in VANETs. RAMV 
differentiates the received messages based on their application relevance, and allows each 
node to verify the messages of high application relevance with a high probability as 
allowed by its resource budget. By piggybacking the verification results, the neighboring 
nodes can efficiently exchange their message verification results, so that each node will 
learn the authenticity status of all its received messages. Thus, RAMV enables the 
neighboring nodes to share the computation load of message verification. With RAMV, 
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in any network scenario each node can verify the received messages in a resource-aware, 
application-friendly and secure way. Thus, RAMV can be adopted for each node to 
efficiently verify the received messages in the single-hop communication scenarios. In 
this sense, RAMV enables many important traffic safety, traffic management, and 
commercial applications which rely on authentic messages exchanges.  
RAMV [143], [144] is a security scheme residing in the application domain of each 
vehicular node. It can be implemented as a scheduler for the concrete message 
verification algorithms, as shown in Figure 7.2. Given a concrete VANET application 
(for example, collision avoidance) and a concrete message verification algorithm in the 
Message Verifier (for example, ECDSA [181]), RAMV can be implemented by 
following the algorithms described in Chapter 3. 
Specifically, RAMV needs to support the user’s configuration of the resource budget 
for message verification. Based on the resource budget and the number of received 
messages, RAMV will estimate the filtering probability (p) for the Message Verifier to 
probabilistically decide whether to verify each received message based on its relevance 
rank. Besides, the Message Receiver needs to route the received piggybacked notification 
to RAMV, and the Message Transmitter needs to send out the notifications generated by 
RAMV in a piggybacked manner. The concerned applications should be able to accept 
the indirect message verification results which are learned by RAMV from the 
neighboring nodes directly verifying such messages.  
 
Figure 7.2 One feasible implementation framework of RAMV 
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7.1.3 JPRA 
Chapter 4 introduces JPRA [146], a joint privacy and reputation assurance scheme to 
reconcile the inherent conflicting requirements of privacy protection and reputation
management. JPRA adopts a localized reputation management model to support efficient 
reputation management in face of frequent network topology changes incurred by node 
mobility and pseudonym changes. Besides, novel algorithms are proposed to prevent 
reputation update and reputation manifestation from helping the adversary trace the 
pseudonym changes of each node. Thus, JPRA efficiently and synergistically supports
both privacy protection and reputation management in VANETs, so JPRA is critical to 
the future implementation of VANETs. 
The implementation of JPRA involves modifications to both the privacy protection and 
the reputation management schemes, as shown in Figure 7.3. While implementing JPRA, 
the specific privacy protection scheme, reputation aggregation algorithm, and behavior 
monitoring algorithm are the given conditions.     
Specifically, the privacy protection scheme needs to notify JPRA of its pseudonym 
change in advance to give JPRA sufficient time to update the reputation label of the 
concerned node. Chapter 4 already estimates the time required for the update of 
reputation label in JPRA. Besides, the privacy protection scheme needs to consider the 
reputation label as a component in the pseudonym. If one node has a unique reputation 
label among its neighbors, the privacy protection scheme should refrain from any 
pseudonym change, since a pseudonym change would be futile. On the other hand, given 
a specific node behavior monitoring algorithm and a reputation aggregation algorithm, 
JPRA accomplishes the necessary functions of reputation management. 
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Figure 7.3 One feasible implementation framework of JPRA 
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7.1.4 STCP2 
Chapter 5 identifies and thoroughly investigates the privacy protection issues imposed 
by short-time certificates to VAENTs. STCP2 [147] optimizes RSU deployment in terms 
of privacy protection and security provisioning given a deployment cost, properly 
handling the power abuse of RSUs and VANET Authority. With the RSUs deployed, 
secure and privacy-preserving pseudonym update procedures are designed for each node 
to update its certificate and change its pseudonyms at each RSU. Thus, running by an 
RSU, each node will enhance its location privacy with confidential pseudonym changes 
against all possible adversaries. Due to the application potentials of short-time certificates, 
STCP2 is essential to privacy protection in VANETs.  
If short-time certificates are to be adopted in VANETs, the RSUs need to be deployed 
following the progressive RSU deployment algorithm in STCP2, so that a minimal 
privacy assurance will be provided to the vehicular nodes in face of the power abuse of 
VANET authorities and RSUs. Besides, the secure pseudonym update procedures need to 
be implemented in each vehicular node and each RSU. With STCP2 implemented in 
VANETs, each RSU can periodically report the average privacy achieved by the passing-
by vehicles. Such information could be used in GPS devices and digital map websites to 
provide privacy-aware travel route recommendations to the real-world users, as discussed 
in Chapter 5. 
7.1.5 Value-added Applications 
Chapter 6 introduces three promising value-added application solutions for VANETs, 
namely VAAD [150], GPAS [148], [149], and VehicleView [151], [152]. 
Table 7.1 
Implementation requirements of VAAD, GPAS and VehicleView 
Entities Requirements 
Vehicular Node To install an APP software for this application 
RSU To install an APP software for this application 
Managing Entity To be operated by a third party 
VANET Authority To support the authorization of new entities and new messages 
incurred by new applications 
Clearance Center To support the financial operations of new applications 
Customer To be able to communicate with the managing entity of each 
value-added application 
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VAAD provides a secure and privacy-preserving solution to ad dissemination in 
VANETs with practical cost and effect control. GPAS is a cost-effective solution for 
supporting location-sensitive surveys in VANETs, including commercial surveys and 
traffic surveys. VehicleView enables the large-scale and long-term collection of vehicular 
sensor data to support various vehicle performance monitoring applications. An 
incentive-centered architecture is proposed in each solution to trade off the conflicting 
requirements of the involved entities. Besides, the critical application-specific security 
and privacy issues are identified and solved with novel algorithms. To our best 
knowledge, our solutions are the first comprehensive ones to these promising applications.     
To implement each solution in VANETs, the involved entities need to be created or 
modified, as summarized in Table 7.1. From Table 7.1, the technical efforts for 
supporting such value-added applications are reasonable, with only software updates for 
vehicular nodes, RSUs, the VANET Authority, and the Clearance Center. The 
corresponding managing entity, VAAD Manager (VM) for VAAD, Survey Center (SC) 
for GPAS, and VehicleView Manager (VM) for VehicleView, can be created and 
operated by either the administrators of VANETs or by the profit-seeking companies. 
Furthermore, these applications require a business-friendly environment which is still to 
be created by the policy-makers and stakeholders of VANETs. Thus, these applications 
can serve as a proper use case for the policy-making processes in VANETs. Hopefully, 
the application potentials of these value-added applications can facilitate the set-up of a 
business-friendly environment for VANETs.  
7.1.6 Supports to Traffic Engineering 
In general, the schemes proposed in this dissertation provide valuable supports to 
traffic engineering and traffic management, which are identified and justified as follows.  
Real-time traffic statistics: With VANETs deployed, the vehicle-oriented surveys as 
supported by GPAS [148] can collect real-time traffic statistics of any given region as the 
valuable inputs to  traffic engineering and traffic management.  
Cost-effective traffic surveys: GPAS [148], [149] can support cost-effective traffic 
surveys about a certain region. The traffic survey results will be very helpful to the 
decision-makings in traffic engineering and traffic management.  
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Traffic information reporting and broadcast: By ensuring reliable and trustworthy 
multi-hop communications, LEAPER [142] provides reliable end-to-end connections 
between the local traffic authority and the nearby vehicles. Thus, LEAPER can be used 
by each vehicle to report important traffic incidents to the local traffic authority. 
Similarly, LEAPER can be used by the local traffic authority to disseminate traffic 
conditions, route recommendations, or weather information to the nearby vehicles.  
Privacy-aware RSU deployment: In STCP2 [147] a privacy-aware RSU deployment 
algorithm is proposed to optimize the deployment of RSUs in VANETs, which can be 
adopted in traffic engineering. Besides, the privacy strength of each RSU can be 
estimated, which can be used to recommend travel routes to the drivers.  
Traffic safety improvement: With RAMV [143], [144], the verification of beacons 
becomes scalable in VANETs, which makes traffic safety applications feasible.  
On the other hand, several of our proposed schemes require precise traffic statistics of 
specific regions, which can only be provided by the traffic engineering staff. For instance, 
JPRA [146] and LEAPER [142] may benefit from the precise traffic statistics, such as 
vehicle’s average speed and average vehicle density, to configure the system parameters. 
Thus, these information requirements can also help the traffic engineering staff improve 
traffic statistics collection. 
7.1.7 A Baseline VANET Model 
Overall, our proposed schemes complement the existing security and privacy schemes 
in literature to form a baseline VANET model as shown in Figure 7.4. This baseline 
VANET model represents the state-of-art of VANET research and development.  
In this model DSRC [8] provides the necessary physical layer and MAC layer 
functionalities for wireless vehicular communications. WAVE [9] provides the necessary 
management and security functionalities. For brevity, in Figure 7.4 only the major 
security and privacy functionalities are depicted. Within WAVE, our security and privacy 
schemes provide the most comprehensive solutions to the corresponding functionalities.  
Specifically, the baseline VANET model supports various traffic safety applications 
with scalable verification of beacons, as enabled by RAMV [143], [144]. With reliable 
and trustworthy multi-hop communications as enabled by LEAPER [142], this baseline 
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VANET model can support various traffic management applications and value-added 
applications such as traffic incident reporting, traffic condition broadcast, internet 
accessing, and so on. JPRA [146] protects the privacy of vehicular nodes when the PKI-
like certificates are adopted in VANETs, while STCP2 [147] protects the privacy of 
vehicular nodes with short-time certificates. Besides, VAAD [150], GPAS [148], [149], 
and VehicleView [151], [152] all add to the set of promising value-added applications.  
With the traffic safety applications satisfyingly supported with RAMV, this model is 
ready to be implemented, since the major motivation of VANETs is to enhance traffic 
safety. Meanwhile, the other applications may demand more support from the 
infrastructure domain of VANETs, which will be investigated in the future work. Thus, 
this baseline VANET model also provides a solid starting point for the future research 
work on VANETs. 
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Figure 7.4 The baseline VANET model completed by our dissertation 
7.2 Future Work 
Using the baseline VANET model as a starting point, we identify several challenging 
research and development topics which are critical to ensure the secure and cost-effective 
implementation of intelligent VANETs. Based on our previous research work, the 
promising future work topics are identified to 1) enable the cost-effective implementation 
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of VANETs (see subsections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2), 2) realize the critical technical assumptions 
in the baseline VANET model (see subsections 7.2.3, 7.2.4, and 7.2.5), and 3) design 
more intelligent and advanced applications based on VANETs (see subsections 7.2.6, 
7.2.7, and 7.2.8). With these topics thoroughly investigated in the future, the 
implementation of a secure, cost-effective and intelligent VANET will naturally follow.  
Next, the motivations and challenges of each topic will be discussed in detail, and 
initial considerations on the possible solutions will also be provided.    
7.2.1 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Security Provisioning 
As discussed in our book chapter [5], any security scheme will incur a certain cost in 
terms of communication overhead, computation overhead, and so on. Thus, a thorough 
cost-benefit analysis of security provisioning is critical to cost-effectively implement 
VANETs. Such a cost-benefit analysis needs to answer several critical questions. What 
are the essential security requirements in any certain application scenario? What is the 
most cost-effective scheme to meet a given security requirement in a given application 
scenario? What is the best security implementation plan for VANETs? 
However, considering the numerous applications and security schemes of VANETs, it 
is challenging to answer these questions. Up to now, no concrete cost-benefit analysis for 
VANET security provisioning has been presented in either industry or academia. The 
security architectures provided by the representative research projects, including 
Connected Vehicle [215], eSecurity Work Group [216], C2C Communication 
Consortium [217] and SeVeCom [20], only include all possible security requirements for 
VANETs without any consideration on these questions.  
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Figure 7.5 Steps for the cost-benefit analysis of security provisioning 
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Indeed, the Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) community also lack a concrete cost-
benefit analysis of security provisioning, though individual efforts on comparing different 
security schemes [218], modeling the possible attacks to intrusion detection systems 
[219], and modeling the cost and benefit of node cooperation [220], do exist. Besides, the 
cost and benefit of any security scheme in VANETs have different emphasis than those in 
MANETs. For instance, in VANETs network bandwidth and communication latency may 
be more relevant, while in MANETs the power consumption and computation overhead 
may be more relevant. Thus, the cost-benefit analysis of security provisioning in 
VANETs is a unique research topic which deserves systematic investigation.  
To investigate this topic, a thorough understanding of the applications, security 
schemes, and their interactions in VANETs is needed. Besides, a methodology to 
categorize or partition the huge problem domain into manageable parts is also needed, 
which may be identified based on the inherent logical relations among the applications, 
security schemes and network components in VANETs. As a starting point, a feasible 
approach consisting of the necessary steps of application categorization, security 
requirement determination, and security schemes comparison, is shown in Figure 7.5.   
Application Categorization and Prioritization: The available (or envisioned) VANET 
applications should be categorized according to their communication requirements, 
application significance, and economic potentials. The representative application 
scenarios, each of which may contain several applications, need to be identified and 
prioritized with different priorities. In Figure 7.5, ASi, i=0, 1, …, indicates different 
application scenarios. Here, we assume that the priority of ASi is higher than or equal to 
ASi+1. In this process, collaboration between industry and academia is necessary to 
identify the applications and their distinguishing properties. The utility theory in 
economics may be a useful tool to evaluate the priority of each representative application 
scenario. 
Security Requirement Determination: Given an application scenario ASi, its relevant 
security requirements should be identified. To this end, a solid adversary model should be 
created for ASi by considering the potential adversaries and their possible attacks. Game 
theory may be applied to model the interactions between the adversaries and the involved 
entities in ASi, as in [219], [221]. The security requirements of ASi could be divided into 
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two subsets: the essential security requirements (ES(ASi)) and the optional security 
requirements (OS(ASi)). ES(ASi) includes the security requirements which are critical to 
ASi and will be probably breached by the possible attacks. OS(ASi) contains the security 
requirements which are either unimportant to ASi or unlikely to be breached due to the 
incurred attacking cost. Here, we use si or sj to indicate each concrete security 
requirement, for instance, message integrity.  
Security Schemes Comparison: For each security requirement si, the available security 
schemes (pk?P) should be compared in terms of cost and effect. Here, P is the set of all 
available security schemes in literature, and pk is a concrete security scheme. Generally, 
the cost and benefit of pk rely on the specific application scenario ASi. Thus, a cost matrix 
[ci,k] and a benefit matrix [bi,k] can be derived for each security scheme pk in each 
application scenario ASi. In this process, the utility theory may also be used to combine 
various factors in the cost of pk, including communication overhead and computation 
overhead, into a single metric. Similarly, a single benefit metric can also be created.  
Eventually, based on the cost matrix [ci,k] and the benefit matrix [bi,k], combinatorial 
optimization may be performed to get the optimal security implementation plan in the 
form of IMP = <imp0, imp1, …>. Here, impk indicates whether the security scheme pk 
should be implemented in VANETs or not. During the optimization, the priority of the 
representative application scenarios could be treated as either absolute or relative. If the 
priority is regarded as absolute, IMP should optimize AS0 in terms of cost and effect. 
With that, IMP can go on to optimize AS1, AS2, and so on. If the priority is relative, utility 
theory may also be applied to combine the cost and benefit of all application scenarios 
into a single utility metric, based on which IMP can be selected.  
By performing a thorough cost-benefit analysis, an optimal security implementation 
plan IMP can be created. As a side product, various VANET applications will be 
categorized and prioritized based on practical considerations, which may be helpful to the 
application implementation. Besides, useful guidelines for the system design and security 
policy-making may also be derived. For instance, for each application scenario, the 
essential security requirements and optional security requirements should be 
differentiated in security scheme implementation. A security scheme for an essential 
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security requirement should be implemented and activated all the time. Comparatively, a 
security scheme for an optional security requirement may be implemented, but only 
activated when necessary, in order to be cost-effective.   
In summary, a thorough cost-benefit analysis is meaningful for VANETs and should 
be performed in the future. Specifically, this research topic is relevant to various current 
research activities in the RITA project of Connected Vehicles [215], including the 
Vehicle to Vehicle Communications Systems Engineering direction and the Policy and 
Institutional Issues direction.   
7.2.2 RSU-Assisted Secure and Scalable Communications  
As discussed in Chapter 6 and GPAS [149], the wireless communications nearby each 
RSU could be crowded as shown in Figure 7.6. Within the communication range of one 
RSU, the nodes may periodically broadcast beacons and other application-specific 
messages. Each node may communicate with its neighbors via uni-cast, resulting in V2V 
uni-cast communications. Besides, each vehicle may communicate with the RSU to 
update its certificate, report events, or access the infrastructure, resulting in V2R uni-cast 
communications. In the current WAVE operation model, each vehicular node may be 
equipped with a single-channel radio or a multiple-channel radio [222]. With a single-
channel radio, each node can only transmit and/or receive data on a single RF channel at 
any time. Even with a multiple-channel radio, each node can only transmit data on a 
single RF channel while receiving on at least one RF channel at the same time. Thus, no 
matter how the broadcasted messages and the uni-cast messages are divided into different 
channels, they will contend for the radio resource of the individual nodes. When the 
traffic density and the message exchanges increase, the network nearby the RSU may 
become saturated [223], which makes the RSU a bottleneck in VANETs.  
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Figure 7.6 All possible wireless communications nearby an RSU 
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Thus, it is necessary to make the wireless communications nearby the RSU both secure 
and scalable. To this end, the available control channels (CCH) and service channels 
(SCH) of WAVE should be properly assigned to different messages from different nodes 
and the RSU. The nodes and the RSU should transmit or receive on the correct channel at 
the correct time. Thus, a challenging scheduling problem naturally arises. In this problem, 
the RSU may serve as a centralized scheduler for all the nodes within its communication 
range. Besides, each node has a limited communication time with the RSU due to its 
mobility, which is one important constraint on this problem. To ensure RSU-assisted 
secure and scalable communications, the above scheduling problem may be tackled with 
the following steps.  
Communication Scheduling: With the broadcasted WAVE Service Announcements 
(WSAs) from the vehicular nodes, the RSU may obtain a full picture of the 
communication capability and requirement of each node, in terms of the pending 
messages, the message sizes, the deadline of each message, the destination of each 
message, the transceiver capability, and so on. Together with its own communication 
requirements, the RSU can schedule the communications of itself and the vehicular nodes 
for the next scheduling interval (T). In this process, the RSU needs to maximize the 
overall network throughput or the average throughput of all involved entities. The 
constraints to be considered may include the remaining communication time of each node, 
the communication capability of each node, and the possible interferences among the 
communications. The output will be an optimal radio resource accessing plan satisfying 
all constraints, or an indication of failure to find such a plan. Eventually, the plan can be 
broadcast to all vehicular nodes in the WSA of the RSU, or a dedicated control message 
for this end.  
To formally model this scheduling problem, the above parameters need to be identified 
and the constraints need to be enriched based on the realistic VANET scenarios. Besides, 
the maximal network throughput of the VANETs nearby the RSU needs to be 
theoretically estimated based on the current node density and communication 
requirements of the nodes. If the overall communication requirements exceed the 
maximal network throughput, the RSU will refrain from scheduling the communications 
as discussed above, and try to perform a clustering of its neighbors instead.  
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Figure 7.7 The clustering of vehicular nodes around an RSU 
Adaptive Clustering: To further improve network throughput, one promising approach 
may be the clustering of the vehicular nodes as shown in Figure 7.7. As an example, four 
clusters with the shaded vehicles as the cluster heads are shown in Figure 7.7. The nodes 
within each cluster (cluster members) will reduce its transmission power to cover only 
this cluster, and each cluster head keeps its normal transmission range. Broadcasted 
messages of the cluster members will be aggregated at the cluster head, which will 
further broadcast the aggregated messages with its full transmission power to support 
traffic safety applications. Additionally, both V2V and V2R uni-cast communications 
will also be aggregated by the cluster head, which will further route the aggregated 
messages to the RSU or other cluster heads.  
Based on current network conditions, the RSU needs to select the best clustering 
strategy in terms of reduced communication overhead and latency. The possible 
clustering strategies may include 1) forming clusters with a uniform road length, and 2) 
forming clusters with an equal number of nodes. The impacts of these clustering 
strategies need to be theoretically modeled and compared. In this process, existing 
transmission power control schemes [224]-[226] and clustering schemes [227]-[229] may 
provide useful hints.  
Within each cluster, the cluster head needs to forward the broadcast and uni-cast 
messages of each cluster member. The timing of the forwarding actions of the cluster 
head needs to increase the efficiency of message aggregation, while still meeting the 
specific latency requirement of each message. Besides, the communications within each 
cluster still need to be synchronized to reduce the interference among the cluster 
members, which may follow a scheduling approach similar to the RSU-assisted 
scheduling problem, with the cluster head as the scheduler.  
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Eventually, the aggregation and forwarding actions of each cluster head need to be 
monitored by its cluster members. Proper countermeasures must be designed to handle 
the misbehaviors of either the cluster head or cluster members. Besides, data privacy 
needs to be ensured when the cluster head forwards sensitive messages for its members.  
In summary, the RSU-assisted secure and scalable communication is a promising and 
challenging research topic which is meaningful to the implementation of VANETs.   
7.2.3 Finance Infrastructure for VANETs 
In VAAD [150], GPAS [148], [149], and VehicleView [151], [152], the financial 
transactions among the vehicular nodes and the infrastructure of VANETs need to be 
supported. For instance, in any value-added (commercial) applications the service 
consumers (say vehicular nodes) need to pay the service providers. Even in security 
provisioning, the vehicular nodes may need to pay the certificate authority to obtain new 
pseudonyms [127]. Thus, the financial transactions are prevalent in VANETs and should 
be supported with a finance infrastructure.  
So far, the financial transactions in VANETs are supported in an ad-hoc manner. For 
instance, we propose a Clearance Center (CC) to function as a virtual bank for VAAD 
[150], GPAS [148], [149], and VehicleView [151], [152]. Many value-added applications 
simply assume the presence of a perfect finance infrastructure which could support all 
necessary financial transactions. Even the currency is represented in different ways in 
VANETs, including E-cash vouchers in VAAD [150], GPAS [148], [149], and 
VehicleView [151], [152], Nuglet in [82], and credits in [84]. Thus, to consistently and 
securely support the financial transactions in various VANET applications, a financial 
infrastructure will be desirable for VANETs.  
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Figure 7.8 The overview of a finance infrastructure for VANETs 
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We propose a preliminary finance infrastructure for VANETs, as shown in Figure 7.8. 
The Clearance Center (CC) functions as the bank in VANETs, which will issue E-cash 
vouchers and support the clearance (cash-in) of E-cash vouchers. All entities in VANETs, 
including the Authority, the service providers, and vehicular nodes, can get E-cash 
vouchers by depositing a certain amount of money in CC. On the other hand, each entity 
can also get back its money by cashing in its E-cash vouchers. Basically, the financial 
transactions among these entities will be in the form of E-cash voucher exchanges. The 
advantage of an E-cash scheme [214] is that the voucher can be securely verified without 
revealing the identity of the voucher user, which is beneficial to the privacy protection in 
VANETs. In this finance infrastructure, several issues deserve further investigation.  
Adopting an E-cash scheme: It is critical to adopt a proper E-cash scheme to VANETs 
based on the relevant considerations such as the E-cash voucher size, the computation 
overhead of voucher verification, the feasibility of divisible E-cash voucher, and so on. 
With an E-cash scheme adopted, it is necessary to allow each entity to securely deposit, 
store, exchange, and cash in E-cash vouchers, which may lead to many interesting 
questions. For instance, when should one node go to CC to change its E-cash vouchers 
with small amount to a whole E-cash voucher with a larger amount? How can each node 
minimize the division of its E-cash vouchers by scheduling the usage of its E-cash 
vouchers with different amounts? All these questions need to be answered in VANETs.    
Policy making: Necessary policy should be made regarding the owner and operator of 
CC, which will involve the close coordination among traffic management authorities, car 
manufactures and drivers. Besides, a business model needs to be designed to differentiate 
the services to be charged and the free services. For instance, the road condition update 
service should be free to all VANET users to enhance road safety, while the commercial 
services should be provided to the vehicular nodes at a proper price. This business model 
will have a huge impact on the ecosystem of VANETs and should be carefully designed. 
Eventually, a pricing model should be designed to guide each service provider in 
charging its services, to reflect the communication and computation overhead. The 
administrators of VANETs may also adjust the pricing model to steer various 
applications (services) to properly share the network resource in VANETs.  
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Finance analytics: With this finance infrastructure, the financial statistics of each 
entity in VANETs may be analyzed to determine the economic potential of each 
application in VANETs, as well as to guide the design of new applications.  
7.2.4 TPD for VANETs  
In VANETs, a Tamper-Proof Device (TPD) is a critical component to many security 
and privacy schemes. A TPD is a secure hardware module which usually cannot be 
tampered or harmed by the external attacks. Seemingly, a TPD is a feasible approach to 
ensure trustworthy computing in each vehicular node. Thus, the TPD has been adopted in 
each vehicular node to securely store confidential private keys [230], [231], to 
trustworthily calculate the reputation of this node [82], [108], to perform digital signature 
generation and verification [35], [36], [231], or to manage the certificate [90], [91]. 
However, each scheme adopting a TPD usually only assumes a set of desirable functions 
for the TPD as suit itself. Indeed, if all such schemes have their ways, each vehicular 
node will be filled with tens of application-specific TPDs, which is not practical due to 
the cost and design implications incurred by so many TPDs.  
Thus, due to the severe cost and application implications of TPDs, it is meaningful to 
systematically investigate the feasible application of TPDs to VANETs. In this regard, 
the following issues deserve further investigation.  
A standard interface design for a certificate management TPD: As discussed in [35], 
[36], [231], one major motivation of adopting TPDs in vehicular nodes is to securely 
manage the certificates and associated private keys issued by the Authority. As various 
applications and security schemes have different requirements on certificate management, 
it is necessary to design a standard interface for the TPD in charge of certificate 
management in each node. Such an interface should meet the requirements of critical 
VANET applications on certificate management. For instance, it is commonly held that 
TPD should keep the privacy keys and secret keys intact and secret from all parties 
except for the VANET Authority. However, for privacy protection each node needs to 
change its pseudonym from time to time, and a pseudonym usually contains a specific 
certificate. In this case, it is challenging to define the proper level of control one node 
may exert over TPD. For instance, should each node be allowed to determine which 
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pseudonym to be used and when to be used? On one hand, each node may want to change 
its pseudonyms at will so that it can access multiple value-added applications with 
different pseudonyms. On the other hand, to prevent the Sybil attack it may be desirable 
to allow each node to use one pseudonym within a certain time period. Thus, it is critical 
to identify the important requirements of various applications on certificate management
in VANETs, based on which a standard TPD for certificate management can be designed.  
As an example, a preliminary interface design for TPD is given in Figure 7.9. This 
TPD consists of three major interfaces: signature verification, signature generation and 
certificate management. The Signature Verifier module will verify the digital signatures 
of the received packets, and return the verification results to the concerned applications. 
For any out-going data packet generated by this node, the Signature Generator module 
will attach its own timestamp (TSP) and generate a digital signature based on the current 
certificate in use. The novelty of this TPD lies in the Data Classifier module and the 
Certificate Manager module. The Data Classifier module will determine the application 
type of the out-going data packets, for instance, the beacons and other data packets. The 
Certificate Manager module will allow the node to explicitly select which pseudonym to 
be used at any time. However, the Certificate Manager will ensure that the certificate for 
beacons should not be changed with a frequency higher than a preset threshold, which 
can be configured by the VANET Authority to prevent Sybil attacks. In this way, both 
requirements from the general applications and beaconing can be supported by the TPD. 
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Figure 7.9 A preliminary functional interface of TPD in VANETs 
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An extensible TPD design for various applications: Besides certificate management, 
many applications, for instance, reputation management and event data recording, may 
also rely on a TPD to protect the specific algorithms. However, such schemes are 
application-specific and may require the TPD to protect different algorithms in various 
application scenarios. For instance, when a TPD is used to protect the reputation update 
of each node, many reputation update algorithms with different parameters may need to 
be implemented to support the aggregation of the reputation for different applications. 
Thus, for these security schemes relying on application-specific algorithms, multiple 
TPDs may be needed for different scenarios. However, it will not be cost-effective to 
replace the current TPD or to add a new TPD for any new application scenario.  
Thus, it is meaningful to design an extensible TPD which can be cost-effectively 
updated for various application scenarios. On preliminary considerations, one possible 
approach could be to design a set of cryptographic primitives around a given hardware 
TPD to form an overall extensible TPD module. The wrapping cryptographic primitives 
will be implemented in software, which will be continuously audited by the hardware 
TPD to ensure that these primitives are not tampered with. Whenever a new application 
scenario is to be supported, the VANET Authority will instruct the TPD to register the 
authentication code of a new software module or update the authentication code of an 
existing software module.  
The cost-benefit analysis of TPD: The application of a TPD will incur a certain cost to 
the vehicular node. Thus, it is necessary to perform a thorough cost-benefit analysis of 
the existing trust computing technologies [232] and identify the most cost-effective one 
for VANETs. With the cost of TPD determined as such, the newly proposed schemes will 
only make reasonable assumptions regarding the application of TPD to VANETs.  
By investigating the above open issues, the usage of TPD in VANETs will become 
economically feasible. Besides, a set of critical requirements of TPD can be identified by 
the researchers in VANETs, which may serve as valuable inputs to the trust computing 
community for designing new TPD platforms. On the other hand, the VANET 
researchers will be encouraged to make reasonable assumptions of TPD in designing new 
applications and security schemes.  
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7.2.5 Ad Hoc RSU (adRSU) Design 
In both GPAS [148], [149] and VehicleView [151], [152], ad hoc RSUs (adRSUs) are 
proposed as additional access points to such applications. An adRSU is a lightweight 
reprogrammable device which can be temporarily deployed to serve as an RSU. 
Especially in the initial stage of VANET deployment, adRSUs may be a valuable 
addition to the sparsely deployed RSUs to better support VANET applications.  
Thus, it is meaningful to propose a secure and cost-effective design for adRSUs. 
Besides better supporting VANET applications, such a design of adRSUs will provide a 
reference to the design of RSUs. To this end, the following issues need to be addressed.  
Requirement analysis: Besides GPAS and VehicleView, other value-added 
applications and traffic management applications may also benefit from adRSUs. For 
instance, an adRSU can be deployed at a road intersection to collect the real-time traffic 
volume data with V2R communications. Thus, it is necessary to identify the specific 
requirements of such applications, as necessary inputs to the design of adRSUs. 
System design: Due to its nature and targeted applications, the adRSU must be secure, 
extensible and lightweight by design. An exemplary high-level adRSU design is shown in 
Figure 7.10. This adRSU supports two communication technologies, namely DSRC and 
cellular. The adRSU can communicate with vehicular nodes via DSRC, and it can 
communicate with the infrastructure entities via the cellular technology, for instance, 3G 
or 4G. The Communication Adaption Layer (CAL) provides efficient and reliable data 
transfer services to the upper layers by shielding the details of the communication 
technologies. CAL may schedule the data transfer activities of both DSRC and cellular 
interfaces to reduce the power consumption and bandwidth requirements of the adRSU.  
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Figure 7.10 A feasible system design for an ad hoc RSU in VANETs 
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The System Management Layer (SML) maintains the security policies and security 
credentials of this adRSU. For instance, it may store the authorization from the VANET 
authority, with which to securely communicate with vehicular nodes. SML may 
continuously monitor the state of this adRSU, including its location, supported 
applications and so on, to detect any tampering and intrusion.  
Above all, the Application Layer (AL) supports various value-added applications and 
traffic management applications. AL will be implemented as an open framework where 
applications can be flexibly added, deleted, activated or deactivated in runtime.  
The above preliminary considerations serve as a starting point for the concrete design 
of adRSUs. More factors need to be considered in reality, especially with inputs from the 
requirement analysis. For instance, should solar panel, battery or power line be used to 
power the adRSU? If the power line is available in most road intersections, is it possible 
to use power line communication as the interface between the adRSU and the 
infrastructure of VANETs? All these questions need to be answered in the future.  
Business model: The cost and benefit of adRSUs in VANETs need to be analyzed to 
determine the proper business model of adRSUs. It will be meaningful to determine how 
adRSUs will be deployed and maintained in VANETs, by the individual service 
providers or by the VANET Authority. To answer this question, the cost and benefit of 
adRSUs for each application, as well as the frequency of adRSU usage of each 
application, needs to be estimated.   
The design of adRSUs will be relevant to the car manufacturers (e.g., GM, Ford and 
Chrysler), the network device manufacturers and the government transportation agencies 
(e.g., RITA [19] and NHTSA [233]). Especially, the design of adRSUs may incite and 
help the design of RSUs in VANETs. Thus, the design of adRSU needs to be performed 
with the cooperation from the above parties.  
7.2.6 Data (Information) Management 
In VANETs, each vehicular node is equipped with numerous sensors which can 
generate data about its environment. Besides, numerous applications in VANETs also 
provide each node with bountiful information. Thus, the numerous data (information) 
overwhelming each node call for the proper data (information) management in VANETs. 
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The design goals of data management in VANETs are two-fold: 1) to enable each node to 
timely and precisely present new knowledge of its environment to the drivers, probably 
through data mining, message aggregation, and knowledge representation; 2) to allow 
each node to efficiently and timely disseminate data to help other nodes in 1). Currently, 
research on data management in VANETs is still in its initial stage, as evidenced by the 
numerous call-for-papers posted each year.  
To our best understanding, the data management in each vehicular node consists of a 
context model, a message aggregator, a knowledge presenter and a message disseminator, 
as shown in Figure 7.11. Here, the context model represents the context of this vehicle 
based on the sensor data generated by the on-board sensors and the received messages 
from its neighbors. The message aggregator evaluates the received messages based on the 
current context model, and aggregates them into a consistent input to the context model. 
The knowledge presenter will display the new knowledge to the user (driver or passenger) 
based on the current context of this node and the preferences of the user. The message 
disseminator will generate and send out messages to share knowledge with its neighbors.  
Context Model: The context of a vehicular node may consist of its current driving state, 
its current geographic location, its environment and potentially the intentions of its driver. 
A comprehensive context model is critical for each node to perform context-aware 
actions. For instance, if a node is nearby a highway exit and it decelerates obviously, the 
context model may identify the driver’s intention to take the exit and request the 
knowledge presenter to display the points of interests in the area this exit leads to.  
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Figure 7.11 Critical components of data management in each vehicle 
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Figure 7.12 RSU-assisted high-level context update 
The context model should consist of several sub-models for various applications and 
knowledge. Each sub-model may rely on data clustering, expert system, Bayesian 
networks or Markov chain to represent the knowledge of different types. The context 
model should also be able to figure out the typical actions (intentions) of the driver with 
pattern recognition techniques.  
Besides, to enable each node to timely learn of the high-level knowledge of its 
neighborhood, an RSU-assisted high-level context update approach may be adopted in 
VANETs. As shown in Figure 7.12, each RSU will collect data reports from the passing-
by nodes and form a high-level context about the concerned region. In areas without any 
RSU, the vehicles in a parking lot or a road intersection may cooperate to work as a hot 
spot for message aggregation [234]. This high-level context may contain the long-term 
statistics about the facilities within this region, which may not be accumulated by the 
passing-by vehicles. The RSU may periodically broadcast the high-level context to the 
nearby nodes, so that each node may complete its own context model with the received 
high-level context information. In this process, the collection of data reports, the format 
of the high-level context, and the dissemination of the high-level context all need to be 
further investigated.  
Knowledge Presenter: The knowledge presenter needs to allow the user to configure 
his/her preference of the knowledge to be displayed. Besides, the information presented 
should not intrude on the user’s attention or actions in driving. To design a proper 
knowledge presenter, the principles of user interface (UI) design may be considered.  
Message Aggregator: The message aggregator may take as inputs not only the 
received messages but also the knowledge from the context model. Thus, a 
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comprehensive model is needed here to evaluate the trust of the received message against 
the context model, based on the message content, the physical model of VANETs, and 
potentially the trust of the data sources. Afterwards, the aggregated message could be 
used to update the context model. To this end, new metrics of knowledge quality and 
reliability may be proposed to guide the update of the context model.   
Message Disseminator: The message disseminator needs to make intelligent and 
context-aware decision on when and what to disseminate. For instance, if one neighbor 
has already disseminated a message regarding an event, this node may not need to 
disseminate its own message regarding the same event to avoid duplicate messages.  
However, it is also critical to ensure the nodes in the zone-of-relevance (ZoR) of the 
concerned event will receive the message. To this end, a context-aware mobility-assisted 
message dissemination algorithm is proposed.  
In this algorithm, the context-aware property lies in the message aggregation and 
separation actions of each node. Suppose one node A receives one message Msg1 
regarding event 1 and one message Msg2 regarding event 2. Further suppose A is in the 
ZoR of both event 1 and event 2. Then, to be efficient, A may aggregate Msg1 and Msg2 
into a single message Msg3 regarding both events. On the other hand, if another node B 
on the boundary of ZoR of event 1 receives Msg3, it may choose to separate Msg2 from 
Msg3 and only disseminate Msg2. Thus, by message aggregation and separation as 
required by the context, this algorithm can ensure efficient message dissemination. 
However, special security measures may be necessary to ensure trustworthy message 
aggregation and separation in this process.  
To ensure that the message (Msg1) will cover the whole ZoR for all the valid duration 
TV of the concerned event, each node with Msg1 may decide when to disseminate Msg1 
based on the actions of its neighbors as well as the node mobility in the ZoR. Suppose 
that the node average speed in the ZoR is v, and node A has a distance d from the 
boundary of the ZoR. Let ?t indicate the lapsed time since A disseminates Msg1 or 
overhears Msg1 from its neighbors for the last time. Then, A will disseminate Msg1 when 
?t?v ? d. That is, one node may have already approached A from outside the ZoR since 
the last dissemination of Msg1. If all nodes in the ZoR follow this approach, the message 
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dissemination in ZoR will be minimized while still ensuring that all nodes entering the 
ZoR will receive Msg1 in time.  
7.2.7 Interactions with Emerging Technologies 
To further exploit the application potentials of VANETs, it may be helpful to 
investigate VANETs in the context of several emerging technologies, such as cloud 
computing [235] and cyber-physical systems (CPS) [236]. New concepts in such 
technologies could help identify new features and potentials of VANETs, while the 
unique characteristics of VANETs may find their place in these new technologies.  
7.2.7.1 VANETs and Cloud Computing  
It will be rewarding to introduce the concept of cloud computing to VANETs. For 
instance, by implementing the infrastructure of VANETs with clouds, the cost of VANET 
deployment may be greatly reduced. Besides, as discussed in [237], in emergency 
scenarios, a public safety vehicle could use its neighbors in VANETs as its cloud, to 
perform certain computation extensive functions. Interesting research issues will arise in 
the interactions between VANETs and cloud, as discussed below.  
Implementing the VANET infrastructure with a cloud (or clouds): Due to the 
popularity of cloud computing, in the future the infrastructure of VANETs may be 
implemented with a cloud or several clouds, as show in Figure 7.13. In this case, each 
RSU will serve as a gateway to several clouds, which may imply severe constraints on 
the design of the RSUs. Thus, it is meaningful to model and investigate the impact of 
clouds on the RSUs and the vehicular nodes. A novel design will be desirable to shield 
the implementation details of VANET infrastructure from the RSUs and the vehicular 
nodes. On the other hand, the critical security requirements of VANETs will also impact 
the design of the clouds in the VANET infrastructure.  
Besides, to enable each vehicular node to access the services provided by the 
infrastructure clouds, it is necessary to enable each node to discover the nearest (or best) 
gateway and maintain a reliable communication connection with it. To this end, [238] 
proposes a gateway discovery protocol for each vehicular node to find the nearest 
gateway (RSU) in VANET cloud. However, in [238] the mobility of vehicular nodes or 
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the location information of the gateways is not considered. Indeed, a soft hand-over 
mechanism, similar to that in cellular communications, between two gateways may be 
proposed based on the mobility of each node as shown in Figure 7.13, so that each node 
may maintain an unbroken connection with the cloud. In this process, the potential 
network partitions in VANETs should be considered, and reliable multi-hop 
communications must be supported.  
Implementing make-shift clouds with vehicular nodes: In emergency scenarios, the 
access to the VANET infrastructure may be lost. In this case, a public safety vehicle may 
benefit from a make-shift cloud formed by its nearby nodes. Similarly, in a parking lot 
the vehicular nodes may form a make-shift cloud by sparing their computation 
capabilities, which may be exploited by the vehicle in demand of high computation 
capabilities. Thus, in VANETs it is both necessary and feasible to allow the nearby nodes 
to form clouds providing valuable services. To this end, it is critical to identify the 
services or tasks which can be divided into smaller subtasks for each individual node. 
The security and trust issues must be resolved to ensure that each node will honestly 
perform its subtasks. Besides, the geographic boundary of such a cloud must be properly 
determined, in order to minimize the impact of the node mobility on the overall 
performance of the cloud. Eventually, a pricing and payment algorithm is necessary to 
reward the vehicles participating in the cloud according to their share of computation.  
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Figure 7.13 VANET infrastructure with clouds 
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7.2.7.2 VANETs and Cyber-Physical Systems 
According to one program solicitation of the National Science Foundation (NSF), the 
term cyber-physical systems (CPS) [236] “refers to the tight conjoining of and 
coordination between computational and physical resources”. Thus, with the close 
relation among the physical environment, the on-board sensors, the on-board computation 
unit, and the human driver, VANETs are a typical cyber-physical system. Thus, it will be 
beneficial to both the VANET research and the CPS research by investigating VANETs 
in the perspective of CPS. Specifically, the following directions may be followed.  
To model and evaluate the coupling of computational and physical resources in 
VANETs: In VANETs, computational resources available to each node, such as network 
bandwidth and services, depend on the physical environment of this node. Specifically, 
network bandwidth available to one node depends on node density and node mobility of 
its neighborhood, as well as the network bandwidth requirements of its neighbors. The 
availability of services, especially the location-based services, obviously depends on the 
geographic location of this node, and the node density of its neighborhood. By modeling 
and evaluating the close coupling of the computational and physical resources, better 
estimation of one resource may be performed indirectly by estimating another type of 
resource which is easier to be estimated. In this way, adaptive service provisioning may 
become feasible based on the current available network resources or physical resources.   
To consider the human factor in VANET research: So far, the focus of VANET 
research is usually on the computation part of vehicular nodes, and the human factor is 
usually omitted. However, the human driver (passenger) is the central entity in any 
decision-making or monitoring directly related to the physical world. Currently, 
researchers begin to investigate data fusion [236] and service scheduling [239] with 
considerations on the human factor. Besides, a specification logic for vehicular cyber-
physical systems is also proposed in [240]. More serious research efforts should be put 
into this direction. For instance, Human-Machine Interface (HMI) design for on-board 
units should ensure effective information display to the human drivers (passengers), 
without causing distractions. Another potential research thrust may be to evaluate the 
feasibility of VANET applications based on their demands on human interactions.    
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To model and evaluate the impacts of VANETs on traffic safety and traffic 
management: So far, numerous traffic safety applications and traffic management 
applications have been proposed for VANETs. It will be meaningful to investigate the 
impacts of the cyber world on the physical world in VANETs, for instance, the impacts 
of security provisioning on traffic safety. In this process, the human decision making 
process needs to be modeled, in order to estimate the human reactions to various events 
reported by the on-board units. New theoretical tools and simulation tools may need to be 
designed to this end, which will serve to evaluate the effects of the proposed VANET 
applications and guide the future application implementation.  
7.2.8 Applying VANETs to Traffic Engineering  
As discussed throughout this dissertation, V2V and V2R communications in VANETs 
provide a cost-effective approach to collect real-time traffic data and to disseminate 
traffic control commands. Thus, it is meaningful to upgrade existing traffic engineering 
applications or design new ones based on VANETs. Specifically, the following traffic 
engineering applications may benefit from VANETs.  
Traffic-adaptive green waves: In traffic engineering, a green wave refers to the 
coordinated control of consequential traffic lights in such a way that any vehicle with a 
normal speed will always run into green lights. Traditionally, the green waves are formed 
based on the traffic statistics accumulated over a long period, say 1 hour, so the green 
waves cannot adapt to the real-time traffic conditions in a timely manner. With VANETs, 
real-time traffic volumes and speeds in each direction of each road intersection can be 
obtained, which can be used to construct traffic-adaptive green waves in the 
neighborhood. Not only the green waves can be reconfigured with a higher frequency 
according to the traffic conditions, but also a green wave can be configured over a more 
complicated route than a long road segment, as shown in Figure 7.14.  
In this process, the emerging dominant traffic flows within the neighborhood needs to 
be identified based on the real-time data statistics, which need to be collected with 
reliable V2V and V2R communications. Besides, various green waves need to be 
coordinated to achieve the best over-all traffic throughput in the concerned region. To 
tackle these issues, expertise from both VANETs and traffic engineering are needed.  
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Green waves
 
Figure 7.14 Exemplary green waves in a region 
Localized traffic light control based on VANETs: As discussed in [13], [14], the 
localized traffic light control based on the traffic condition of each road intersection alone 
may be as effective as the traffic control based on global traffic information. With 
VANETs, it will be easy to implement the localized traffic light control algorithms based 
on the traffic conditions collected via V2R communications. The realistic performance of 
[13], [14] can be evaluated and compared to the traditional traffic control algorithms. 
Depending on the outcome of the realistic experiments, a totally new traffic control 
strategy may become applicable in traffic engineering. In general, this issue can be 
considered together with the research issues discussed in subsection 7.2.7.2.   
Privacy and security-aware travel route selection: As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
presence of an RSU indicates an opportunity for any vehicular node to further enhance its 
privacy and security. Thus, with the deployed RSUs in a region, it is meaningful to 
enable each node to select its travel route based on not only the traditional metrics, for 
instance travel time and travel distance, but also the privacy and security strength 
provided by each alternative route. To this end, the security and privacy strength of each 
RSU should be quantitatively measured. An approach to equivalently compare the 
security and privacy strength to the traditional travel metrics should also be designed. In 
the end, an efficient algorithm is needed to select the best travel route out of numerous 
alternative ones. On the other hand, the study on privacy and security-aware route 
selection may provide useful guidelines on the deployment of RSUs in VANETs. For 
instance, if the RSUs can be deployed on the road intersections crossed by the most 
frequented travel routes in this region, the privacy and security strength of each travel 
route will be more likely to correspond to the traditional travel costs.  
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Figure 7.15 The interaction probabilities among road segments 
Real-time traffic information dissemination: The real-time traffic information about 
one region needs to be timely disseminated to the vehicular nodes in this region, so that 
such nodes may make mobility decisions accordingly. However, it will be both redundant 
and unnecessary to disseminate the traffic information about any road segment to all the 
nodes within this region. As shown in Figure 7.15, the nodes in road segment A will be 
more interested in the traffic conditions of the road segments directly adjacent to A, 
namely, B, C, D, E, F and G. Comparatively, these nodes may only be interested in the 
less detailed traffic information on the road segment H, which is farther away from A.    
To capture the different relations among different road segments, we could define an 
interaction probability p for any two road segments X and Y. This probability p will 
indicate the probability that one vehicle on X will go to Y following the shortest path, 
which indirectly indicates the impact of the traffic information of Y on the nodes on X. 
For simplicity, in Figure 7.15 a uniform p1 indicates the interaction probability between 
two directly adjacent road segments, and a uniform p2 indicates the interaction 
probability between two road segments which are connected by another road segment.  
Once properly modeled and estimated, the interaction probability can be used to realize 
efficient traffic information dissemination and encoding in VANETs. Specifically, if the 
traffic information of each road segment will be independently disseminated, the 
dissemination probability of the traffic information can be reduced as the interaction 
probabilities decreases, forming a message gradient similar to that in VAAD [150]. In the 
case that the overall traffic information of all road segments will be encoded together and 
disseminated by the RSUs in this region, each RSU may encode the information 
differently based on its location regarding the road segments in this region. Following 
this line, more interesting results may be derived.    
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7.3 High-level Conclusions 
As previously discussed, the application potential to improve traffic safety alone is 
more than enough to justify the cost incurred by the research, development and 
deployment of VANETs [208]. Thus, both traffic management applications and value-
added applications can be regarded as free-riders of VANETs. Such applications can be 
more cost-effectively supported by VANETs with V2V and V2R communications. Thus, 
VANETs show great application and economic potentials.  
This dissertation aims to fill the gap between the theoretic research and the practical 
implementation of VANETs, pushing VANETs nearer to the stage of massive 
deployment. Important security and privacy issues, each of which has great impacts on 
VANET applications, are identified and thoroughly addressed with novel schemes. 
Additionally, the value-added applications proposed for VANETs further enhance the 
application potentials of VANETs, making the future massive deployment of VANETs 
even more appealing. Thus, this dissertation makes the future implementation of 
VANETs feasible by supporting a baseline VANET model as discussed in section 7.1.7.  
Besides, this dissertation also serves as a solid foundation for the future research and 
development of VANETs. The important open research and development topics 
discussed in section 7.2 indicate the promising research thrusts for VANETs. The initial 
considerations on these open issues will incite more novel and concrete solutions in the 
future research and development efforts.   
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